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I 
AilS TRACT 
This thesis examines the American and English evidential rules relating 
to the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search or improperly by 
the police. It attempts to discover the theoretical bases of the different 
rules in these jurisdictions. The police powers of search are first examined 
and then the thesis critically discusses the reasons for and the purpose of the 
English courts'~ general discretion to exclude relevant evidence; the aim is to 
determine whether this dti~cretion has the same purpose and function in the 
various areas of the law of evidence. 
In my conclusion the real rationale of the American exclusionary rules is 
the protection of certain fundamental values - the policy and value postulates 
peculiar to a politically free and democratic society. In using these as focal 
points the Supreme Court has attributed a dynamic function to the rules of 
evidence in the area of constitutional law; contrary to the English view the 
purpose of the evidential rules is not solely to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the accused. 
The written constitution, though not~ explanation for the strict 
exclusionary rules, does provide certain important concepts which the Supreme 
Court has used to justify the bolder approach to supporting the constitutional 
rights with the rules of evidence. The origin of the American rules is the 
Court's supervisory jurisdiction over criminal trials. 
The English rule, on the other hand, is the result of the self-imposed 
restrictive role of the courts, though there are understandable reasons for this. 
II 
For England the inclusionary rule IDBlf be inevitable, but it has three serious 
defects. First, it has been arrived at by accident; it lacks theoretical 
justification and is inconsistent with the confession rule. Secondly, 
judicial statements as to the Courts'discretion to exclude such evidence are 
linguistically almost meaningless. Lastly, there appears to be a lack of 
appreciation that in the area of constitutionally defined rights rules of 
evidence can have as much importance as substantive rights. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POWERS OF SEARCH 
The essential distinction between the police powers to search in 
England and the United States of America lies in the fact that the 
federal Constitution defines them in broad and general terms and, therefore, 
any judicial extension or restriction of these powers is done within the 
context of a written constitution. This is not so in England, although 
even here the fundamental "freedoms of person and house" are legally 
considered to be a part of the constitutional law: in both countries these 
fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by the constitution, although in 
England they can, like any other law, be altered or restricted by a simple 
statute passed by Parliament (1). Moreover, in the United States this 
branch of the constitutional law has recently undergone dramatic change, 
a change generated by the issue of admissibility of the evidence obtained 
when the powers to search the premises, or an arrested person, have been 
exceeded or the law on it has been disregarded by the police: leaving aside 
his remedies at civil and criminal law the aggrieved person - often accused 
of a serious crime - has successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to provide 
a further remedy through the rules of evidence and the police have been 
precluded from adducing evidence of any relevant facts discovered by them 
after, and as a consequence of, excessive execution of their constitutionally 
defined powers of search. 
In England the case law has primarily dealt with the question of civil 
liability of the police in actions for trespass when the constitutional 
powers have been exceeded; the judgments impliedlYaccept admissibility of the 
" 
evidence obtained as a result of such trespassory conduct (2). On rare 
occasions the issue of admissibility of such evidence has been raised, though 
then the courts have failed to undertake a serious analysis of the long term 
implications, legal and social, of the admissibility rule; judicially a 
narrow view has been taken as to the function of the rules of evidence in 
this area and other policy considerations have been left out. The dearth 
of judicial authority on the question of admissibility of evidence obtained 
by illegal search or arrest may be due to four facts. Firstly, it may be 
that the police training and the internal discipline of the police 
organization, and the peculiarly law-abiding nature of the British society, 
mean that there are fewer instances when the police decide to exceed their 
powers. 
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Secondly, it is possible that there is not an inconsiderable disregard 
by them of the law defining the limits of their powers but that the defence 
at the trial do not raise the issue of admissibility (3). Thirdly, lack of 
a basic and formal constitutional document may be preventing a focusing 
of judicial attention and discussion on the police powers. Lastly, the 
practice of 'plea bargaining' could be a contributory factor in hiding 
from the public and academic scrutiny the pattern of police behaviour in 
this area. All these speculative propositions may form fruitful hypotheses 
for an empirical research. However, examination of their validity is not 
a part of this thesis. 
I 
In a free society interferenceswith individual freedoms are permitted 
under the most necessitous circumstances - circumstances which in countries 
with written constitutions are stated in broad and general terms against 
which individual situations are judicially assessed. In England lack of 
a written constitution has me~t that the search powers of the police have 
been enacted piecemeal by Parliament (4) and sometimes created by the 
judiciary; the latter have, however, shyed away from any attempt to state 
boldly broad terms defining the police powers of search. There are numerous 
statutes and local enactments conferring powers of search, but apart from 
reference to these it would be impossible to determine these powers in 
advance, either by a lawyer or by a policeman who, unlike the former, 
has to make a 'spot decision' when a serious offence has taken place. Thus, 
searching of premises for a murder weapon or for the body of a murder victim can 
only be done by a search warrant duly issued by a judicial authority (5). 
The need to search is prompted by the need to obtain evidence to secure 
conviction or, where search is of a person arrested, to ensure the safety 
of the police from the weapons that might be on the arrested person's body. 
English common law is reputed to have shown great readiness to preserve the 
privacy of an individual's home and has adhered to the principle that 
"every man 1 s house is his castle" ( 6) ; not even the King or his ministers 
have been exempt from this fundamental principle safeguarding individual 
liberty and the right to be left alone (7). The only authority for carrying 
out a search of the premises has, at common law, been a valid search warrant. 
A search warrant could only be valid either because it was authorised by a 
statute or by common law. Common law made only one exception to the general 
principle of inviolability of one's premises; 
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i.e. magistrates could issue a search warrant for stolen goods, reasonably 
believed to be in possession of the person named (8). As regards the search 
of a person, at common law if there was a reasonable cause to believe that 
he had possession of stolen goods, or that he had committed a felony and 
evidence of that offence could be obtained from his person, there was a 
power to arrest him and also to search his person (9). Moreover, as 
EntioM v Carrington (10) clearly established, a warrant issued by an 
authority, other than a judicial one, was totally void (11). 
The procedure, where search for stolen property is intended to be 
carried out, is now governed by Section 26 of the Theft Act 1968. Although 
this provision deals with procedure, it hardly needs saying that the fruits 
of the search will be admissible as evidence at the trial (12). Similarly 
there are a great number of statutes authorising, with and without warrant, 
seizure of articles and documents of evidential value either on the person 
or on the premises. Indeed, many of these statutory provisions conferring 
power of search on the police use the word 'evidence'. Thus Section 6 of 
the Dangerous Drugs Act 1967 starts with a paragraph headed: 'Further powers 
to search and to obtain evidence'. Again Section II Coinage Offences Act 1936 
states that counterfeit coins or counterfeiting instrument is to be seized 
"for the purpose of being produced in evidence" (13). 
The power to search a lawfully arrested person also derives from 
common law, and, contrary to general belief, does not avail in all 
circumstances (14). In Leigh v Cole (15) where the defendant had been 
arrested for being drunk and disorderly, counsel argued that although a 
constable was entitled to do everything reasonable to ensure the safe custody 
of the arrested person, he was not entitled to search every person he took 
into custody. Williams, J. said: "With respect to searching a prisoner there 
is no doubt that a man when in custody may so conduct himself, by reason of 
violence of language or conduct, that a police officer may reasonably think 
it prudent and right to search him, in order to ascertain whether he has any 
weapon with which he might do mischief to the person or commit a breach of 
the peace". Thus, an arrested person can be searched depending on the 
circumstances and provided there is a "reasonable" belief. In Dillon v O'Brien 
(16) while executing a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff, for conspiracy, 
at his home the defendants confiscated the banknotes and other property 
"for the purpose of producing the same as evidence in prosectution of the 
plaintiff and others" for conspiracy. No violence or assault was committed 
in securing the evidential material. 
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Plaintiff sued for damages for wrongful seizure and detention of certain 
papers and money. Pallas, C.B. pointed out that if no such right existed, 
then upon the lawful arrest of a murderer "caught in the act" the weapon 
with which the crime had been committed had which was in his hand, could not 
lawfully be detained for the purpose of evidence. This hypothetical situation 
is not much help in supporting the rule, if any, that a lawfully arrested 
person can be searched for, as we have seen, the ratio of Leigh v Cole would 
meet such a case. However, it is clear from the report that the plaintiff 
was arrested whilst in the act of conspiracy, and Pallas, c. B. felt that 
authority existed for search of a lawfully arrested person (17). He said: 
"I, therefore, think that it clear, and beyond doubt, that, at least in 
cases of treason and felony, constables (and probably also private persons) 
are entitled, upon a lawful arrest by them of one charged with treason or 
felony, to take and detain property found in his possession which will form 
material evidence in his prosecution for the crime •••••• The interest of the 
State in the person charged being brought to trial in due course necessarily 
extends to the preservation of material evidence of his guilt or innocence. 
•••••• His custody is of no value if the law is powerless to prevent the 
abstraction or destruction of the evidence, without which a trial would be 
no more than an empty fol.'lll 11 • 
Dillon v O'Brien clearly makes a slight extension of the power to search 
a lawfully arrested person as stated in Leigh v Cole, for it suggests that 
search can be carried out not only within the narrowly defined circumstances 
referred to in Leigh v Cole but in all circumstances where the arrest is for 
a felony. It is, however, submitted that Palles, c. B.'s dictum should be 
restricted to the facts of the case and the decision should be limited to 
the principle that the police are entitled to take and detain property of 
evidential value if, on arrest, it is found within sight of the arresting 
officers. The arrested person can be searched, but only for the purpose of 
satisfying a reasonable belief that material evidence of THAT crime is likely 
to be found. Thus, in the case of an arrested person the right to search 
him exists where the type of offence leading to the arrest suggests that he 
has a weapon which he might use to cause danger either to himself or to the 
constable. However, it may be that Dillon v O'Brien might be taken as a 
definite authority for police power to search an arrested person for any 
material evidence of the crime for which he is arrested (18). 
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Assuming that entry into the premises was lawful and search t&ces place 
as an incident to a lawful arrest of tbe occupier, (19) it is further 
submitted that the ward "possession" in the dictum should also be 
narrowly construed. To argue that evidence lying somewhere in the other 
parts of the premises, wherever the arrest takes place, is theoretically 
in his possession and therefore can be seized would be a serious extension 
of police powers and contrary to the common law principles. Moreover, 
such an extension of power would logically mean that the police could 
search the premises after a lawful entry even though the arrest had taken 
place outside the premises. 
It seems that the extension in Dillon v O'Brien was made without 
consideration of Bessel v Wilson (20) which was neither cited nor referred 
to in the judsment. In Bessel v Wilson Lord Campbell, c. J. had said: 
"It is often the duty of an officer to search a prisoner. If, for instance, 
a man is taken in the commission of a felony, he ~ be searched to see 
whether the stolen articles are in his possession or whether he has any 
instrument of violence about him; and, in like manner, if he be taken on a 
charge of arson he may be searched to see whether he has any fire boxes or 
matches about his person" (21). 
It is clear from this that his lordship is referring to the power to 
search only to find evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made. The 
plaintiff has been arrested under a warrant, after he had failed to appear 
in person to answer a summons, and had been searched. The Chief Justice, 
expressing his disapprobation of the action, said: "•••• there is no right 
in a oase of this kind to inflict the indignity to which the plaintiff had 
been subjected". And as to the power ta.-search to see whether the arrested 
person had any weapon of violence, his Lordship made clear that this would 
depend on the precise circumstances of the arrest; the court felt the 
suggestion that such circumstances existed was absurd, for there was no ground 
for such a belief. This approach is in line with that taken in Leigh v Cole 
where the court said that "even when a man is being confined for being drunk 
and disorderly, it is not correct to say that he must admit to the degradation 
of being searched, as the searching of such a person must depend upon all the 
circumstances of the case" (22). 
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The authorities exmmined so far, including Dillon v O'Brien, are clear 
that search of a lawfully arrested person must be confined to seeking evidence 
of "that offence" and not of "an offence", and provided the police have a 
reasonable belief' that such evidence is possessed by the arrested person. 
Thus, the crucial determinant in the decision to search is the surrounding 
circumstances, and not the crime itself. Moreover, the authorities are also 
clear that these powers of' search exist only when the arrest itself' is lawful. 
However, in practice it is doubtful whether this rule is observed. The Royal 
Commission on Police Powers and Procedure (23), after referring to the absence 
of such a power, said that it has long been the practice to search persons 
who are taken into custody for a serious offence, and that this was a necessary 
and obvious precaution "not merely to obtain possible evidence bearing on the 
charge but to deprive the arrested person of' any means of' injuring himself' 
or others whilst he is in custody". 
"Reasonableness" as a criterion for searching is frequently adopted in 
modern statutory powers to search. For example Section 14 of' the Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1965, after providing for the circumstances in which a warrant to 
search can be issued, goes on to say that the constable may 'enter , if need 
be by force, the premises named in the warrant and to search the premises and 
any person found therein, if there is a reasonable ground for suspecting that 
an offence against this Act has been committed". This Act also confers power 
on a constable to arrest without warrant a person who has committed or is 
reasonably suspected of' having committed or attempted to commit an offence 
against the Act, if that person is likely to abscond {24). In this case the 
common law powers of searching the arrested person would probably apply. 
Again, Section 6 of' the Dangerous Drugs Act 1967 after conferring the power 
to search any person, or vehicle, reasonably suspected of' passing drugs, 
expressly provides that the constable may "seize and detain •••• anything 
found in the course of' the search which appears to the constable to be evidence 
of' an offence against either of' these Acts". Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that the constable cannot detain anything that could be of possible evidential 
value on a prosecution of an offence other than under these Acts. This further 
lends strength to the argument that the common law powers of' search must be 
confined to seizure of' evidence of' the crime for which the arrest is made; if 
it were not so, then the statutory limitations do not make sense (25), 
especially when the offence is an arrestable one. 
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Restriction of the seizure of evidential material to the offences under 
these Acts seems unnecessary if there exists at common law a power to search 
every arrested person and seize articles or documents for the purpose of 
using as evidence at the trial of the person searched (26). Furthermore, 
as an obvious corollary of this, if a constable armed with a search warrant 
fails to confine the search and seizure within the limits stated by the 
statutory power and confiscates property relating to another crime, the 
latter should be inadmissible - whether or not such property was taken as a 
result of a chance discovery or by a deliberate 'fishing' for it; if it were 
held admissible, it would be in disregard of the statutory restrictions. 
There is no authority on this point, but on the basis of the principle laid 
down in Kuruma v R. (27) evidence secured iri disregar4 of the statute would 
probably be admissible provided it is relevant. The question then arises 
whether, when a statute defines the powers of the constables, the deliberate 
restrictions are intended to ensure that the police should not exceed their 
powers and that if they do, the remedy lies in excluding such evidence; is it 
intended that the aggrieved party should be left to pursue his civil remedies, 
if any? However, whilst where a constable commits trespass he leaves himself 
open to an action in tort, it is difficult to see what·remedy there can be for 
evidence obtained in disregard of statutory restrictions. Indeed, even when 
excessive exercise of the powers takes place, at common law damages for 
trespass may be nominal unless the conduct can be described as oppressive (28). 
II 
Every aot of a constable in searching for evidence in an individual's 
premises or on his person involves a reduction in the extent of the latter's 
rights and freedom, and whilst certain actions on the part of the police may 
be established practices they do not thereby become lawful (30); to underpin 
them by retrospective court decisions confirming their legality, without even 
considering the overall effect of such decisions on the political structure 
of society or on the need in a free society to police the police is to place 
undue emphasis on and misunderstand, the notion of "Law and Order". 
In Elias v Passmore (31) H. was arrested under the authority of a warrant 
at the premises of the National Unemployed Workers•· Movement of which H. was 
an official. 
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The warrant was issued for an offence, under Section 3 Police Act 1919, of 
attempting to incite disaffection among the police. H. was duly convicted. 
HO\Y'ever, although no search warrant had been issued, the police, at the time 
of the arrest, seized a number of books and documents which were found on the 
premises. None of these property could have been, nor was, used as evidence 
at the trial of H. Some of the documents did not belong to H. and, most 
important of all, nor could they said to be in possession or control of H. 
One of the documents was eventually used at the trial of one J.E. who was 
also an official of N.U.W.M. Most of the documents were returned by the 
police; others were detained in connection with the prosecution of J.E. 
"and any other proceedings of an analogous character which may be instituted". 
The action was brought for (a) damages for trespass to the premises and the 
goods (32) and (b) delivery of the documents still retained and damages for 
the detention. Significantly, the defendants relied on "interest of the State" 
to justify what would otherwise be an illegal act. The important point to note 
for our purposes is the fact that when executing a legally valid warrant of 
arrest on a properly formulated charge the police had searched the premises 
and seized articles whichthey - perhaps reasonably - believed would be relevant 
evidence for the prosecution not only of the person arrested but of someone 
else. Secondly, these documents had been seized not from the arrested person's 
person but from the premises where he was arrested - the premises of which he 
could not be called an occupier (33). The case has been treated by writers 
as authority for a proposition that such a power of seizing exists (34); it, 
therefore, needs to be analysed. The case is not a direct authority on the 
question of admissibility of evidence thus seized, but if it can be shown that 
the police had no such power, then the question of admissibility becomes 
significant. 
There is no indication in the report as to whether the defence at the 
trial of J.E. raised any objection to admissibility of the evidence. In the 
immediate action the defendants denied liability and argued that they had 
entered for lawful purposes and that the seizure of documents was lawful. 
Plaintiffs relied on Entick v Carrington (35) which declares "general warrant 
for arrest", or search of the premises of such an arrested person, illegal 
(36). Horridge, J. therefore, had to consider whether a right to search an 
arrested person existed and, secondly, whether the police action in seizing 
the documents was justified and supported by law, and, thirdly, if so, whether 
they were entitled to retain them. His Lordship came to the conclusion that 
the right 'to search on arrest' "seems to be clearly established by the footnote 
to Bessel v Wilson ••••• where Lord Campbell clearly lays down that this right 
exists". In the present case it was not a seizure of evidence from the body 
of the arrested person, ••••••• 
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and, moreover, the evidence had been seized from the premises not occupied 
by the arrested person. Neither of these aspects were dealt with by his 
Lordship. The jud81Dent relies upon Dillon v O'Brien (37) as laying down 
that constables are entitled, upon a lawful arrest of a person charged 
"to take and detain property found in his possession which will form 
material evidence on his prosecution of that crime", and that according 
to Pringle v Bremner and Stirling (38) "that would include property which 
would form material evidence on the prosecution of~ criminal charge". 
Elias v Passmore bristles with some unsatisfactory features. First, 
had the police applied for a search warrant it would not have been granted 
for there was no authority to issue one either at common law or under a 
statute (39). Thus the'!l.nterest of the state" to ensure that the person 
charged is brought to trial and relevant evidence, however obtained, is 
preserved was allowed to excuse an unlawful police act. Entiok v Carrington 
which rejects "interest of the state" as an argument for both the arbitrary 
arrests and search for evidence was briefly mentioned, ignored but not 
distinguished; what the police could not have achieved by a search warrant 
within the law became acceptable to the courts when achieved outside the law. 
Secondly, the court failed to discuss whether the property seized was 
legally in the "possession" of the plaintiff {40). The premises searched 
did not even belong to the Plaintiff. It has been seen that the power to 
search an arrested person exists only to secure evidence which the police 
reasonably believe would form material evidence in the trial of the arrested 
person for the crime for which the arrest was carried out (41); and although 
on arrest the police could not be expected to be squeamishly discriminating in 
deciding upon the materiality of every item of available evidence, it is 
difficult to justify search of the premises without a search warrant, and 
almost impossible to defend when such a search was the 'fish' for evidence. 
Worse still is the police conduct when the evidence seized is relevant to 
the prosecution of some person other than the one arrested. The court 
expressly stated that although the original seizure may have been unlawful, 
if the property is ultimately used in evidence, then ex post facto the 
seizure is justified. 
Thirdly, Pringle v Bremner, Dillon v O'Brien and Crozier v Cundy (42) 
were all cited as supporting the ruling. However, these oases provide legal 
excuses for police seizing other articles of evidence if they could reasonably 
be relevant to the purpose for which the search had been carried out. 
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In Pringle's case, where there was a warrant to search and other evidence 
was a chance discovery, Lord Chelmsford held that the defendant police 
although not justified would be excused (43). Crozier v Cundy permits seizure 
of other goods if they furnish proof "of the identity of the articles stolen 
and mentioned in the warrant". Admittedly, it would be an absurd rule which 
refused justification for seizure of evidence of crimes other than that for 
which the lawful search or an arrest was being made. However, that is quite 
different from santioning a deliberate police search of the premises without 
a search warrant (44); a chance discovery may provide justification for a 
seizure in the "public interest", but "interest of the state" is a dangerous 
notion to use for judicial development of police powers ofsearch: indeed 
the development of English constitutional law is in a way a rejection of 
executive powers based on it; the common law does not "permit police officers, 
or anyone els~ to ransack anyone's house or to search for papers or other 
articles therein, or to search his person simply to see if he may have 
committed some crime or other". (45) 
Three recent decisionshave weakened, if not overruled, Elias v Passmore. 
In R. v \.Jaterfield and Lynn (46) two police constables, on instructions from 
their superior, tried to prevent the removal of a car, which shortly before 
had been involved in a collision with a wall, for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence in relation to a prospective charge of dangerous driving. On being 
told by the constables that the car was to remain where it was until a police 
sergeant arrived, W. told the constables to move as they could not impound 
his oar. Neither L., the driver, nor w., the owner of the oar, had been 
charged or been arrested. On instructions from W., L. started the engine 
whereupon one of the constables went to the front of the car and signalled 
them to stop. Unable to reverse because of the other constable standing at 
the rear, L. drove at the constable in front, who jumped aside. On their 
appeal against convictions for assaulting a constable in the due execution of 
his duty and of procuring the assault, the Court of Appeal quashed the 
convictions. 
Reading the judgment of the court Ashworth, J. relied upon the view of 
Wright, J. in R v Lushington ex p. Otto (47) that the constables have the 
power to retain things which may be evidence of crime provided these come 
into their possession without wrong on their part. 
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Ashworth, J. held that since the appellants had been neither charged nor 
arrested, Dillon v O'Brien was not applicable. Secondly, 'execution of duty' 
does not include seizing evidence and preserving it for use in the court. The 
decision is not much help in resolving the difficulty seen in Elias v Passmore, 
i.e. whether it is lawful for a constable to seize and retain evidence from a 
lawfully arrested X but for use in a possible prosecution of z. or whether it 
is lawful to search the premises on arrest of X. However, the case makes clear 
that the power to search for and seize evidence is closely connected with the 
lawful arrest or search. 
In Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd., v Jones (48) the police, having a 
reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff company had certain items of clothing 
which had been stolen and would be material evidence on a criminal charge 
against the company, obtained a search warrant in respect of clothing 
manufactured by a particular manufacturer. No garments of the make and type 
they were looking for were found, but garments of other make, the like of which 
had been previously stolen, were seen. These showed that labels had been 
removed and bore prices much less than the trade prices. Be]eving that these 
had been stolen, the police seized them. The question before the court was 
whether they were justified in doing this and therefore had a defence to an 
action for trespass to goods. 
Lord Denning, M.R. pointed out that no broad principle existed and he 
decided to state one now: "A constable may arrest him (i.e. a person) and 
deprive him of his liberty, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that 
(an arrestable) offence has been committed and that he is the man. I see no 
reason why goods should be more sacred than persons. In my opinion, when a 
constable enters a house by virtue of a search warrant for stolen goods, he 
may seize not only the goods which he reasonably believes to be covered by the 
warrant, but also other goods which he believes on reasonably grounds to 
have been stolen and to be material evidence on a charge of stealing or 
receiving against the person in possession of them or anyone associated with 
him". It is difficult to quarrel with this statement, for if in the course 
of executing a search warrant other evidence, suggesting a commission of another 
offence of the type stated in the warrant, iS. discovered it would be 
unreasonable to expect a fresh warrant to be applied for. His Lordship then 
continued: "Even if it should turn out that the constable was mistaken and 
that the other goods were not stolen goods at all, nevertheless, so long as he 
acted reasonably and did not retain them longer than necessary, he is protected. 
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The lawfulness of his conduct must be judged at the time and not by what 
happens afterwards". (49). 
Thus, the holding limits the seizure of evidential material, not 
covered by the search warrant, to goods which are "material evidence on a 
charge of stealing or receiving". ~ implication,therefore, if the evidence 
discovered relates to a completely different type of offence, it cannot 
presumably be seized. Moreover, qualifying Elias v Passmore, the police can 
justify the seizure of the other goods only if at the time of seizure they 
had a reasonable belief that they were stolen or received by the person whose 
premises are searched or by someone else closely associated with him. In 
other words, seizure can be justified only if it can reasonably be said to 
relate to the offence for which the warrant was issued. Moreover, the 
justification must exist at the time and not, as Herridge, J. had maintained, 
found from the fact that the evidence was eventually used. Rightly so, for 
it is a pernicious doctrine which allows the police to disregard the rights 
of individual persons and search for evidence, select which is likely to be 
useful, and then excuse the whole process because evidence has been used at a 
trial. It is an essential feature of a free society that the powers and rights 
of the executive and the individuals ought to be defined in advance and not 
ex post facto. 
The Court of Appeal in Chic Fashions emphasised the need for the common 
law to evolve according to changing times. Thus Diplock, L.J. said: 11The 
Society in which we live is not static, nor is the common law, since it 
comprises rules which govern men's conduct in contemporary society on matters 
not expressly regulated by legislation. This is why in the question we have 
to answer I have stressed the word 'tod~' (50). The tone of the three 
judgments indicates willing.ness on the part of the judiciary to confer new 
powers on the police, powers which would involve erosion of the inviolability 
of a person or his property. However, statements suggesting such willinl!):ess 
are in the context of powers to seize property believed to be stolen or received. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the powers of seizing property 
for the purpose of evidence stated in this case relate to situations when 
arrest or search is made for stolen property. As to whether there is power 
to seize property, found during a legal search or arrest, which could be material 
evidence of a commission of crime by someone else, Diplock, L.J. decided not to 
consider the point. 
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Salmon, L.J. was, however, explicit. In his opinion "if a policeman finds 
property which he reasonably believes to be stolen in the possession of a 
person whom he has no reasonable grounds to believe is criminally implicated, 
the policeman has no common law right to seize the property" (51). 
If the power to seize evidential material is so restricted in cases 
where a search warrant is issued, there is no reason why it should be any 
wider when a person is arrested at his home. It is submitted that arrest 
and search of the person should be kept distinct from arrest at and search 
of home; in the latter case there is no known power to ransack the house 
to search for evidence. If the arrest on the premises is for handling stolen 
goods then search of the premises is provided by a statute, but otherwise 
there is no power to search the house. Common law is indeed not static but 
is a growing organism which continually adapts itself to meet the chaqtng 
needs of time. However, conferring of such powers must not be seen in the 
context only of fight against the crime but also within the perspective of 
constitutional rights of a citizen. However, a recent decision has further 
extended these powers (52). 
In the course of an investigating a suspected murder the police went 
to the house of the plaintiffs one of whome allowed them in. Some questions 
were asked about the disappearance of a person suspected as murdered. The 
house was searched. ~1e police asked for the passports of two of the 
plaintiffs and these were handed to them. These, together with some letters, 
were taken away. Later the third plaintiff's passport was asked for and 
taken away. All these documents were retained by the police who believed that 
some of them would be of actual or potential evidential value. The Court of 
Appeal held that1hey must be returned as it was not shown that they were 
material evidence ot prove the commission of the murder, nor had it been proved 
that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the plaintiffs were in 
&nY way implicated in a crime. Some essential aspects of this case must be 
noted. First, the police had no search warrant, nor could any have been granted 
either at common law or by statute (5~). So neither Crozier v Cundy nor 
Dillon v O'Brien would help in justifying the keeping of the documents for, 
as the Master of RoLls said, these were kept "without the consent of the 
plaintiffs" (54). Secondly, the documents were not taken incidental to an 
arrest. 
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The court took it as "settled law that the officers are entitled to 
take any goods which they find in his possession or in his house which they 
reasonably believe to be material evidence in relation to Dhe crime for which 
he is arrested or for which they enter. If in the course of their search 
they come on any other goods which show him to be implicated in some other 
crime, they may take them" (55). It is therefore clear that seizing of the 
evidence as an incident to a. lawful arrest or a lawful search is justifiable. 
Moreover, the principle is wider, or explicitly stated for the first time, 
for it allows the constable to seize goods which appear to implicate the 
accused in a crime other than for which the search is being carried out. 
However, it is submitted that there is no general power to search the premises 
if the entry was for the purpose of arrest; only if search is made pursuant 
to a search warrant that 'other goods' which show him to be implicated in some 
other crime may be seized (56). A chance fact that arrest takes place on the 
accused's or the plaintiff's premises cannot logically confer power to search 
the premises, for if the arrest had taken place on a street, search of his 
abode would be illegal. Moreover, the Court of Appeal. is here assuming that 
an arrested person can be searched in all circumstances; but·,~ as already 
seen, common law did not confer such a wide power. 
As regards the situations when police are acting without the authority 
of a search warrant, or when no arrest has been made, the Court of Appeal did 
not accept Elias v Passmore. "The decision itself can be justified on the 
ground that the papers showed that Elias was implicated in the crime of 
sedition committed by Hannington. If they had only implicated Elias in some 
other crime, such as blackmail or libel, I do not think the police officers 
would have been entitled to seize them. For that would be in flat contradiction 
of Entick v Carrington. The common law does not permit police officers, or 
anyone else, to ransack anyone's home, or to search for papers or articles therein, 
or to search his person simply to see if he may have committed some crime or 
other. If police officers should so do, they would be guilty of a trespass. 
Even if they should find something incriminating against him, I should have 
thought that the court would not allow it to be used in evidence against him, 
if the conduct of the police officers was so oppressive that it would not be 
right to allow the Crown to rely on it" (57). 
His Lordship seems to lay down this principle: the officers can search 
the arrested person, but there must be a lawful arrest; premises cannot be 
searched as an incident to the arrest in the hope that some evidence might be 
uncovered. 
- 15-
wi 
If a lawful search is carried out - either of the arrest ,._person or of the 
premises - then a chance discovery and seizure of evidence implicating the 
accused in some other crime is excused; so also is seizure excused if evidence 
implicates someone else in the crime for which the arrest is made or the search 
is carried out, but a chance discovery of evidence implicating another person 
in another crime does not allow seizure of such evidence. This summary of 
Lord Denning, M. R.'s proposition is a considerable restriction of the 
principle in Elias v Passmore. 
Weloome as this clarification may be, it was, unfortunately, accompanied 
by a fundamentally contradictory statement. When no one has been arrested or 
charged, the police, according to his Lordship, are justified in seizing an 
article if certain conditions are satisfied: (a) there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that a serious offence has been committed, (b) the police 
officers have reasonable grounds for believing that the article in question is 
either tbe fruit of the crime or is the instrument by which the crime was 
committed or is the material evidence to prove the commission of the crime, 
(c) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person in possession of 
it has himself committed the crime, or is implicated in it,: or is a party to 
it, (d) the lawfulness of the conduct must be judged at the time and not by 
what happened afterwards (58). Such a rule leaves the police free to decide 
what is a serious crime for unless it is any search and seizure must be 
illegal. It is a remarkable judicial extension of search powers, especially 
since the court proposed to lay down a 1 general principle 1 • The court may 
have felt deep dissatisfaction at the inability of the police to search a 
house for evidence of a crime like murder (59), but that problem arises 
because of the fact that police powers of search reflect the law of arrest and 
apart from the specific statutory provisions permitting issuance of search 
warrants, there is no broad statutory principle within which the law oan be 
judicially refined and developed. In this respect the law in the United States 
provides an enlightening comparison. 
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Unlike England the United States of America possesses a written 
constitution enshrining the basic human rights which had been considered by 
the founding fathers as immutable (60). This does not mean - as is often 
assumed - that the American fundamental individual rights and liberties are 
any more basio than in England. It means that whereas in England the 
fundamental individual liberty can be protected at judicial level only, in 
America they are safeguarded both at the level of a written permanent 
well qs Charter enacted by legislative as~by the judiciary. The fact that the 
constitution is not unwritten means that whenever new powers are conferred on 
the police by the federal or state legislatives,or whenever the law-enforcement 
agencies perpetrate acts which subsequently are Challenged as beyond those 
permitted by the constitution, the Supreme Court,as the first arbiter, has a 
formal source the broad generali tif.Sof which parmi t a fr~ and judicial law 
making than is possible in England. However, in both countries the extent 
of the police powers of search is judicially defined on the basis of certain 
individual liberties considered fundamental by both judicial systems: in 
England these liberties although in an unwritten form are no less constitutional 
in their foundation (61). What is signficantly different between the two 
systems is the fact that the judicial training, the assumed role by the courts 
vis a vis the executive and the traditional technique of judicial reasoning, 
in England is inhibitive of an equally bold development of law. The difference 
between the two countries, it is submitted does not lie in the form in which 
the constitutional law appears but in the assumed and expected role and 
stating of the courts in the political structures of the two societies. 
In the United States the power of the police to arrest without a warrant 
depends, apart from any statutory provisions in conformity with the 
constitution, upon the common law distinction between felony and misdemeanour, 
which in England existed until 1967 (62). Otherwise an arrest can be under 
the authority of a warrant issued by a judicial authority who must be satisfied 
as to a "probable cause" for the applicant's belief that the suspect is guilty 
of a criminal offence. The powers of arrest as well as search are governed 
by the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution which says: "The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
paDticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things 
to be seized". 
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Thus, the Amendment affirms the belief of American society that 
individual liberty depends in part, if not a large part, upon freedom from 
unreasonable intrusion by the executive and that warrantless searches and seizures, 
of persons or of property, can only be legal if they are not unreasonable. 
Thus, although the validity of the power of the police to search the premises 
or arrest a person depends on an ex post facto judicial ruling, the courts have 
insisted that warrant should be obtained whenever possible. "The warrant 
requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and 
it has determined the result in series of cases in courts all over this 
country. It is not an inconvenience to_be somehow 'weighed' against the 
claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part 
of our machinery of government operating as a matter of course to check the 
'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who form 
part of~·system of law enforcement. If it is to be a true guide to 
constitutional police action, rather than just a pious phrase, then 'exceptions 
carmot be enthroned into a rule"'• (63) 'lhus, where the facts indicate that 
a warrant could have been obtained, but it was probably inconvenient to do so, 
the arrest or search would be illegal even though there was a probable cause 
within the Fourth lmendment(64). The Supreme Court has taken the view that 
even though there may have been a 'probable cause' for arrest without warrant, 
such an arrest - or a search following an arrest - could only be lawful if 
there were 'exigent circumstances' which explained or justified the failure 
to obtain a valid warrant (65). Of course, if the person arrested is 
reasonably believed by the police to have committed or to be committing a 
felony, i.e. there is a probable cause, arrest without warrant can take place 
and would be lawful. ·Thus, in Trupiano v United States a federal agent on 
receiving inf<:>rmatlon that an illegal still was being operated entered a farm 
of the petitioner, made an arrest of one of the accuseds without an arrest 
warrant and then seized the illegal distillery and other items connected with 
it. Evidence was that the various items and the equipment had been seen by the 
agents through the open door before entry into the premises. Moreover, after 
the arrest a truck standing in the yards was thoroughly searched for papers and 
other things of evidential nature. All this was done without any search warrant 
and even though the federal agents had more than adequate opportunity to obtain 
one. The tiupreme Court held that the arrest was lawful because it had been 
made when a felony was being committed in the presence of the officers. 
"The absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there was sufficient time to 
obtain one, does not destroy the validity of an arrest under these circumstances. 
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Warrants of arrest are designed to meet the dangers unlimited and unreasonable 
arrests of persons who are not at the moment committing any crime. Those 
dangers, obviously, are not present where a felony plainly occurs before the 
eyes of an officer of the law and a place where he is lawfully preeent 11 • (66) 
However, following Carroll v United States, the Court held that obtaining 
of search warrant in the circumstances was reasonably practicable long 
before the raid was carried out because the federal officers had already been 
supplied with detailed reports by one of their colleagues posing as a farm 
worker on the farm. According to Murphy, J. it is better not to rely upon 
the normal zeal of the law enforcement officers to ferret out the crime but 
instead look to the magistrates and let the latter "determine when searches 
and seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed upon suoh 
activities"; this was the basis of the Fourth Amendment requirement for 
search warrants, and the police could not be expected to view the individual's 
constitutional right to privacy with neutrality and detachment contained in 
a judicial process (67). 
It is therefore clear that, broadly speaking, whenever practicable the 
police must secure a warrant of arrest or search. The police are not likely 
to consider a suspect's constitutional rights with objective neutrality in 
their zeal to deal with the criminals and if the courts were to countenance 
the circumstances of such zeal then it may lead to indifference on the part 
of the police to the legal process contemplated by the ~ourth Amendment; 
the result would be that the purpose of the restrictions in the Fourth Amendment 
would be negated (68). The basic principle for determining whether there was 
a probably cause or not for an arrest, or for issuing a search warrant, is: 
were the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer 
at the time, and of which he had a reasonable trustworthy information, sufficient 
in themselves to justify a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offence has been or is being committed? 
probability though it is not necessary 
Thus, reasonable caution implies 
that the factual information in the 
knowledge of the arresting officer be sufficient to establish guilt; however, 
mere good faith or suspicion are not a sufficient justification (69). vlhile it 
is not essential that the evidence which led to the warrantless arrest be one 
which would be admissible at the actual trial(70), the Supreme Court has held 
that the fruits of such an arrest, or of a lawful search, cannot be relied 
upon to substantiate the existence of a 'probable cause' for arrest (70b). 
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This, briefly, is the law giving powers of arrest to the police and 
is, perhaps, more clear that is its concomitant problem of search and 
seizure of evidential material. We must, therefore, now look at the judicial 
attitude to what is an unreasonable search for as will be seen later the 
issue of 'illegally procured evidence• is invariably considered by first 
determining whether the search was reasonable. 
Although it is a long established practice, endorsed by the Supreme 
Court (71), to search the person of a prisoner following a lawful arrest 
and to seize any articles found on him and connecting him with the orime 
or whioh are likely to assist him to escape from custody, the powers to 
search a,person or premises are governed by the same Fourth Amendment ( 72). 
It seems that search of a suspect, even where there is no probably cause 
for arrest, is justified to a limited extent. Warren, C.J. said in Terry v Ohio: 
"A search for weapons in the absence of a probable cause to arrest, however, 
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which 
justify its initiation ••••• Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary 
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others 
nearby and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 'full' 
search, even though it remains a serious intrusion. •••••• a perfectly 
reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is 
possessed of adequate information to justify taking aperson into custody for 
the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime". (73) Thus the doctrine of 
'exigent circumstances' has enabled the Court to create one refinement to 
the precise requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
The second refinement, or exception, to the basic law regarding search 
and seizure is the doctrine of "search incident to a lawful arrest". Search 
and seizure in these circumstances has been held as consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures (74). 
However, this power is a limited one in that its evolution owes to the 
necessities inherent in the situation of arrest for, otherwise, as Murphy, J. 
put it, "the exception swallows the general principle, making a search warrant 
completely unnecessary whenever there is a lawful arrest" (75). In other words, 
there must be exigent circumstances, e.g. because the obtaining of a search 
warrant is impracticable or unreasonable, before such a search can be free 
from the charge of unreasonableness. However, the doctrine has suffered from 
vagueness in the description of the scope of search permissible under it. 
Does it allow limitless search of all the premises assuming that the arrest is 
made in the prisoner's residence? Or does it only allow a search of his 
person? Or does it extend to search of the immediate vicinity and no further? 
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An answer to these questions is of fundamental importance for, if the doctrine 
were to have no limits in a oase of lawful arrest it would substantially reduce 
the importance of that part of the Fourth Amendment which allows a search 
provided it is reasonable: the police could then deliberately delay the arrest 
of a suspect until he was in his house and then carry out a warrantless search 
as an incident to the arrest. As Stewart, J. said in Coolidge v New Hampshire 
(76): "If we were to agree •••• that the police may, whenever they have 
probable cause, make a warrantless entry for the purpose of making an arrest, 
and that seizures and searches of automobiles are likewise per se :reasonable 
given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be 
carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth 
Amendment out of the constitution" (77). Thus, search incidental to arrest 
must also be 'reasonable' and one must look to case law for the definition 
of the word 'reasonable'; the law as to the scope of this doctrine is in two 
parts: that which existed before and after Chimel v California (78). The 
essential issue in this doctrine is the p&ysical scope of the search, and the 
test for this has been the "immediate possession and oontrol" of the person 
arrested. This phraseology is sufficiently wide and flexible to enable the 
courts at different times to broaden or narrow the scope of acceptable search. 
Searoh as incident to arrest was first recognised in a dictum in 
Weeks v United States (79) though there the power was limited to search of 
the arrested person. An embellishment was made to this dictum in Carrol v United 
States which altered it to extend to "his person or his control" (80), and the 
extension was subsequently recognised in Agnello v United States (81) where 
one of the arrested person's home, several blocks away from the place of arrest, 
was searched. The Court then said: "The right without a search warrant 
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime 
and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize 
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was 
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an ascape from 
custody, is not to be doubted •••• The legality of the arrests or of the 
searches and seizures made at the (place of arrest) is not to be questioned. 
Such searches and seizures naturally and usually appertain to and attend such 
arrests. But the right does not extend to other places". 
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The doctrine of 'search to arrest' having been thus extended in its 
scope has also been applied to a situation where the original lawful 
authority is as regards "seizure" of goods or articles. Thus in Marron v 
United States (82) the federal agents bad, while carrying out a search 
pursuant to a search warrant authorising seizure of liquor and certain 
other articles used in its illicit manufacture, accidently found a ledger and 
seized it even though it was not covered by the terms of the search warrant. 
The Supreme Court upheld th~ seizure of the ledger because the arrest and 
search were lawful and the agents "bad a right without a warrant 
contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things 
used to carry on the criminal enterprise". It may be that the Supreme Court 
was not here sanctioning a general exploratory search; however, once the 
doctrine was extended to the area under the arrested person's "control", 
an unresolvable debate on the scope of "control" was bound to take place and 
the subsequent cases indicate the difficulty of providing a sufficiently 
precise definition of the word "control" which could be useful on all occasions 
without at the same time raising the spectre of excessive police powers. In 
Go-Bart Importl~g; Co. v United States (83) an attempt to state the limits of 
thedoctrine was made by Butler, J.: "As an incident to the arrest they seized 
a ledger in a closet where the liquor or some of it was kept and some bills 
beside the cash register. These things were visible and accessible in the 
offender's immediate custody. There was no threat of force or general search 
or rummaging of the place". By no means can this effort at explaining 
Marron v United States be criticised, for the explanation does in itself 
contain the criterion of "visible and accessible" for determining whether the 
articles seized were within the control of the person arrested. However, one 
cannot also fail to notice that "visible and accessible in the offender's 
immediate oustody 11 contains words which again raise linguistic problems: 
indeed, this phraseology is no different from that of 11his person or his 
control". 
Whatever may be the shortcomings of subsequent attempts to define the 
scope of the doctrine, the limitation on the doctrine put in Go-Bar Importing 
Co. v United States was thrown aside by the Supreme Court in United States v 
Lefkowitz (84). The Court there held that in appropriate circumstances 
search as an incident to arrest could extend beyond the person of the arrested 
person to the premises under his immediate control. 
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In Harris v United States the search of the bedroom was held valid even 
though the arrest had been made in the living room (85). In this case the 
search was for two cancelled cheques believed to have been stolen by the 
defendant and used in connection with the forgeries for which the defendant 
had been arrested. During the course of an intense and thorough search for 
these cheques, and for pens and papers, the police found a sealed envelope 
marked "personal papers 11 which contained draft cards and registration 
certificates. Having concluded that the evidence for prosecution for 
forgeries was inadequate the police prosecuted, and had convicted, the 
defendant for an offence under Selective Training and Services Act. The 
Supreme Court upheld_ the search as being within the doctrine of 'search as 
incident to arrest' (86). In United States v Rabinowitcz the Supreme Court 
held that search beyond the immediate ares where the arrest was made was 
11reasonable" and within the Fourth Amendment(87); the test was whether the 
search area was under "the possession or under the control" of the arrested 
person. Thus, if the arrest took place inside the house, search of the 
arrested person's car, parked outside, would have been unlawful (88) for the 
search would not have been confined within the immediate vicinity of the 
arrest and - and this was a further refinement of the doctrine - because such 
a search m~ not have been substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. 
United States v Rabinowitcz was overruled in Chimel v California (89). 
The Supreme Court, after examining a number of inconsistent authorities, held 
that the precedents on which the pre-Chimel law rested was by no means 
unimpeachable. The police officers had, after the arrest, looked through the 
entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage and a small 
workshop and had seized numerous articles for evidential purposes. The Court 
held that the search of the defendant went beyond his person and the area 
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could 
have been used as evidence against him; the extensive search, going beyond the 
immediate area as it did, had no constitutional justification. Stewart, J. 
said: "Where an arrest is made it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might 
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the 
officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest frustrated. In 
addition it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and 
seize evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or 
destruction. 
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And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 
or evidentiary items must,of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a 
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to 
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. 
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person, 
and the area 'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to mean 
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence". 
"There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching 
any room other than that in which an arrest occurs - or for that matter, for 
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in 
that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, 
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The 'adherence to 
judicial processes' mandated by the l!,ourth Amendment requires no less". 
This decision clearly reverts the law back to what it was at the time of 
Carrol v United States, for it endorses the criterion of 'the immediate control 8 • 
However, the detailed exposition by Stewart, J. also restricts the freedom of 
the police to rely on the doctrine to justify an exploratory search. The 
majority opinion echoes Frankfurter, J. dissenting judgment in United States 
v Rabinowitcz where, in discussing the test of 'reasonableness•, he had said: 
"To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of 
reason •••••• What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable? 
The test is the reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the 
history and the experience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it 
against the evils to which it was a .~.E.Q~" (90). 
Ey thus requiring the police to justify a warrantless search by proof of 
exigent circumstances - or reasonableness - the Court has closed a door to 
possible manipulation or abuse of the basic constitutional search and seizure 
powers; the police can no longer avoid the need to show a probabl~ cause for 
issuance of a search warrant by expeditiously arranging the arrest to take 
place on the suspect's house even though they may have had an earlier opportunity 
to arrest him at a different location (91). In the opinion of the majority the 
requirement of a 'probable cause' in the Fourth Amendment. was, and is, intended 
to interpose a magistrate between the citizen and the police so that violation 
of an individual's privacy could only take place after an objective mind has 
weighed up the relevant arguments: the Amendment proscribes unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and general exploratory searches are unreasonable. 
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The third refinement of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
requirements is seen in the 8 plain view doctrine 11 • This doctrine, although 
its precise requirements and limits cannot be stated with confidence, permits 
seizure of evidential material if they can be said to fall within the view or 
sight of the law enforcement officer provided he had the right to be in the 
position where he has the plain view. Thus, in Coolidge v New Hampshire (92) 
Stewart, J. explained the doctrine: 11What the 'plain view' cases have in common 
is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an 
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of 
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine seems to supplement the 
prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another objeot, not pursuit, 
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being 
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits 
the warrantless seizure", but the application of the doctrine is legitimate 
"only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence 
before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general 
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at 
last emerges" (93). The rationale behind this rule that the police, if while 
legitimately carrying out an arrest upon a piece of evidence inadvertently, 
can seize such evidence,is clear: it would be absurd, if not dangerous, to 
ignore it for the time being until a search warrant "particularly describing it" 
is obtained, for the evidence by then might be destroyed or it might endanger 
the safety of the police officer. As against the minor disregard of the Fourth 
Amendment there is the indisputable gain for the public in effective law 
enforcement. 
On the first view of this subject one may experience some difficulty in 
distinguishing this doctrine from that of 'search incident to a lawful arrest' 
(94); the difficulty is enhanced by the requirement that for the 'plain view' 
doctrine to apply the police must have come across the evidence inadvertently 
This requirement makes sense only when a legal search - with or without a search 
warrant, and in the latter case where search is an incident to lawful arrest 
is being carried out; in any other situation the sighting of the relevant 
evidence is bound to be inadvertent. However, this may not be the correct 
way of looking at the 'plain view' doctrine; the police may, to bring the 
seizure within the doctrine of 'plain view', manoeuvre themselves into the plain 
view of the objects desired to be seized, but which they cannot seize within 
the doctrine of a search incident to arrest. 
• 
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The evidence seized then could legitimately be described as seized inadvertently. 
However, it may be that if the facts clearly indicated that the police have so 
manoeuvered themselves the Supreme Court may describe it as not having been 
discovered 'inadvertently'. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the two doctrines are distinct because 
'search incident to arrest' permits a search and describes in what circumstances 
it is lawful and also involves the question of 'reasonableness'; the 'plain view• 
doctrine does not involve search in any sense but only a seizure of what is 
visible; obviously, in the latter doctrine there is no issue as to what is 
reasonable. Furthermore, the 'plain view' doctrine is not necessarily 
dependent upon an arrest having taken place; on the other hand, 'search incident 
to arrest' doctrine operates only when there has been a lawful arrest. 
Admittedly, in practice, the 'plain view' doctrine is likely to be relied upon 
when evidence has been discovered at the time of arrest of the defendant (95). 
As regards the 'plain view' doctrine there is authority, albeit a meagre 
one, that if there has been no arrest then for the doctrine to apply it must 
be sho~n1 that the incriminating nature of the evidence seized was apparent 
to the officer sighting it. Thus in Stanley v Georgia (96) where state police 
officers had, during the course of search of the defendant's house under a 
search warrant in connection with alleged bookmaking activities, found and 
seized obscene films, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the defendant 
on the ground that the state statute permitting such a seizure was 
unconstitutional. However, in his separate opinion, allowing the appeal on 
different ground that the Fourth Amendment had been violated, Stewart, J., 
concurred in by :Brennan and vJhi te, J .J., said: "This is not a case where 
agents in the course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal 
activity, or criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that 
the contents of the film could not be determined by mere inspection •••••• After 
finding (the films) the agents spent some fifty minutes exhibiting them by 
means of the appellant's projector in another upstairs room. Only then did the 
agents return downstairs and arrest the appellant". Such a requirement for the 
'plain view' doctrine may provide one feature distinguishing it from the 
doctrine of 'search incident to arrest'. It may be a sensible requirement 
of the 'plain view' doctrine, for it is only in that manner that the police 
can be prevented from seizing all articles, irrespective of their incriminating 
nature. 
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These rules on search with or without search warrant or warrant of arrest 
extend to state trials as well. The Supreme Court has held that the 
'due process cause' of the Fourteenth Amendment - which is applicable to the 
States only- covers all those rights within the various Amendments to the 
federal Constitution which can be described as within the 'concept of ordered 
liberty' (97), and the Fourth Amendment comes within this concept. As 
Frankfurter, J. said in Wolf v Colorado (98): "The security of one's privacy 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment - is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the 
concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the states through 
the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, 
as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority 
of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned ••• " 
It is essential to grasp the basic constitutional powers of the police 
to arrest or search before examinjng the judicial approach to admissibility 
of evidence obtained in breach of these rules, both in England and the United 
States. Police powers, whether the constitution of a country be a written or 
an unwritten one, involve a reduction or restriction of individual liberty -
liberties which are also constitutional. Therefore, every time an instance of 
an excessive execution of police powers is presented to the court, the issue 
resolves itself into one of an attack on a constitutional right and privilege 
by an excessive - or unconstitutional - exercise of a constitutionally based 
power. The courts, both in England and the United States, ~e~.then faced with 
the dilemma - though this has not been so recognised in England, probably 
because of the strong influence of positivism on the English legal trainin8-
of deciding the extent to which these constitutional rights of individuals 
need to be protected by developing appropriate rules of evidence and whether 
the complainant's civil remedy for trespass is adequate for the purpose. 
Moreover, the situation also raises the problem of the extent to which the 
courts should feel free to impose judicial control and supervision on police 
methods of apprehending the offenders prior to court proceedings or even 
prior to the accused being charged at the police station. 
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NOTES 
1. A leading book on English constitutional law states that the three 
freedoms - of person, of speech and to enjoy one's property - are not 
"guaranteed" for a British subject. By "guaranteed" the authors obviously 
mean written down in a formal constitutional document alterable by a 
special process only; see Wade and Phillips "Constitutional Law" (1970) 
at P•479· It is submitted that the fact that any infringement of the 
freedom of person is remediable by civil or criminal proceedings does 
not logically mean that the freedom is not constitutional. 
2. But see Ghani v Jones Lf9627 3 AllE.R. 1700, dictum by Lord Denning, 
M.R., at p.l703 suggesting inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence. 
3. But of. the frequency of the issue of inadmissibility of involuntary 
confessions. 
4• Sometimes the search powers are for purposes which are far from a 
serious threat to the society, e.g. see Poaching Prevention Act 1860, 
Protection of Birds Act 1954; the police also have powers to search 
premises under what are known as "regulatory statutes" like the licencing 
Acts. See also Davis v Lisle (1936)10~ J.P. 280 and Archbold, infra. 
5· For an excellent discussion of the police powers of search see D.A. 
Thomas "Police Powers-III" (1967) Crim. L.R. ;. He maintains that 
"there is an unanswerable case for a fundamental revision of the law". 
See also Devlin "Police Procedure, Administration and Organisation" 
(1966) Butterworth. 
6. Coke 3 Inst. 73. See also Semayne's Case, 1604, 5 Co.Rep.9la. 
1· Entiok v Carrington (1765) 19 St.Tr.l029. 
8. Coke 4 Inst. 176. Also Archbold 'Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice' 
37th Ed. But in Entick v Carrington, supra, Lord Camden, C.J. suggested 
that this exception crept into the law by imperceptible practice and that 
even Coke, C.J. denied its legality in his 4 Inst. 176. For an example 
of a modern statute conferring power for the magistrate to issue search 
warrants see S.3 Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
9· Dallison v Caffrey Lf96jf 1 Q.B.348. Also Lister v Perryman (1870) 
L.R.4H.L.521. 
10. (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029. Also Leach v Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1002. 
11. Unless, of course, a statute confers power to issue a warrant on some 
other authority. See e.g., Cooper v Boot (1785) 4 Dough 348. A high 
rank police officer may have authority to issue a search warrant under a 
statute e.g. see s.9 Official Secrets Act 1911. 
12. S.26 reenacts S.42 Larceny Act, 1916, but also extends it under S.26(3) 
in that the authorised person may "seize !&. goods he believes to be 
stolen goods". 
13. See also Archbolda Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice at 3185 
et. seq. These statutory powers are often subject to the criterion of 
"reasonable grounds"; for example, s.14 Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 and 
S.6 Dangerous Drugs Act 1967. 
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14. For powers to make a lawful arrest without a warrant see S.2 Criminal 
Law Act 1967. 
15. (1853) 6 Cox C.C._329. 
16. (1887) 16 Cox c.c. 245. 
17. Crozier v Cundey (1S27) 6 B & c. 232; R v Barnett (1829) 3C. & R 600; 
R.V. Frost, 9 C & P. 129. 
18. Which may incidentally lead to discovery of evidence of another crime. 
Thomas says that Dillon v O'Brien settles the law that an arrested 
person can always be searched, see (1967) Crim. L.R. 4• 
19. In Dillon's Case the entry into the house was apparently lawful. 
20. (1853) 20 L.T. (o.s.) 233. 
21. Ibid. at p.237. 
22. (1853) 6 Cox. C.C.329 at P.332 per Williams, J. 
23. 1928/29 Cmnd. 3291. 
24. Dangerous Drugs Act 1965, s.15. 
25. See also S.2 Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934, which allows seizure 
of anything reasonably suspected of being evidence of the commission 
of the offence under the Act. It is difficult to find authority on 
the admissibility of evidence of other offences obtained under such 
searches. 
26. Or any other person. See Archbold at 3185, relying on Elias v Passmore, 
infra. 
27. [f.952] lAll E.R. 236. 
28. See Rookes v Barnard [f96~ lAll E.R.367. Cf. the inadmissibility of a 
breathlyser test evidence when statutory procedure is not observed under 
the Road Traffic Act 1973. See Scott v Baker Ll96§7 2All. GR.993 where 
Lord Parker, C.J. said that even though there may be positive evidence 
that the blood contained alcohol beyond the prescribed limit, if 
statutory procedure is not observed the evidence is not admissible; the 
procedure - including the need for making clear to the accused that he 
is being arrested - is considered as part of the offence itself. See 
Archbold for the considerable amount of law on this; also (1973) Crim. 
L.R. 153. "The Breathlyser Reblown" by Peter Seago. 
29. For example the Licensing Act 1967, 8.187; Obscene Publications Act 
1953 S.3. 
30. Cf. the opinion of the Royal Commission of 1928/29, Cmnd. 3297. The 
commission felt that the existing practice of the police as to search of 
the prisoners is necessary and proper in the interests of justice and 
"cannot be regarded as in any way an undue infringement of the right 
and liberties of the subject but that the practice should be regalarised 
by a statute". 
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31. Ll93~ 2 K.B. 164. 
32. On the principle of the Six Carpenters' Case, but the point is not 
relevant for the purpose of this study. 
33. Counsel for the defendant even contended that the document, being a 
seditious document, could not be the subject-matter of property; the 
point was not pursued. 
34· See, for example, Phipson on Evidence 11th Ed. p.367. Archbold 57th Ed. 
P• 1057. 
35· (1765) 19 How. S.Tr. 1029. 
36. Quaere, the second part of this holding is confined to situations where 
a general warrant is issued or to all situations where an illegal arrest 
is made, but not to situations where the arrest was lawful. 
37. 16 Cox C.C.245· 
38. 5 M. (H.L.)55· 
39· It is interesting to note that in the year when Elias v Passmore was 
decided the Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934 was passed which in 
S.l(2) allows a High Court judge to grant a search warrant to search the 
premises or place and any person found therein, and to seize anything •••• 
or any such person which the officer has reasonable ground for susp~ottng 
to be evidence of •••••• ". No such pO\-Ier was provided in the Police 
Act, 1919. 
40. Both W.H. and J.E. were officials of the N.U.W.M. and H. was arrested 
on the union's premises. 
41. Dillon v O'Brien and Crozier v Cundey, supra. 
42. 5M. (H.L.)55; 16 Cox C.C.245; 6 B. & C.232. 
43· :~~pra. at 
44. Herridge J. tacitly accepted the legality of the practice, but this 
goes against what Lord Camden said in Entiok v Carrington~ "If no 
such excuse (i.e. for trespass) can be found or produced, the silence 
of the books is an authority against the defendant". See also Report 
of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, 1929, where the 
practice of searching the home of the person arrested is referred to and 
is said to be accepted by the courts for so long "that it has become 
part of the common law". 
45· Per Lord Denning, M.R. in Ghani v Jones Lf9627 3 ALL E.R. 1700 at 1703. 
46. Lf96i/ 3 All E.R.659. D.A. Thomas has argued that this case overrules 
Eliasv Passmore, see (1967) Crim. L.R. at P.5 
47• Lf89i/l Q.B. 420. 
48. [196§7 1 All E.R. 229. 
49· Ibid. at 236. Authorities like Crozier v Cundey were examined, but 
the further restriction of Entick v Carrington in this case did come 
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as·a surprise to many, see e.g. Professor Wade in 'The Times' August 
31, 1967. 
50. Ibid. at 238. See also Salmon L.J. at 240. 
51. Again this was in the context of evidence relating to an offence 
of stealing or receiving stolen goods, and not in the context of 'any 
crime•. Diplock, L.J. at 238 Salmon L.J. at 241. Cf. Price v 
Messenger (1860) 2 B & P.l58 ,.,here a constable was held liable to an 
action for trespass when he seized some teas under a warrant to search 
for stolen sugar. Abbott, cf. said: "If these others had been likely 
to furnish evidence of the identit,y of the articles stolen and mentioned 
in the warrant, there might have been reasonable ground for seizing 
them although not specified in the warrant". See also Garfinkel and others 
v M.P. Conm. L1972J Crim. L.R. 44. 
52. /J.96i/ 3 All E.R. 1700. 
53. As Lord Denning M.R. put its "The police have to get the consent of 
the householder to enter if they oan; or, if not, to do it by stealth 
or by force. Somehow they seem to manage ••••• the police risk an 
action for trespass. It is not much risk", ibid. at 1701. 
54. As to the argument that the plaintiffs consented to the police taking 
them, "This is a little far-fetched ••••••• (The plaintiff) bowed to 
their authority. Even if he consented to their looking at the pass-
ports, he did not consent to their keeping them", per Lord Denning 
at 1702. 
55. Pringle v Bremner and Stirling, Chich Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. 
v Jones, supra, were relied upon for this proposition. 
56. Even this is doubtful, see Price v Messenger supra. 
57. Per Lord Denning at 1703. 
58. This last requirement had also been stated by Lord Denning in Chic 
Fashions. 
59. As to whether police could seize an axe used by a murderer, though 
no arrest had been made, the court in R v Waterfield, supra, said that 
"such a case can be decided if and when it arises". Was this hypothetical 
situation that induced the Court of Appeal to state the new principle 
in Ghani v Jones? 
60. The American Federal Constitution of 1787 did not contain any of the 
fundamental rights and prohibitions projected in the various Amendments. 
After some debate as to whether these rights should be left to the state 
legislatures to enact, it was dec-ided that the provisions should be put 
in the federal constitution. The constitution was ratified in 1791, 
and the Amendments were ratified later by the various states. 
61. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has maintained that there is a close 
link between the judgement of Lord Camden in Entick v Carrington, supra, 
and the Fourth Amendment prohibition. 
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62. i.e. the Criminal Law Act, 1967. In the u.s. the law on this subject 
still rests on the distinction between felony and misdemeanour and 
probable breach of the peace. Thus anyone may arrest another if he 
suspects htm of attempting to commit a felony or forcible breach of 
the peace. A police officer can arrest on reasonable suspicion 
of a felony. He may even enter a house without a warrant to effect 
·an arrest of a person known to be there and suspected to have committed 
a felony or a breach of the peace. See American Law Institute's 
Code of Criminal Procedure. See also Coolidge v New Hampshire, 
403 u.s. 510. On the law of arrest a writer has commented that 
"•••• a careful look at the law of arrest discloses a situation of 
ambiguity so great that there are wide areas of discretion largely 
untouched by legal rules", and that the delegation of immense powers 
to the police is uncontrolled by the formal legal system. See F.J. 
Remington in "Police Power and Individual Freedom", ed. by Claude 
R. Sowle pub. by Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago. 
63. per Stewart, J. in Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra. 
64. In Draper v United States, 267 u.s. 156 it was recognised that 
'probable cause' and •reasonable grounds' are substantially equivalent 
in meaning. See also Trupiano v United States, 334 u.s. 699, Carroll 
v United States, 267 u.s. 156, Go-Bart Importing Co. v United States, 
282 U.S. 358, Johnson v United States 333 u.s. 10. 
65. See Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 and Carroll v United States, 
supra, Trupiano v United States, supra, Cooper v California, 386 
U.S. 58, Chambers v Maroney, 399 U.S. 42. The Supreme Court has almost 
excluded the requirement of 'exigent circumstances' in cases involving 
search of moving vehicles because a vehicle is "movable, the occupants 
are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a 
warrant must be obtained" and because "the opportunity to search is 
fleeting." 399 U.S.42. 
/ 
66. 334 u.s. 699, a case during ~he prohibition era; italics not in the 
original. 
67. See also Amos v United States, 255 U.S.· 313, Byars v United States, 
273 u.s. 28 and Taylor v United States, 286 U.S.l for similar sentiments. 
68. See Trupiano v United States, supra, per Murphy, J.; United States v 
Lefkowitz 285 u.s. 664 per Butler, J.; Boyd v United States, 116 u.s. 
630 contains perhaps a most important statement on constitutional 
liberty and personal securities. The Supreme Court there clearly 
stated that the principles of the Fourth Amendment were not far 
removed from the ones pronounced in Entick v Carrington. See also 
the dissenting judgement of Douglas, J. in Draper v United States, 
358 u.s. 307. 
69. See Giordenello v United States, 357 U.S. 480, Henry v United States, 
361 U.S. 98~ Wong Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471, Ker v California, 
374 u.s. 23, Beck v Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, McCrag v Illinois, 386 u.s. 
300, Terry v Ohio, 392 u.s. 1. 
10. Grau v United States, 287 u.s. 124 held that evidence in the hands of 
the officer must have been such as would be admissible at the trial, 
but according to \•lhi ttaker, J., delivering the opinion of six members 
of the Court in Draper v United States, supra, "the principles under-
lying that proposition were thoroughly discredited and rejected in 
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Brinegar v United States, 338 U.S. 160 at pp.l72-74•" See also 
46 Harv. L. Rev. 1307. Obviously, there is a difference in the 
quantum and modes of proof for establishing guilt in a trial and 
to substantiate the existence of a 'probable cause'. Thus, in the 
Draper case the court held that the warrantless arrest of the 
defendant by federal narcotics agent was lawful even though the 
'probable cause' was founded on a tip-off from an informer. See 
also Mathera "The Informer's Tip as a probable cause for Search and 
Arrest" 54 Cornell L. Rev. 958. 
70b. See Johnson v United States, 333 u.s. 10, Henry v United States, 
361 u.s. 98, Alderman v United States, 394 U.S. 165. Rios v United 
States, 394 U.S.253 interestingly takes a strictly legalistic approach 
to the point in time when, in a rapid succession of events, there 
had to be a ~robable cause', and of. Hill v Calfir.nia, 401 u.s. 797. 
71. See, for example, Weeks v United States 232 U.S. 383, relying upon 
Dillon v O'Brien 16 Cox c.c. 245. Also Agnello v United States, 269 
U.S. 20, Carrol v United States, 267 U.S. 132, Preston v United States, 
376 U.S. 364, Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 
72. In Maryland Penitentiary v Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 the Supreme Court 
laid down that seizure of evidential items could not be justified by 
describing them as "instruments" of the crime and not "mere evidence" 
of the crime, and that such a distinction could not be maintained when 
considering the scope of search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 
73. 392 u.s. 1. 
74. It ought to be pointed out that this doctrine - as that of seizure 
of evidential items in the 'plain view' or 'open view' - is significant 
only when the place where an arrest is made in a place protected b,y 
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, e.g. open fields may not be within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. 
75. See Trupiano v United States 334 u.s. 699 (1948). 
76. 403 u.s. 443, (1971). 
77. The majority in this case rejected the argument that since the arrest 
was lawful the subsequent search and seizure of the prisoner's car, 
parked outside the house was also reasonable. The analogy with the 
power to stop a car on the road and search it on a 'probable cause' 
was rejected. See also Carrol v United States, 267 U.S. 132 and 
footnote (65), supra. In Coolidge case the police knew all along 
about the presence of the car and had planned all along to seize it 
and, therefore, there were no exigent circumstances to justify their 
failure to obtain a search warrant. Cf. the standpoint taken b,y 
White, J. in Chimel v California, 395 U.S.752 and Coolidge v New 
Hampshire supra. See also Jones v United States, 357 U.S. ~9J. 
78. i.e. the law as expounded in Harris v United States, 331 U.S. 145 
and United States v Rabinowitz, 339 u.s. 56. 
79. 232 u.s. 383. 
eo. 267 u.s. 132. 
81. 269 u.s. 20. 
82. 275 u.s. 192. 
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83. 282 u.s. 358. 
84. 285 u.s. 452. See also Trupiano v United States, supra, where 
the Supreme Court held that evidential material seized in the presence 
of the arrestee A. was also illegal because the presence of A. at that 
place at that time was fortuitous and irrelevant to the question of 
whether a warrant could and should have been obtained; the doctrine 
of search inoident to arrest did not apply. 
85. 331 U.S. 145. Frankfurter, J. supported by Murphy and Rutledge, JJ. 
dissented; the decision to uphold the validity of the search was 
five to four. 
86. In the view of the majority the seizure of the draft papers was 
legitimate because they were government papers and should not have 
been in the petitioner's possession. Frankfurter, J. disagreed with 
this reasoning, for according to him there was no distinction, in terms 
of the requi~ement for a search warrant within the Fourth Amendment, 
between government papers and private ones. Moreover - and this is 
a powerful logic - the right to search under a warrant depends on the 
items to be seized having been particularly described; where absence 
for search warrant is justified on the principle of search incident to 
arrest, the right to seizure is no greater. 
87. Supra. Again Frankfurter, J., joined by Black and Jackson, JJ., dis-
sented. According to Frankfurter, J.a "To tear 'unreasonable' from 
the context and history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment in applying 
the narrow exception of search as an incident to an arrest is to 
disregard the reason to which reference must be made when a question 
arises under the Fourth Amendment. It is to make the arrest an incident 
to an unwarranted search instead of a warrantless search an incident 
to an arrest •••• The exceptions (to the Fourth Amendment) cannot be 
enthroned into the rule." 
88. See Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443. Also Agnello v United 
States 269 U.S. 20, Preston v United States, 376 u.s. 364, Jones v 
Louisiana, 382 u.s. 36, Shipley v California, 395 u.s. 818, Vale v 
Lousiana, 399 U.S. 34· 
89. 395 U.S. 752. The opinion was delivered by Stewart, J. from which \ihite 
and Black, JJ. dissented on the ground that the fact of arrest supplied 
an exigent circumstance for the extensive search. See also Williams v 
United States,601 u.s. 646. 
90 •. Italics not in the original. Frankfurter, J.'s statement clearly 
indicates a thought process which takes into account the nation's 
history and social policy reasons in deciding the validity or legality 
of the executive actions. 
91. Speaking of the sweeping search incident to arrest under the pre-Chimel 
law, Stewart, J. says in Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra: '~he approach 
taken in Harris and Rabinowitz was open to criticism that it made it so 
easy for the police to arrange to search a man's premises without warrant 
that the Constitution's protection of a man's 'effects' became a dead 
letter." See also Trupiano v United States, supra. 
Cont'd ••• 
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92. 403 u.s. 443 (1971) Italics not in the original. 
93. The doctrine has also been recognised in other Supreme Court decisions. 
See, for example, United States v Lee, 274 U.S. 559, United States v 
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, Trupiano v United States, 334 u.s. 699, Ker v 
California, 374 u.s. 23, Harris v United States, 390 U.S. 234. It has 
also been held that the mere fact that the police had advance knowledge 
of the objects likely to be found did not rule out the application 
of the plain view doctrine; see McDonald v United States, 335 u.s. 
451, Ker v California, 374 u.s. 23, Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra. 
94. See United States v Lefkowitz, supra, where the Supreme Court 
explained Marron v United States, 275 u.s. 192 as seizure within the 
'plain view' doctrine. It, however, appears that that case was based 
on the doctrine of 'search as incident to arrest•. 
95. Cf. United States v Lee, 274 u.s. 559 where the Court held that 
observation by the officers of liquor on the dock of a boat was not 
'search'. 
96. 394 u.s. 557· 
97. Thus the first eight Amendments to the Constitution may come within 
the 'concept of ordered liberty' because they signify the American 
Bill of Rights. As to the 'concept of ordered liberty' see infra. 
The subject of, and the question as to which of the Amendments bind 
the states bristles with uncertaint,y and has been much discussed. 
Some of the Supreme Court members have now and then held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights in its totalit,y, 
but this has not been a upanimous view. See, for example, Wolf v 
Colorado, 338 u.s. 25 and Malley v Hogan, 378 u.s. 1. Many a time 
the Supreme Court has held the view that the Fourteenth Amendment 
could not be treated as a "shorthand incorporation" of the eight 
Amendments and thus binding on the states. However, it has been the 
general opinion of the members of the Court that the Fourteenth 
Amendment expresses a demand for civilised standards which may, or 
may not, be defined by the Bill of Rights. The recent view is that 
of "selective incorporation", see 73 Yale L.J. 74, and Palko v 
Connecticut, 319 u.s. 302. This doctrine means that all those rights 
which are fundamental are absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
"due process clause" and thus applicable to the states. In tl;lis 
connection the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment expresses 
rights which are basic to a free society and therefore are enforceable 
against the states, see Mapp v Ohio, ;Q1U.S.643, Wolf v Colorado, 
338 u.s. 25, Ker v California, 374 U.S. 23, Stanford v Texas, 379 
U.S. 476, Berger v New York, 338 U.S. 41. 
98. 338 U.S. 25. See also Mapp v Ohio, supra, and Coolidge v New 
Hampshire, supra, which support this approach to applying the Fourth 
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ADMISSIBILITY AND 'DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE' 
The previous chapter examined cases where the issue was not the 
admissibility of inadmissibility or relevant evidence, but whether the 
police had any legal justification for disregarding or exceeding the law 
on their powers of search and, therefore, had a defence to a trespass action. 
The judgments im~edly accept that evidence obtained by an unlawful act is 
admissible. So far as the issue of admissibility of such evidence in a 
criminal trial is concerned, English law is surprisingly thin in 
authorities. Moreover, unlike in the United States, in the few cases the 
courts have had to deal with the issue, judicial consideration of the matter 
has shown absence of any reference to a theoretical basis and the 
discussion indicated a lack of understanding of, or concern with, the long 
term judicial and constitutional implications of the admissibility rule. 
The single criterion influencing the courts in their approach to the issue 
has been 'relevance,•, and the main, if not the only, object of a criminal 
trial is perceived to be to determine whether the accused is guilty (1). 
Thus, when faced with the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained by 
illegal search there is a significant absence of consideration of factors 
such as the need for the courts to police the police, the possible tainted 
role of the courts if the fruits of such illegality were permitted to be 
used, the effect of admitting such evidence on police training and on the 
police attitude to the rules imposing restrictions on their powers, the 
fact that an adversary system treats a criminal trial as a dispute between the 
executive and an individual, or that the doctrine of 'rule of law' is in 
all respects applicable both to an individual and the executive (2). 
However, this does not mean to say that the present rule of admissibility 
subject to the discretionary exclusion has nothing to commend itself; it 
suggests that the absence of a theoretical reference for the rule has 
caused English law on this subject to be fundamentally inconsistent with 
itself. At practical level the aggrieved party is left to pursue his 
civil remedies for damages or resort .to the dangerous remedy of self-help 
and forcibly prevent the police from securing the evidence (3). 
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The American Supreme Court, on the other hand, has rec~ed both the 
'public policy' and 'judicial policy' issues raised by the question of 
admissibility in~s area. Any suggestion that the difference in the two 
approaches can be explained by the written and unwritten constitutions i$ 
unsound; the Supreme Court has used the constitutional Amendments to 
rationalize the exclusionary rule and the judicial attitude behind it; but 
the rule is not mandated by the constitution. It may be that police illegality 
in obtaining evidence has been tooinfrequent in England to perturb the courts 
and, therefore, no compelling reason has existed for consideration of 
policy issues; it could also be that the courts in England do not consider 
themselves as active agencies for changes in social institutions but only as 
arb~ry of disputes. 
I 
A number of English decisions of great antiquity support the proposition 
that no matter how the evidence was obtained provided it is relevant it is 
admissible indeed, even if it has been stolen from the dfend~t it is 
admissible (4). These cases involved tangible evidence, like documents, 
and therefore 'relevance• has been the only test even though the documents 
were otherwise privileged. So far as criminal proceedings are concerned, 
the most authoritative statement comes from Lord Camden, C.J. in 
Entick v Carrington, where he linked 'admissibility of illegally obtained 
.evidence' with the 'privilege against self-incrimination': "It is very 
certain that the law obligeth no man to aocuse himself; because the 
necessary means of compelling self-accusation, following upon the innocent 
as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem, 
that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too 
the innocent would be confounded with the guilty".(5) Admittedly, the 
dictum does not speak in terms of 'inadmissibility' but only that search for 
evidence is prohibited. However, logically the former must follow the 
latter, for if search for evidence is not allowed, then this end can only 
be attained by refusing to admit such evidence. Moreoever, the reference 
to the fact that such illegal searches pose a danger to the innocent expresses 
the public policy issue of the long term dangers to society from police 
illegality. 
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In Kuruma v R. (6) the appellant had been convict~d by a Kenya court 
for being in unlawful possession of two rounds of ammunition contrary to 
Emergency Regulations, 1952 of Kenya and had been sentenced to death. The 
Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa had dismissed his appeal, and the ground 
of this appeal to the Privy Council was that the evidence proving that the 
appellant was in illegal possession of the ammunition had itself been illegally 
obtained (7), and should not have been admitted. Dismissing the appeal 
Lord Goddard said: "In their Lordships' opinion, the test to be applied in 
considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the 
matter in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned 
with how the evidence was obtained. While this proposition may not have 
been stated in so many words in any English case, there are decisions which 
support it and, in their Lordships' opinion, it is plainly right in principle". 
(e). 
The Committee relied on Crompton, J.'s dictum in R. v Leathem (9) that 
"It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible 
in evidence". With respect it is submitted, ~mpton, J. 's statement \-las made 
during the course of argument with the counsel and, moreover, this opinion 
had been expressed in connection with wh~t is now known as the 'confirmation 
of unlawful confession by subsequent facts'. While confession which is 
induced or obtained by threats is inadmissible, facts, i.e. real evidence, 
discovered as a consequency may be admissible (10). c6Jfupton, J. had said: 
"Suppose by threats and promises a confession of murder is obtained, which 
would not be admissible, but you also obtain a clue to a place where written 
confession may be found, or where the body of a person is secreted; ·-could not 
that latter evidence be made use of because the first clue to it came from the 
murderer? It matters not ••••• " .The Committee also drew strength from the 
rule applicable in civil cases that secondary evidence of a privileged 
document is admissible (11), and concluded that "There can be no difference 
in principle for this purpose between a civil and a criminal case". (12) 
It is clear that the Committee failed to expound on why the inclusionary rule 
is "right in principle" or why there is "in principle" no difference between 
civil and criminal proceedings, unfortunate as it may be that instead of 
deciding upon a rule independently within the oontext of the nature and purpose, 
and the courts' role, in a criminal trial civil cases were used as an analogy. 
The~licy matters which are relevant for consideration in developing rules of 
evidence for criminal proceedings cannot necessarily be pertinent to a civil 
trial: the party involved and the nature of the proceedings are different. 
- 38 -
Lord Goddar~'s opinion calls for criticism in two more respects. First, 
his Lordship cited with approval Olmstein v United States (13) where wire 
tapping evidence was held to be admissible because the act of tapping was 
not illegal. However, the treatment accorded to the American law on the 
subject was cursory and it was not even considered whether the American 
exclusionary rule is required by the constitution or whether such a rule is 
the result of judicial implication (14). Indeed, as will be argued later, the 
American exclusionary rule is not demanded by the constitution (15). Secondly, 
Lord Goddard supported the opinion by citing Scottish oases, but the Committee 
~have misunderstood the Scottish doctrine (16); the Scottish approach 
seems to be that a judge has a discretion to admit or exclude such evidence. 
In Lawrie v Muir (17) Lord Justice-General Cooper pointed out two important 
interests that are in co~fliot in such a situation; (i) the interest of the 
citizen to be protected from illegal invasions of his liberty by the government 
authority and (ii) the interest of the state to ensure that evidence relevant 
to the charge should not be withheld from the courts. Neither of these 
interest has a paramount claim. We may add a further interest, that of the 
society in its concern that in a criminal process the courts must take account 
of the fundamental social values, one of which is that those entrusted with 
law enforcement must not also break the law. The Committee cited with 
approval H.M. Advocate v Turnbull (18) where had Guthrie refused to admit 
evidence obtained by trespass to property for to have admitted it would have 
been a positive inducement to the police to adopt irregular or illegal 
methods and would make the requirement for a search warrant meaningless. 
Neither of these reasons for excluding the evidence were referred to nor 
discussed by the Committee; the only relevant difference between Kuruma's 
case and H.M. Advocate v Turnbull seems to be that one was a case of trespass 
to person whereas the Scottish case involved a trespass to property (19). 
In Scotland the issue of whether the evidence will be admitted is decided by 
reference to all the facts of the case, i.e. the police conduct is relevant 
to the primary issue of admissibility and not to secondary one of whether 
evidence being admissible should be excluded because its admission is 'unfair' 
to the accused. Such a difference in the theoretical approach permits the 
Scottish system to consider the police conduct for the purpose of deciding 
whether the evidence is admissible, and not whether it should be excluded. 
Any bel;·~f that the American approach is explained by reason of a written 
constitution was dispelled by the judicial committee in King v R. (20) , 
where the Committee made clear that whether individual .rights be unwritten or 
enshrined in a written constitution the issue of admissibility of illegally 
obtained evidence depends on judicially created rules of evidence. 
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In King v R. the police, armed with a search warrant, had searched a 
house under the Jamaican drugs law. The warrant authorised search for drugs 
in premises occupied by one J.C. and if such drugs were found to arrest J.C. 
While on the premises the appellant was searched and drugs were found in his 
trouser pockets. Section 22 of the Jamaican Constabulary Law authorised a 
police constable to carry out a search of a person when he "is known or 
suspected to be in unlawful possession" of drugs; the person was to be taken 
before a justice who could then "cause such a person to be searched in his 
presence". The court in Jamaica took the view that even if Section 22 had not 
been complied with, the evidence of drugs was, on the authority of Kuruma v R., 
admissible. Delivering the opinion of the committee Lord Hodson concluded that 
the search was not justified by the warrant nor could the language of the 
section be construed to confer an implied authority to search any person. 
Appellant had also contended that as the Jamaican constitution gave protection 
to persons against search of their persons-or property without their consent, 
the search was in violation of this right and therefore the evidence should 
not have been admitted. His Lordship expressed the opinion that there was no 
reason to exercise the discretion to exclude the evidence admissible under 
the principle in Kuruma v R. (21). On the constitutional objection his 
Lordship said: "This constitutional right may or may not be enshrined in a 
written constitution but it seems to their lordships that it matters not 
whether it depends on such an enshrinement or simply on the common law as it 
would do in this country. In either event, the discretion of the court must 
be exercised and has not been taken away by the declaration of the right in 
written form" (22). 
Kuruma v R. is therefore the only decision of importance in criminal 
law on the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal arrests or searches. 
It lays down the rule that such evidence is admissible subject to exclusion 
in the discretion of the court. However, the opinion is emphatic that their 
Lordships were not "qualifying in any degree whatsoever" the rule with· regard 
to admission of confessions (23). We must, therefore, examine the nature and 
operation of the judicial discretion to exclude and,secondly, whether the 
inclusionary rule in Kuruma v R. is consistent with the rationale behind the 
rule as to exclusion of involuntary confessions. 
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II 
The term 'illegally obtained" evidence is used in this thesis to 
describe evidence obtained (i) by illegal search and arrest and (ii) 
in breach or disregard of any substantive law - common law or statutory (24) 
- on the right or power to demand or seek evidence; for example evidence of 
finger prints (25). Evidence of confessions obtained by threat or promise 
or in breach of the judges' Rules will be treated as 'improperly obtained' 
evidence; this term will also be used to describe evidence of conversation 
with, or of, a person recorded on tape recorders installed without the 
knowledge of the accused. Evidence obtained by wire tapping, or by eaves-
dropping on the conversation by mechanical devices, on the above suggested 
method of classification, may or may not be illegal depending on whether or 
not the police acts involved a trespass on person or property. It must be 
admitted that this way of looking at the various items of evidence, involving 
police impropriety, is not derived from judicial decisions. So far as the 
courts are concerned, this distinction between the two types of evidence does 
not appear to have been recognised. However, it is submitted that a criterion 
to justify the distinction lies in the fact that in the cate80ry of 'illegally 
obt&ined' the evidence has been procured by an act which, apart from the 
question of admissibility is tortious or criminal or unconstitutional, or is 
contrary to a statute; in the case of 'improp~rly obtained' evidence the 
police have used methods which from the point of view of the prevailing moral 
standards, are unacceptable and must be discouraged. Frequently, the courts 
when exercising their discretion to exclude have·done so on the ground that 
to admit the evidence would be 'unfair' to the accused; it may be that this is 
another way of expressing disapprobation of the police ~onduct. However, such 
a suggestion is difficult to sustain since 'unfair to the accused' relates to 
the detriment to the accused whereas 'improperly obtained' describes the 
behaviour of the police. The one shows concern for doing justice to the 
accused, the other reflects concern at the disregard by the police of certain 
standards; they are distinct notions. 
Judicial rejection of illegally or improperly procured evidence can be for 
one or more of three reasons. First, though relevant it is unreliable. 
Secondly, allowing such evidence leaves the aggrieved victim without any 
effective remedy for the illegaility involved in the obtaining of the evidence. 
Thirdly, judicial policy - ralecting public policy - should air to discourage 
activities, illegal or improper, on the part of the law enforcement agencies. 
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Inadmissibility of involuntary confessions is partly based on the first 
reason, whereas admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and 
seizure seems to be founded exclusively on the criterion of relevance; in 
this latter case the question of admissibility is independent of the issue of 
whether the plaintiff, i.e. accused, is entitled to damages for a trespass (26). 
Where real evidence is discovered in consequency of an involuntary confession, 
its admissibility is determined by reference to the logical criterion of 
of relevance, though here the authorities are not consistent on whether any 
part of the initial confession is admissible. Where evidence - e.g. confessions 
obtained in breach of the Judges' Rules or tape recordings of conversation 
obtained without the knowledge of the accused or finger print evidence 
obtained without any caution to the person concerned as to his right not to 
give it - it obtained by police impropriety, it seems the courts will admit 
it provided it is relevant to the issue before the court. However, in may 
oases the courts have unequivocally claimed an inherent jurisdiction to exclude 
such evidence in their discretion. 
In Kuruma v R. Lord Goddard, C. J. said that there was no difference in 
principle between admitting illegally obtained evidence in civil and criminal 
cases, except that in a criminal case the judge has a discretion to disallow 
it, if the strict rules of admissibility "would operate unfairly against the 
accused (27), one example of this Unfairness' being a situation where evidence 
has been obtained from the accused by a trick (28). The discretion to exclude 
what is otherwise an admissible evidence is seen in other branches of the law 
of evidence, and is stated in sufficiently general terms not to be restric~ed 
to the evidence in issue in the particular case. 
For example, in Noormohamed v R. the Privy Council, when dealing with 
'similar facts' evidence, recognised this discretion. Lord du.Parcq pointed 
out: "••• the judge ought to consider whether the evidence which it is 
proposed to adduce is sufficiently substantial having regard to the purpose 
to which it professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of 
justice that it should be admitted. If, so far as that purpose is concerned, 
it can in the circumstances of the case have only trifling weight, the judge 
will be right to exclude it •••••• cases must occur in which it would be 
unjust to admit evidence of character gr~vely prejudicial to the accused even 
though there may be some tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible. 
The decision must then be left to the discretion and the sense of fairness of 
the judge" (29). In D.P.~. v Christie (30) Lord Moulton expressed the opinion 
that the exercise of such a discretion was of a general nature and could apply 
to other fields of evidential rules, e.g. admissions by conduct. The basis of 
this discretion, according to his Lordship, is an anxiety to secure a fair trial 
- 42-
and "therefore, a judge would in most cases be acting in accordance \d th 
the best traditions of our criminal procedure if he exercised the influence 
whioh he rightly possesses ove r the conduct of a prosecution in order to 
prevent such evidence being given mn cases where it would have very little 
or no evidential value". In Harris v D.P.P. Lord Simon's view was that the 
judge has a duty to set the essentials of justice above the technical rules 
of admissibility if the strict application of the latter "would operate 
unfairly against the accused" (31). According to Lord Moulton the trial 
judge "has an overriding discretion to exclude any evidence the prejudicial 
effect of which hopelessly outweighs its probative value". 'rhus these dicta, 
among others, are in general agreement that in a criminal trial the facts 
might demand that the inclusionary rule of admissibility be overriden because 
either that its evidential value is insignificant when weighed against the 
probability of injustice to the accused, or that the application of the 
inclusionary rule operates unfairly against the accused; in the latter case 
no indication is given as to the meaning of 'unfairly' though the combined 
use of the 'essentials of justice' and 'unfairly' suggests that the term may 
mean 1uqpstly against the accused'. However, the claim that a judge, in~lish 
criminal trial, has a general duty to control the procedure (from which springs 
the judicial discretion) and that such a discretion can be applied in other 
fields of evidence, makes it necessary to examine these other areas to see 
whether the claim is justified and whether it is supported by a rational 
basis. 
III 
There are authorities (32) supporting the proposition that this discretion 
is pervasive and is available even when the initial question of admissibility 
is determined by statutory criteria, as in the case of S1(f) (ii) of the 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (33); thus the court claims power to control even 
the operation of a statutory rule of admissibility if the result of its 
application is likely to be an 'unfair' trial for the accused. Although, 
judicial pronouncements on this existence of the discretion have been obiter, 
the House of Lords recently gave considerable weightto this judicial power 
and endorsed the previous authorities. In Selvey v D.P.P. (34) the House of 
Lords, by unanimously and unequivocally stating that discretion to exclude 
does exist, converted the cumulative effect of the various dicta into an 
authoritative ratio. The House held that cross-examination of the accused as 
to his previous co~victions or bad character is permissible once the conditions 
in s. 1(f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 are met, notwithstanding 
that in fact the imputations cast by the accused on the character of the ••••• 
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complainant or prosecution witnesses were essential to his defence or that 
they constituted the foundation of the defence (35). In answer to the 
Crown's contention that once the prescribed conditions of the section are 
satisfied the judge has no discretion to exclude such admissible evidence (36), 
Viscount Dilhorne said: "In the light of what was said in all these cases by 
judges of great eminence (37) it is too late in the day even to consider 
the argument that a judge has no such discretion. Let it suffice for me to 
say that in my opinion the existence of such a discretion is now clearly 
established". No reason for the need for such discretion was given. 
According to Lord Hodson there was abundant authority for the "exercise of 
the judge's discretion to secure a fair trial 11 , and, later, "li'air, as a word, 
may be imprecise, but I find it impossible to define it or even to attempt 
an enumeration of all the factors \othich have to be taken into account in any 
given case". However, Lord Hodson did emphasise that there are two reasons 
for this discretion: "First, there is a long line of authority to support 
the opinion that there is such a discretion to the exercised under this 
subsection. In the second place, which is I think more significant, there is 
abundant authority that in criminal cases, there is a discretion to exclude 
evidence, admissible in law, of which the pre-judicial effect against the 
accused outweighs its probative value in the opinion of the trial judge" (38). 
Lord Guest felt certain that the judge had a discretion to exclude relevant 
and admissible evidence for it was a "long established practice": his lordship 
would assume that it springs from the inherent power of the judge to control 
the trial before him and to see that justice is done in fairness to the 
accused (39). Similarly, in the view of Lord Pearce, with whose judgment 
Lord Wilberforce agreed, "It is a sensible and valuable discretion left in 
the hands of the judge to see that a criminal is fairly tried. He can see 
better than counsel for the prosecution or defence where fairness lies. It is 
argued that fairness is too loose a concept to afford guidance. I do not agree. 
It has been a guiding light in criminal trials for many generations. One 
generation may take a different view of its application from another; but that 
is an advantage rather than otherwise" (40). 
The Act itself does not expressly or impliedly confer on the courts such 
a discretion and, it has been commented (41) that since the many authorities 
on which their lordships relied in Selvey v D.P.P. for the existence of this 
discretion were only dicta, the House should have clarified the law, and ~ 
keeping with the rules of statutory interpretation, should have rejected ihe 
lower cour~' claim to possess discretion to exclude. 
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It is true that the exclusionary discretion in this area is a judicial 
invention (42) and so far as the Act is concerned it oould only originate 
from the court's inherent power to regulate the trial. The justification for 
the concept can, however, be gleaned from the fact that the purpose of the 
1898 Act s. 1(f) was to ensure that, in fairness to the prosecution, if the 
accused leads an attack on the character of the prosecutor, the latter should 
be free to do the same to make a point that the accused's evidence is 
unreliable. However, in some circumstances it may be absolutely essential 
for the accused to adopt this strategy for this may be the whole basis of his 
defence, for example in the cases of sexual offences where the accused claims 
that the complainant had consented or that as his past conduct clearly 
indicates he has fabricated the story. The words of the Act, if given 
ordinary and natural interpretation - and in Selvey's case this is what the 
House of Lords did (43) - might then cause injustice to the accused. It is, 
therefore, only right and proper, or as the courts would say 'fair', that 
the judge should be free to see that evidence of past conduct of the accused 
is not let in if there appears a strong probability of justice being denied 
to the accused. It is true that the courts have not been uniform in giving 
their reasons for the exercise of discretion and words like 'unfairness' or 
'injustice' to the accused have been used interchangeably. It is however 
submitted that when claiming the right to exercise discretion to exclude, it is · 
the likelihood of injustice to the accused which is the dominating factor. 
This is seen in the judgment of, for example, Singleton, J. in R. v Jenkins 
where he said: "••• the judge has a discretion in the matter. He may feel 
that even though the position is established in law, still the putting of 
such questions as to the character of the accused person may be fraught with 
results which immeasurably outweigh the result of questions put by the defence 
and which make the fair trial of the accused person impossible" (44). On the 
other hand, one finds judgments which indicate the influence of the sporting 
theory of an English trial. Thus, in R v Cook Devlin, J., giving the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that, unless the subsection were given 
some restricted meaning, a prisoner's bad character would emerge almost as a 
matter of course if, for example, when charged with assault he asserts that 
the prosecutor struck him first. In Devlin, J.'s view this difficulty can be 
met in two ways. "First, it (the Court of Appeal) has in a number of cases 
construed the words as benevolently as possible in favour of the accused. 
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Secondly, it has laid down that in cases which fall within the words the 
trial judge must not allow as a matter of course questions designed to show 
bad character; he must weigh the prejudicial effect of such questions against 
the damage done by the attack on the prosecution's witnesses and must generally 
exercise his discretion so as to secure a trial that is fair both to the 
prosecution and to the accused" (45). 
Mention of the concept of 'discretion to exclude' admissible evidence 
to mitigate the harshness of the application of the subsection first appeared 
in R v Watson. There Pickford, J., in the Court of Appeal, after pointing 
out that a full court of five judges had in R v Hudson (43) stated that the 
wording of the subsection must be given the natural meaning, said: "It has 
been pointed out that to apply the rule strictly is to put hardship on a prisoner 
with a bad character. That may be so, but it does not follow that a judge 
necessarily allows the prisoner to be cross-examined to character; he has a 
discretion not to allow it, and the prisoner has that protection", that the 
exercise of that discretion is for the judge and "it is not a question for 
the Court whether it would have exercised its discretion in the same way" (46). 
Subsequent cases accept ed the existence of this discretion through various 
dicta until the House of Lords decision in Selvey v D.P.P. Thus, what started 
as a desire to deal with the rigour of the statutory provision, has finally 
come to be an important principle of the law of evidence and is used in 
individual cases to deal with the problem of doing justice to the accused. 
Had the words of the subsection been given liberal interpretation, need for 
the discretion may not have been felt, but, as Devlin, J. said: "••• now 
that it is clearly established that the trial judge has a discretion and that 
he must exercise it so as to secure that the defence is not unfairly 
predjudiced, there is nothing to be gained by seeking to strain the words of 
S.1 proviso (f)(ii) in favour of the defence. We think, therefore, that the 
words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and that the trial 
judge should, in his discretion, do vhat is necessary in the circumstances 
to protect the prisoner from an application of S.1, proviso (f) that would be 
too severe" (47). In Selvey v D.P.P., Lord Guest put further emphasis on this 
reason for discretion. In his view if a judge has no discretion to exclude, 
he ·WOuld have striven hard to give the subsection a liberal construction: 
"I cannot believe that Parliament can have intended that in such cases an 
accused could only put forward such a defence at peril of having his character 
put before the jury. This would be to defeat the benevolent purposes of the 
Act of 1898 which was for the first time to allow the accused to give evidence 
on his own behalf in all criminal cases. 
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This would deprive the accused of the advantage of the Act". (48) 
The emphasis in these judgments is on the damning effect evidence of 
character would have on the accused who, after all, m~ be innocent of the 
crime chargaLbut could only save himself by showing that the complainant 
or the prosecution witness is giving false evidence, and support this by 
showing that the latter has a record of bad character. 'Unfairness' to 
the accused in these situations becomes an alternative term for 'prejudice• 
to the accused: both of these express the likely danger of causing 'injustice' 
to the accused. These are the very expressions used by the courts when 
considering the discretion to exclude similar facts evidence. Indeed, in 
Selvey's case the House made use of the dicta in Christie v D.P.P., 
Noormohamed v R and Harris v D.P.P. to give support for their claim that the 
courts have a discretion to exclude what is otherwise relevant and admissible 
evidence. The origin of the discretion is claimedto be the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts to control the criminal trials and to create 
conditions of 'fairness• to the accused; and although use of it to control 
the operation of a statutory provision in a criminal trial in most cases has 
been in connection with the 1898 Act, R v List (49) shows that it can be 
relied upon to temper the operation of any statutory provision affecting 
methods of proof which~ly upon the character and the past convictions of 
the accused. In this case Roskill, J. held that the trial judge has an 
overriding duty to secure a 'fair trial' and, therefore, could exclude 
evidence of previous convictions, admissible under Section 27 (3)(b) of the 
Theft Act, 1968, if its prejudicial effect would make it virtually impossible 
to take a dispassionate view of the facts of the case. 
That there is a need for judicial discretion to exclude admissible 
evidence cannot be disputed. It is, of course, desirable that rules of 
evidence, like rules of substantive law, should have the attribute of 
certainty, but it is no less desirable that when the nature of evidence 
carries with an inherent likelihood of causing 'prejudice' or 'unfairness' 
or 'injustice' to the accused, then the courts should have the power to 
exclude it. Character evidence is of this type, for it deepens and feeds 
the suspicion and does not independently contribute to proof. Discretion to 
exclude in this area is, therefore, of great practical value. 
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An innocent defendant in a criminal trial, especiall~ where the allegations 
involve sexual offences, may have no avenue left open other than prove the 
unreliability of the witnesses on the other side. On the other hand for an 
effective administration of justice it may be imperative that in these 
circumstances his past character should also be exposed. \~ether the 
accused should be allowed to do the first without the peril of the latter 
can only be determined in individual cases on the criterion of not 
sacrificing justice to the accused for the sake of expediency of obtaining 
a conviction, and this can only be done by the judge concerned (50). 
IV 
In cases where similar fact evidence, that is to say past misconduct 
which may or may not be a crime, is relied upon by the prosecution, the 
general rule of exclusion is eminently sensible, for such evidence has the 
tendency of deepening suspicion rather than prove the guilt. Evidence of 
similar conduct on other occasions does, however, have some probative value: 
such evidence suggests that if the accused has, on other occasions, committed 
acts similar or identical to those which exist in the immediate case, or that 
in the past he had possessed incriminating material, there is a strong 
probability that he is the perpetrator of the present crime (51). However, 
this is only 'probable' and since English criminal procedure cautiously 
prefers to proceed on the basis that it is better to let ten guilty persons 
escape than have one innocent person wrongly convicted, this type of 
evidence, though in strict logic relevant (52),~inherently dangerous for 
~ 
the accused may be one of those few whom the probability theory fails to 
safeguard; despite his past conduct this may be an instance when he is not the 
culprit. tvidence of past conduct, therefore, can have an immensely 
prejudicial effect on a just outcome of the immediate case before the court, 
and hence is inadmissible. 
However, in a number of exceptional cases, whose extension is jealously 
guarded, similar facts evidence is admissible because not only is it_ 
relevant (53) from the standpoint of strict logic but is also significantly 
relevant in the court's view to the whole case before it. •It may be so 
relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute 
the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut 
a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused11 (54). In these 
exceptional cases evidence of past conduct is admitted, 4rst, because it 
shows something more than a mere fact that the accused is of a bad disposition: 
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the present crime committed is of a peculiar nature and bears indelible 
marks suggesting that the perpetrator is a person who, in the past, has been 
convicted of a similar offence. In other words, evidence is admitted 
because it is 'substantially relevant' and does more than merely point a 
finger at a simple tendency to wrongdoing. Secondly, justice cannot be 
done unless prior offences are disclosed to the jury. 
When admitted there is, nonetheless, a serious risk that the whole 
case might be decided against the accused because evidence of past conduct 
is blown up too large in proportion to its importance in the framework of 
the total evidence presented. Thus,there is an ever-present, and by no means 
an improbable, risk that an innocent person might get convicted and it is, 
therefore, essential that even in these well-recognised limited number of 
exceptions, the court should be vested with some power to exclude evidence 
which in principle is admissible. English law encapsulates this need in the 
concept of 'judicial discretion to exclude' relevant evidence (55). 
The principle underlying the discretionary power to exclude 'relevant 
and admissible' evidence in this area is that the prejudicial effect of 
such evidence might be greater than its probative value: the inferential 
connection between the accused's conduct immediately in issue and his past 
conduct is very much akin to prejudice and is neither supportable by logic 
nor susceptible to observation by the senses. This reasoning also applies 
to excluding relevant and admissible implied admissions made by the accused 
against himself, for failure to reply to or comment upon by the accused to 
an allegation soon after the event constituting the crime could be for any 
number of reasons other than that of implied acceptance ofthe truth of the 
allegations, Injustice (56) could be caused by not excluding such evidence, 
for its truth or falsity is not capable of proof by means other than mere 
probability derived in the light of human experience as to the usual reaction 
of an average normal person to such allegations. If a reply would normally 
be expected, then silence leads to conclusion that allegations were true: 
failure to reply lends veracity to the allegations (57). In such cases, a 
safeguard for a possibly innocent person is the discretion to exclude the 
evidence. The reason for the discretion principle is, again, that the 
accused may fail to get a 'fair trial' because the prejudicial tendency of 
the evidence may be greater than its probative value: the evidence is relevant 
and admissible but because it is not of unimpeachable quality, it is 'unfair' 
to the accused (58) to receive it. 
- 49 -
References to 'fairness' as the reason for, as well as the basis of 
judicial discretion are abundant. In Christie v R Lord Moulton did not 
elaborate on what he meant when referring to the courts' "anxiety to secure 
for everyone a fair trial" (59). In Selvey v D.P.P. Lord Dilhorne, when 
discussing the circumstances in which discretion should be exercised, said 
that there was no general rule as to the exercise of discretion: "It must 
depend on the circumstances of each case and the overriding duty of the 
judge to ensure that a trial is fair" (60). According to Lord Guest "The 
guiding star should be fairness to the accused •••• If it is suggested that 
the exercise of this discretion may be whimsical and depend on the individual 
idiosyncracies of the judge, this is inevitable where it is a question of 
discretion •••••• " (61). Similarly Lord Pearce endorsed the "unfairness to the 
accused" principle (62). Again in Noormahamed v R Lord du Parcq, expressing 
the opinion of the Privy Council, said: "It is right to add, however, that 
in all such cases the judge ought to consider whether the evidence which it 
is proposed to adduce is sufficiently substantial having regard to the purpose 
to which it is professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of 
justice that it should be admitted ••••• cases must occur in which it 
would be unjust to admit evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the 
accused even though there may be some tenuous ground for holding it 
technically admissible. The decision must then be left to the discretion and 
the sense of fairness of the judge" (63). 
Thus whether one looks at the discretion to exclude arising under the 
provisions of s.1. (i)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 or where the 
evidence is of past misconduct or is of implied admissions, the concept of 
'fairness to the accused' constantly recurs in explaining the circumstances 
in which the court should exclude what is otherwise an admissible evidence. 
The precise situations when the tri.'al judge should exercise discretion in 
favour of the accused are not defined. Indeed, any attempt to do so is 
avoided for the concept of 'unfairness' is considered sufficiently flexible 
to provide the degree of freedom which enables the courts to manage the conflict 
of interests between the demand of society that the culprit be brought to 
justice and the other demand of it which calls for an insurance that innocent 
persons should not suffer and that the methods by which conviction or acquittal 
are obtained should not ignore the values of a free society. As Lord Hodson, 
in replying to the argument that the conception of fairness in the exercise 
of that discretion is too imprecise, said: 
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"Fair, as a word, may be imprecise, but I find it impossible to define it 
or even to attempt an enumeration of all the factors which have been taken 
into account in any given case", (64) and supporting this approach Lord Guest 
has said: "If it is suggested that the exercise of this discretion may be 
whimsical and depend on the individual idiosyncracies of the judge, this 
is inevitable where it is a question of discretion, but I am satisfied that 
this is a less risk than attempting to shackle the judge's power within a 
strait jacket" ( 6 5). 
Although the meaning of 'fairness' is unclear, it may be validly be 
interpreted as an expression of the desire to secure "justice to the accused". 
Similar facts evidence, though logically relevant, may in the circumstances 
of the case outweigh its probative value by is prejudicial effect. Attacking 
the character of the prosecution witnesses may be essential to the defence and, 
therefore, the trial judge should be left with discretion to disallow 
questions on accused's past if such an attack is unavoidable. Silence or denial 
in the face of accusations may be given in evidence, but, again, in the 
circumstances of the case such evidence might be highly prejudicial and likely 
to lead to injustice and, therefore, the trial judge should have discretion 
to exclude it; the mere fact that the accused remained silent in the face of 
accusators may or may not be an acceptance of the truth of the allegations, 
but only the trial judge can decide whether being relevant it should still 
be excluded. In all these cases avoidance of injustice is the governing 
principle. However, occasionally there is a suggestion of making the contest 
more even. Thus, Lord Hodson, in deciding not to exercise the exclusionary 
discretion, once said: "This is not, in their opinion, a case in which 
evidence has been obtained by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take 
advantage. If they had thought otherwise, they would have excluded the 
evidence even though tendered for the suppression of the Crime" (66). 
v 
However, so far as admissibility of confessions is concerned, the 
courts have not applied the rule of relevance and admissibility subject to 
discretionary exclusion. It, therefore, is pertinent to analyse the factors 
which have led to strict exclusionary principle rather than to an 
inclusionary one. It is a fundamental principle of English law, (67), 
that for an alleged confession by the accused to be admitted the prosecution 
must prove that it was a voluntary one, that is to say it was not the result 
of a promise of a favour or fear of prejudice held out or exercised by a 
person in authority. 
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The rule has been restated in may subsequent cases (68), though there is no 
clear and consistent discussion of the policy considerations underlying the 
formulation of the exclusionary rule (69). A number of cases give credence 
to the theory that the exclusionary principle on confessions is based on 
the greater probability that what is confessed is untrue. As Pollock ~.B. 
put it in R. v Baldry (68): "The ground for not receiving such evidence is 
that it would not be safe to receive a statement made under any influence 
or fear. There is no presumption of law that is false or that the law 
considers such statements cannot be relied upon; but such confessions are 
rejected because it is supposed that it would be dangerous to leave such 
evidence to the jury" (70) and according to Lord Campbell, C. J. "I doubt 
whether the rule excluding confessions made in consequence of an inducement 
held out proceeds upon the presumption that the confession is intrue; but 
rather that it would be dangerous to receive such evidence, and that for 
the due administration of justice it is better that it should be withdrawn 
from the consideration of the jury". Thus involuntary confessions are 
excluded not because that they are necessarily testimonially untrustworthy. 
Confessions, although induced by fear or promise, may sometimes be 
trustworthy. What is confessed be entitled to credit, yet English courts 
have set their face against going into the possible truth or falsity of the 
involuntary confessions and, provided there is a promise or threat, the 
exclusionary principle will be applied to it with predictable consistency (70b). 
Any discussion of the justifications for this exclusionary rule could 
be within the context of any of the following: (i) the likely or inherent 
danger that what is confessed may be false or (ii) the method by which 
involuntary confession has been obtained is a violation by the police of the 
basic civil rights and privileges of the accused and the courts are the only 
institution which can prevent acts like assault or third degree methods -
physical or psychological - abhorrent to a free society. In other words, 
due administration of justice can only take place if certain minimum standards 
of decency are observed. In this context the courts are using rules of 
evidence as a tool for maintaining or shaping a society and controlling the 
pre-trial police conduct; (iii) the doctrine of privilege against self-
incrimination (71). (iv) 'Unfairness' to the accused. The third is, of 
course, very much connected with the second for the privilege, though 
historically tracing its origin from the pr~ctice and procedure in the Star 
Chamber, does have the function of ensuring that the police should be 
encouraged to have an efficient and effective system of crime detection, 
apprehension and conviction. 
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However, the almost inevitable fate of exclusion that has followed the 
attempts at adducing evidence of involuntary confessions (72) indicates that 
the first cannot be a sole reason for the exclusionary rule; if it were so, 
a rational approach would be to leave the confession to the jury for an 
independent evaluation of its truth or falsity. A less objectionable -
and again a rational - rule could be that involuntary confession should be 
admissible subject to the judicial discretion to exclude. B~ this is not 
the principle and confessions, whatever their worth, are excluded 
automatically once the prosecution fails to prove that they were voluntary. 
The judicial decisions do not give a uniform reason for the exclusionary 
rule. 'Unfairness to the accused' can hardly be the rationale of the rule 
though its influence, at unconsciqus level and in the light of the history 
of the Star Chamber, cannot be ruled out; exerting mental or physical pressures, 
or offering of favours, is very much reminiscent of the Star Chamber practices. 
The likeliest reason for the exclusionary rule seems to lie in the combined 
influences of the privilege against self-incrimination, part concern that if 
left to the jury the danger of convicting an innocent person is not totally 
eliminated, and the need for the judges to deter the police from indulging 
in practices not in accord with the values of a free society. A great 
American authority on the law of evidence has vigorouslydenied any connection 
between the privilege against self-incrimination and the exclusionary rule 
(73). According to him if the two are related at all, the connection lies 
in the fact that the rules owe their origin to the courts' cautious and 
protective attitude to the accused. Such a suggestion, however, ignores 
the fact that there can be more than one reason for a rule. A cautious and 
protective attitude reflects a narrow concern for an innocent person, though, 
as will be seen, modern judgements relying on the notion of 'fairness to the 
accused' do suggest this protective attitude. However, it is difficult to 
accept the suggestion that the privilege or the belief that a coerced 
confession may be totally false have had no influence on the development of 
the exclusionary rule. 
It is true that there is no indication in the pronouncements that the 
courts undertake the role of safeguarding individual rights through the rules 
of evidence. However, some support for such a judicial role is apparent in 
the courts' approach to admissibility of statements by the accused made in 
the absence of cautions required by the Judges' Rules. 
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Physical assaults or psychological pressures and intimidating 
atmosphere that result from confining the suspect in a small and closed 
area, and cutting him off from all friendly or protective forces and 
surrounding him with law enforcing officials, all create fear and uncertainty 
for the accused. These amount to violation of his basic rights and also are 
the first step to arbitrary actions and to an authoritarian system of social 
order. Questions asked in these circumstances may not involve physical 
maltreatment, buit the situations may amount to inducement or fear. English 
courts have, therefore, laid down minimum standards of tolerable conduct 
in circumstances when no arrest has been made or where there is insufficient 
evidence to bring a charge. These basic standards are reflected in what are 
known as the Judges' Rules (74). Evidence obtained in breach of these rules 
is not necessarily inadmissible, but the courts have reserved to themselves 
a discretion to exclude it. Thus Lord Sumner, giving his opinion on the 
breach of the rules, said: ·~ judges, in their discretion, exclude such 
evidence, for they fear that nothing less than the exclusion of all such 
statements can prevent improper questioning or prisoners by removing the 
inducement to resort to it ••••••• Others less tender to the prisoner or more 
mindful of the balance of decided authority, would admit such statements, 
nor would the Court of Criminal Appeal quash the conviction thereafter 
obtained, if no substantial miscarriage of justice had ooourred 11 (75). 
However, opinion has been expressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal that 
enforcement of the Rules tends to 11 the fair administration of justice11 (76). 
Thus, the Rules indicate the English courts' awareness of the need for 
a restraining hand on the police. Lord Sumner's reference to an opinion, 
i.e. the law has been in this respect tender to the accused (77), reflects a 
view that the judiciary doeshave the function of enforcing the Rules but may 
at times have carriedt~s duty to absurd limits. Moreover, the influence of 
of the old English preceptnemo tenetur se ipsum accusare cannot be ignored, 
even though the language of the judges may not make this clear; it is the 
second plank of the basis for the Rules. 'Fairness to the accused' embraces 
the various ideals of the value system of the society, ideals required to be 
aimed at in the process of apprehension and conviction of a suspect. Law 
enforcement must not be hampered by restrictive rules, but then nor should 
the law enforcement agencies be allowed to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the values implied in the description of a society as a 'free society'. 
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The 'due administration of justice' (78) requires observance of some 
basic standards, some minimum decencies, and obtaining of confessions by 
threats or favours infringes these standards and renders them inadmissible. 
This reason also underlies the discretionary exclusion of confessions 
obtained whilst cross-examining the suspect after he has been arrested. 
Thus, if the conduct of the police, in questioning the suspect can be 
described as outrageous on the prevailing moral standards, the resultant 
evidence would be disallowed. 
This means that there is no single basis for the exclusion of an 
involuntary confession. The influence of history on criminal trials, 
combined with other reasons of varying attraction to the judiciary have 
produced this exclusionary rule. What is reasonably certain is that the 
probable truth or falseness of the confession is not, contrary to Wigmore's 
thesis, the only basis of the rule. Confessions m~ be relevant to the 
issue before the court; indeed, they may be true and supported by other 
factual and corroborating evidence. Yet they are invariably excluded if 
technically involuntary. However, although any one or more of the above 
policy bases of the rule may be valid, the logical development of the rule 
presents some problems when a confession, or some part of it, is confirmed 
by subsequent facts (79). 
Real evidence may have been discovered as a consequence of an 
involuntary and inadmissible confession. In R v Warickshall (80) the court 
said that such 'real evidence• or 'facts' are admissible for "a fact •••• 
must exist invariably in the same manner whether the confession from which 
it derives be in other respects true or false". There are decisions in 
favour of admitting relevant parts of the originally inadmissible confessions 
(81) for the subsequent discovery of 'real evidence' renders that part of 
the oonfession testimonially trustworthy. R v Warickshall itself however, 
said that such 'facts' must be proved without calling in the aid of any 
part of the confession ••• " (82). However, case law on whether subsequently 
discovered 'real evidence' lets in the preceding confession is inconsistent 
(83). In fact, such real evidence does not necessarily remove the 
untrustworthiness of the prior confession, for the accused may, for example, 
have knowledge of the whereabouts of the property and may still have been 
coerced into making a confession. 
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If ascertaining the truth is the only aim of a criminal trial - no 
matter what methods were adopted to obtain the evidence to establish the 
truth- then subsequently discovered evidence with so much of the confession 
as is substantiated by the discovered 'facts' should be admitted. However, 
the authorities do not lend support to such a rule (84). 
This uncertainty coupled with the fact that confessions are notwen 
looked into to ascertain their truth, and the fact that improperly obtained 
confessions in breach of the Judges' Rules are sometimes excluded in the 
court's discretion, suggest that the basis of the confession rule is 
abstruse and has more than one pillar to support it. As Campbell, c. J. put 
it in R v Baldry (85): "••••• the law (does not) suppose that the statement 
will be false, but that the prisoner has made the confession under a bias, 
and that., therefore, it would be better not to submit it to the jury" or, 
as Lord Copper (86) expressed, 'fairness' was the ultimate test for the 
admissibility of confessions and 8 if it were competent for the police at their 
hand to subject the accused to interrogation and cross-examination and to 
adduce evidence of what he said, the prosecution would in effect be making 
the accused a compellable witness". This is a clear statement that the 
reason for the rule is to discourage bad or undesirable police practices. 
Thus, the reasons for the exclusionary rule are various - the reasons which 
also provide justification for the treatment that is accorded to subsequently 
discovered real evidence. A concern with the wider notion of justice is 
reflected in the choice of words like 'fairness' to the accused or 'making 
the accused a compellable witness' and thereby denying him the privilege 
against self-incrimination. In other words, the danger that the confession 
may be false, that admitting it would be 'unfair' in the sense that it would 
be condoning police practices abhorrent to the values of the society, that 
the police may need a deterrent as much as the law breakers are the factors 
supporting the exclusionary rule. 
Thus, in the three situations discussed above - i.e. evidence under the 
1898 Act, similar facts evidence, and admissions - the inclusionary rule, 
tempered by the exclusionary discretion, makes sense; for at least it 
provides, or strengthens, safeguards for an innocent person, The 
inclusionary rule in these situations is prudent and conduces to proper 
administration of justice. ~he existence of judicial discretion does not 
grossly sacrifice the principle of certainty of law; if the purpose of a 
criminal trial be to protect an innocent person as much as to find the 
guilty, then the concept of discretion is an effective tool in fulfilling it. 
However, so far as the exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions is 
concerned, 
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it is doubtful whether the sole reason for it is the probably falsity of 
the confession; other policy reasons lie behind the rule, including the 
importance of penalising the police for their conduct (87). 
VI 
When real or factual evidence, obtained by illegal search or arrest, 
is adduced, the inclusionary rule is based on the criterion of 'relevance' 
and the 'best evidence' rule. However, the accused is given a protective 
shield in the form of judicial discretion to exclude. Such an exclusionary 
discretion suggests some policy reason. Real evidence is an observable fact; 
it is unimpeachable and, unlike the similar facts evidence or admissions 
or confessions, it is of absolute probative value. It contains least 
inherent risk of being false and, therefore, cannot prejudice the minds of the 
jury. It is the 'best evidence' that can be adduced to prove an issue. 
However, according to Lord Goddard the courts have a jurisdiction to exercise 
discretion to exclude such evidence if in their opinion admitting it works 
'unfairly' against the accused (88). A hypothetical situation given by his 
lordship to illustrate what amounts to 'unfairness' is when the evidence was 
obtained by a •trick'; beyond this,'unfairness' did not receive any further 
exposition. The term may therefore have been intended to convey the idea 
of 'fair play' (89). Such a notion of a criminal trial disapproves of any 
methods, on the part of the contesting paDties, which offend the rules of the 
'game': it reflects the sporting theory of a criminal trial. It is not 
unknown thatJnthe Continental system of a trial the main duty of the judge 
is to aim at, and seek out, the truth and in this objective a judge is 
allowed a more active part in the proceedings than can be imagined in an 
English trial. The procedural, and evidential, rules of an English trial, 
although paying lip-service to the ideal of ascertaining the truth, are 
inclined towards, as Pollock and Maitland put it, a combative approach (90). 
A criminal trial, on this view, is a gladatorial contest where the prosecutor 
and the defence,must observe the rules of 'fair play'. One of the factors, 
and perhaps a major one, that has influenced 0ur rules of evidence is its 
historical process and in this the influence of the Star Chamber, where 
torture was commonly practised as a means of "ascertaining the truth", looms 
large. This fact has been responsible for the common law revulsion against 
anything which resembles physical or mental oppression. 
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For example, the right of the accused not to be examined on oath springs 
from this feeling against the Star Chamber procedure (91). One can 
similarly trace the origin of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
However, to say that historical factors are responsible for the formulation 
of the rules of evidence and procedure is not to denigrate them;for such 
rules can rarely be scientific; they reflect a system of values of the 
particular society and this very system of values, albeit a changed one, 
may call for, in the field of law on police powers, rules of evidence which 
mirror some minimum standards of decency in a free society. 
The reference to 'trick' carneup again during the hearing on appeal 
in Callis v Gunn (92). The question before the Divisional Court was whether 
discretion should have been exercised to exclude evidence of finger prints 
which had been obtained without administering a caution (according to the 
Judges' Rules) that the defendant was not obliged to have his finger prints 
taken (93) Counsel argued that no man was obliged to convict himself and 
therefore the evidence was inadmissible. Lord Parker, C.J. took Kuruma v R 
as stating the "general law" on this matter and said: 11 I would add that in 
considering whether admissibility would operate unfairly against a defendant 
one would certainly consider whether it had been obtained in an oppressive 
manner by force or against the wishes of an accused person. That is the 
general principle". The notable feature of this judgment is the use of the 
criterion of 'unfairness', which is given a definition; it means that the 
evidence being adduced had been brought to light by methods which~ be 
described as oppressive. This definition is a step further from Kuruma v R, 
though one is at a loss to comprehend the reason for choosing the term 
'unfairness' to encapsulate such police behaviour. His lordship also held 
that the Rulesdid not apply because the issue was not concerned with answers 
to the police or statements made by a defendant, and therefore the evidence 
was admissible subject to the overriding discretion of the court to exclude it. 
"That discretion, as I understand it, wouJd, certainly be exercised by 
excluding the evidence if there was any suggestion of it having been obtained 
oppressively, by false representations, by a trick, by threats, by bribery, 
anything of that sort•i. In the present case the police did not appear to have 
represented to the accused "that he had to accede", but only that they did 
not make sufficiently clear to the accused that he had a right to refuse, and, 
therefore, there was nothing to justify exercising the discretion to exclude 
(94). 
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A number of ideas are here used to illustrate 'unfairness': these 
are 'trick', 'misrepresentation', 'bribery' or, probably ejusdem generis, 
'anything of that sort'. The policy considerations underlying the 
discretion were not considered. What aspects, or char&Pteristics, are common 
to trick, bribery and misrepresentation which make it necessary to exercise 
the discretion to exclude? 'Oppressive conduct' can hardly be an 
appropriate concept to describe these three situations, Indeed, they may 
not even be termed 'unfair' to the accused, if 'unfairness' were to be given 
its ordinary meaning in this context. After all, misrepresentations and 
tricks are some of the features of police work in apprehending the criminals. 
One finds it hard to explain the courts' disapprobation of such conduct, 
except on the ground that there are certain types of conduct on the partof 
the police which the courts cannot countenance. Evidence obtained by a 
'trick' does not necessarily lead to 'injustice', however strongly one may 
deprecate the method; in fact resorting to tricks can hardly be said to be 
something totally alien to the nature of the police work, since use of 
informers is certainly an acceptable, if not essential, tool for crime 
detection and the ultimate apprehension and conviction (95). Injustice 
to the accused can only arise when he, though probably innocent, is 
convicted or where, though probably guilty, he is prevented from establishing 
his innocence because of some highly prejudicial evidence of intangible 
nature adduced against him. Thus evidence of involuntary confessions or of 
similar facts may reasonably be said to carry with it a serious danger of 
prejudice; but in no circumstances can it be maintained that 'real evidence' 
can lead to an unjust result. It may invoke public disapproval or outcry 
and may discredit the police, but it cannot lead to injustice to the accused. 
Lord Parker's extended, and more comprehensive, statement of the 
circumstances which would justify exercising exclusionary discretion to some 
extent impliesthat the meaning of 'unfairness to the accused' may not be 
only in the sense of 'fair play'. But, at the same time, nor can it be only 
in the sense of 'injustice to the accused' for, as already argued, where 
relevant real evidence is available it cam1ot be bettered for the purpose of 
deciding on the guilt or innocence of the accused. Besides, if 'unfairness' 
is intended to mean 'injustice', this is not made clear and KU+Uma v R does not 
support such a connotation. In Kuruma v R there was no examination of the 
forces underlying the strict exclusionary rule in the United States (96). 
As it is, one is forced to look to other decisions - involving both 
illegality and impropriety in the police conduct- to derive the rationale 
of the exclusionary discretion. One thing is certain: the illustrations 
provided by the oourts to explain some of the circumstances when discretion 
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would be exercised suggest something more than, if not different from, a 
concern for injustice to the accused or unfair play by the prosecution; it 
is submitted that the con~r.n is with the police conduct towards the rights 
~ 
and privileges of the individual. niscretion would be exercised if this 
conduct is of a type to attract strong disapproval of the particular court 
concerned. In other words, evidence is excluded because of certain values 
of the society make exclusion necessary. 
R v Payne (97) was a case where the method of obtaining evidence 
involved impropriety. The defendant had consented to be examined by a doctor, 
after being told that it would .be part of the doctor's duty to give an opinion 
as to his unfitness to drive. Evidence was eventually adduced as to the 
extent to which the defendant.was under the influence of drinks and that he 
was unfit to have proper control of the car. The report makes it clear that 
this misleading promise was ndadeliberate lie for at the time there was a 
definite policy to examine the detained persoh medically but only to ascertain 
whether he was suffering from any illness or physical disability (98). 
Allowing the appeal by the defendant Lord Parker, C.J. said that whilst such 
evidence was clearly admissible "nevertheless the chairman in the exercise 
of his discretion ought to have refused to allow that evidence to be given on 
thebasis that if the accused realised that the doctor would give evidence on 
that matter he might refuse to subject himself to examination" (99). It is 
obvious that here there was a misrepresentation, though at the relevant 
time the police had no 'intention' to mislead or tell a lie; in fact 
according to the police practice at the time of the examination the statement 
was true. However, even if we were to infer a 'misrepresentation' 
objectively, it was here that the impropriety lay. Yet it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that in Callis v Gunn there was a 'trick', albeit a 
subtle one. In both cases the evidence was relevant and non-prejudicial, 
and yet in the earlier case police conduct attracted no disapprobation but 
in the latter it did (100). The consequence of any police conduct seem to 
lie in the purely subjective attitude of the courts~it. Admittedly, the 
notion of 'judicial discretion' imples non-fixed approach; but the concept 
does not rule out a comprehensive delineation of the circumstances - and not 
only examples, which would bring about its exercise in favour of the accused; 
exercise of judicial discretion, precisely because it is discretionary, 
will inevitably differ from case to case, but it is an unfortunatecaspedt to 
the law that the principles on which it will be exercised are not definitely 
laid down. Common law may once have developed on a pragmatic basis, but in 
this field of law pragmatism only conduces to greater uncertainty where 
maximum certainty should be theHeal. Moreoever, such an approach leaves 
the individal court free to decide the issue under the prevailing emotional 
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climate on the subject of law and order (101). 
However, in another context this notion of 'unfairness to the accu~sed', 
has not prevented the courts from admitting improperly obtained 'real evidence•. 
Even though it is recognised that tapes, carrying recorded evidence of 
conversation, can be edited and manipulated with considerable ease and 
efficiency, the courts have not been unduly perturbed in admitting evidence 
of such recordings. (102) Thus in R v Maqsud Ali (103) the Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that whether such evidence should be excluded was a matter of 
judicial discretion and the judge had properly warned the jury of the caution 
with which the transalations should beconsidered, and that in principle there 
was no difference between a tape recording and a photograph, the latter for 
quite some time being admissible. To the appellants' argument that even 
though relevant and admissible the evidence should have been excluded because 
it operated unfairly against them because they had not been warned of the 
presence of the microphone, l1arshall, J. said: "The police were inquiring 
into a particularly savage murder and it was a matter of great public concern 
that those responsible should be traced. There is no question here of being 
in custody and subject to any Judges' Rules {104). The criminal does not 
act according to Queensberry Rules. The method of the informer and of the 
eavesdropper is commonly used in the detection of crime. The only difference 
here was that a mechanical device was the eavesdropper. If, in such 
circumstances and at such a point in the investigations, the appellants by 
incautious talk provided evidence against themselves, then in the view of 
this court it would not be unfair to use against them. The method of taking 
the recording cannot affect admissibility as a matter of law although it 
must remain very much a matter for the discretion of the judge" {105). In 
the context of the above statement it is relevant to note that the microphone 
had been placed behind a waste paper basket in a room at the Town Hall and 
amnnection had been made to a recorder in another room. 
No reference was made to Kuruma v R, though the criterion of 
'unfairness' appears to be accepted for the purpose of exercising the 
exclusionary discretion. The passage quoted raises three points. First, 
presumably if there had been compulsion on the part of the police, for 
example if the appellants had been detained at the police station without 
having been arrested, the recorded evidence would have been described as 
unfair to the accused {106). Secondly, so far as tape recorded evidence 
is concerned, the exercise of the 'exclusionary discretion' is determined by 
reference to the 'unreliability' of the recording and not to the method of 
recording; in other words, even if the method amounts to •trickery', 
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discretion would not be exercised. Thirdly - and this is left uncertain 
by this decision - would the evidence be admitted if the mechanical device 
is fitted to the accused's premises and the recording of the conversation 
is picked up by the recording device in a car a few hundred·yards away? 
Admittedly, this would amount to a technical trespass, but, as has been seen, 
under Elias v Passmore and Kuruma v R it may be excused and the resultant 
evidence admitted. Indeed, according to Marshall, J., this would be 
acceptable to the court since the "method of the informer and of the 
eavesdropper is commonly used in the detection of crime" (107). If this 
case were treated as confined to the admissibility of evidence of tape recording, 
then such evidence is admissible unless the method of obtaining it amounted 
to compulsion for the defendant to stay in the room where recording w~s 
made. However, this does not say anything new on the subject of 'unfairness 
to the accused'; for if there is compulsion then such evidence might come 
within the confession rule. In R v Rose and Mills, Winn, J. did impliedly 
suggest that if the method of obtaining the recording amounted to 'sharp 
practice' on the part of the police it may be excluded. In that case the 
conversation between the appellants,who were in separate cells abutting 
on to a corridor, had been overheard by the police officer, and the court 
felt that it was 11not a case in which any device of concealing a microphone 
in a cell in order to pick up conversation conducted between the occupants 
of the same cell was employed" (108). What, therefore, is the criterion 
for exercising the exclusionary discretion in a situation where evidence 
of conversation has been recorded without the consent or knowledge of the 
persons involved in the conversation? Is it 'unfairness' to the accused? 
If so, does it mean 'compulsion' or any 'sharp practice'. One can be 
fairly certain in identifying 'compulsion', but what does the latter mean? 
In the Northern Ireland case of R v Murphy (109) the defendant based 
his appeal on the fact that there had been a 'trick'. He had been 
convicted under s.60(1) of the Army Act, 1955 for the offence of disclosing 
information useful to the enemy. The substance of the case against him 
consisted of evidence of police officers who had posed as members of a 
subversive organisation and thereby elicited information from·him. The 
appellant argued that since they had, as agents provocateur, practised 
deception on him and had caused him to disclose information which he would 
not otherwise have disdosed to them, the evidence had been obtained unfairly. 
It was held that in this case the police were not out to seduce a loyal 
soldier from his allegiance, but to discover whether the appellant was a 
loyal and trustworthy person. 
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As to the exercise of the discretion, Lord MacDermott referred to 
Kuruma v R and Callis v Gunn and ~pproved the view taken at the trial of 
the appellant that the court has an inherent discretion to refuse to admit 
such evidence if cit was so unfairly obtained that it would be contrary to 
the interests of justice to admit it". As to Lord Parker's dictum in 
Callis v Gunn he said: '~e do not read this passage as doing more than 
listing a variety of classes of opporessive conduct (110) which would 
justify exclusion. It certainly gives no ground for saying that evidence 
obtained by any false representation or trick is to be disregarded as 
oppressive and left out of consideration. Detection by deception is a form 
of police procedure to be directed and used sparingly and with circumspection; 
but as a method it is as old as the constable in plainclothes and, 
regrettable though the fact may be, the day has not yet come when it would 
be safe to say that law and order could alw~s be enforced and the public 
safety protected without occasional resort to it". In this case admittedly 
there was a 'trick' or 'misrepresentation' on the part of the police and 
"no other way of obtaining this relevation has been demonstrated or 
suggested". However, in the court's view, Lord Parker never intended to 
lay down any rule of law that once 'trick' is proved discretion to exclude 
must be exercised in favour of the accused. 
Thus, the criterion for exercising discretion is the oppressiveness of 
the conduct of the police. However, if, as Lord MacDermott claims, 
Lord Parker's reference to a 'trick' was only an example, it is certainly 
a distortion of language to say that trick or a misrepresentation is 
oppressive conduct. Moreover, it is simply not true that Lord Parker did 
not intend to say that proof of a trick would not automatically result in 
exclusion of the evidence, for it had been made clear in Callis v Gunn 
that discretion would "certainly be exercised if there was a trick or 
misrepresentation". As to whether, in the immediate case, there was 
'unfairness' to the accused, the court said: •unfairness in this context 
cannot be closely defined. But it must be judged of in the light of all 
the material facts and findings and all the surrounding circumstances. The 
position of the accused, the nature of the investigations, and the gravity 
or otherwise of the suspected offence, may all be relevant. That is not to 
say that the standard of fairness must bear some sort of inverse proportion 
to the extent to which the public interest may be involved, but different 
offences may pose different problems for the police and justify different 
methods" (111). Thus, to put in a nutshell, 'unfairness' has no precise 
definition; it all depends on the type of offence being investigated, and 
on this will depend the freedom of the police in using appropriate methods 
to get evidence. 
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There could not be a better example of a meaningless and haphazard use of 
a word. It is difficult to point out any social interest or as 
Lord MacDermott puts it, the 'interest of justice', that is served by 
excluding evidence obtained in this way or by a misrepresentation. Neither 
of these types of conduct, and there may be many similar types of conduct 
not enumerated either by Lord Goddard or by Lord Parker- could probably 
be claissified as amounting to 'oppressive conduct'; the only other reason 
for the discretion appears to be the sporting theory of a criminal trial. 
As the Criminal Law Revision Committee put it;~the habit has grown up of 
looking at a criminal trial as-a kind of game to be played. according to 
fixed rules, between the prosecution and the defence; and since the defence 
are nat~ally likely to be the weaker ( and the accused may very likely 
seem stupid and helpless), it seems to be expected that the prosecution 
will refrain from using all their strength and that the judge will take 
any opportunity to make the contest more even" (112). 
This Committee has also suggested that, so far as police questioning 
of the suspects is con~rned, there should be two branches of the rule as to 
confession. First, the confession should hot be admissible if the 
prosecution fail to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was not obtained 
by the oppressive treatment of the accused, or secondly, that it was not 
made in consequence of any t~eat or inducement of a sort likely, in the 
circumstances of the case, to render the resulting con~ession unreliable 
(113). The latter is a retention of the present rule as to involuntary 
confessions, though in a substantially changed form. However, the 
recommendation only relates to police questioning, and though 'oppressive 
conduct' is introduced as a new, and independent, notion for exclusion of 
a confession (114), the concept of 'oppressive conduct' as the basis for the 
exercise of discretion to exclude what is otherwise an admissible piece of 
evidence appears to be unaffected by the Report. The Committee recognises 
the general judicial discretion to exclude admissible evidence (115), but 
decides against any attempt to state the grounds on which this discretion 
should be exercised. It says: "\lie considered an argument that either the 
general discretion should be abolished and the law amended so as to make 
the evidence inadmissible in those cases (including, on one view, cases 
where the evidence was obtained illegally) where it was thought right in 
policy that it should be excluded or at least to define, for the sake of 
uniformity, the criteria on what the discretion should be exercised. 
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But our general view is that the existence of the discretion is 
valuable in that it enables the courts to exclude evidence in cases, 
difficult to foresee and define, where its introduction would clearly 
be undesirable in the particular circumstances, and that it is best to 
leave it to· the courts to lay down any general principles on which the 
discretion should be exercised" {116). One can only be excused for 
entertaining a serious doubt whether the courts would be willing to lay down 
any "general principle", for as seen the courts themselves appear to be 
no wiser as the the meaning of 'unfair to the accused'. 
1. 
2. 
6. 
a. 
10. 
11. 
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confessions has no application whatever as to the admission or 
rejection of facts •••• a fact must exist invariably in the same 
manner whether the confession from which it derives be in other 
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case has no~ been overruled, see infra. chapter 3. 
15. See \'lolf v Colo.rado, 338 u.s. 25 (1949) and l1app v Ohio 367 U.s. 
643 (1961). 
16. The Committee cited Rattray v Rattray (1897), 35 S.L.R. 294, 
Fairle~ v Fishmongers of London (1951) Soots;L.T. S4, Lawrie v 
Muir Ll95Q7 Just. Cas. 19. . 
17. Supra. And see the Irish case of People v Lowley Ll95i7 Ir. 
Jur. Rep.38. 
18. Ll9517 Just. Cas. 96. Lord Goddard's example of 'police trick' 
as a ground for excluding the evidence was apparently borrowed 
from this decision. 
19. But see H.M. Advocate v McGovan Ll95Q7 Just. Cas. 33 - trespass 
to person by taking of the scrapings from the fingernails of a 
suspect without his consent• evidence inadmissible; Lord Justice 
- General Cooper said1 "This is not a case where I feel disposed 
to 'excuse' the conduct of the police". Cf. Fairle~ v Fishmongers 
of London Ll95Y Just. Cas 14 and Marsh v Jobnaon Ll95i/ Crm. L. 
Rev. 744. For a brief discussion of the Scottish cases see Paul 
Hardin in 113 Univ. Pan. L. Rev. 165 at 167-169. Also Cowen and 
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23. Ibid at 240. 
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di~retion to exclude admissible evidence. See Prof. Rupert Cross 
in~~ol. L. Review 79. However, Prof. Cross assumas that the 
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conduct, relevant to the issue, could be admitted. See R v Hudson 
Ll91i7 2 K.B.464 at 470-71 per Lord Alverstone, C.J. Cf. R v Preston 
Ll9017 1 K.B.l31 and R v Westfall (1912) 7 Cr. App. R.l76. 
44• (1945) 31 Cr. App. R. 1 at 15. 
45· /19527 2 All E.R.97 at 99; see also r V Elgan Ll9617 3 All E.R.58 
62 "paramount consideration of having a fair trial". 
46. (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 249 at 254, and at 255. 
47. R v Cook, supra at 101. 48. Selvey v D.P.P. supra. at 519. 
49· (1966) 50 Cr. App. R.81 decided on what was at that time s.43 Larceny 
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stolen. See also R.V. Heron (1966) 50 Cr. App. R.132. The Court of 
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of mens rea under S.27(3) of Theft Act 1968 See R v Knott Ll97lV Crim. 
L. Rev. 36. 
50. In R v Christie, supra. Lord Halsbury, L.C. protested, during the 
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discretion to exclude what is othe~V"ise in law admissible evidence 
(1914) 10 Cr. App. R 141 at 149• 
51. In R v Rowton (1865) Le and Ca. 520 \o/illes, J. said that evidence of 
bad character of the defendant "is not admissible upon the part of 
the prosecution, because ••• if the prosectuion were allowed to go into 
such evidence we should have the whole life of the prisoner ripped up" 
and if past character were to be revealed "the result would be that 
the man on his trial might be overwhelmed by prejudice, instead of 
being convicted on that affirmative evidence which the law of this 
country requires. The evidence is relevant to the issue, but is 
excluded for reasons of policy and humanity, because, although b,y 
admitting it you might arrive at justice in one case out of a hundred, 
you would probably do injustice in the other ninety-nine". 
52. Though, especially in the case of 'similar facts e~idenoe' logical 
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stage of determining whether the evidence is legally admissible -
i.e. before the question of exclusionary discretion arises - the 
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Discretion recognised in Noormohamed v R, supra, at 192. Also 
in R v Fitzpatrick fl96~ 3 All E.R. 840" •••• the recorder, who had 
a discretion in the matter, could, and we think should, have decided 
that even if legally admissible the evidence should not be given ••• 
The court is satisfied that owing to the highly prejudicial value of 
the evidence it should not, even if legally admissible, have been 
allowed to be given and that the only proper way of avoiding that 
prejudice would have been by orderin)S se~arate trials", per Lord 
Parker, C.J. at 842; R v Shellaker Ll91~ 1 K.B.414 at 418. 
An 'unfair trial', as Lord Moulton might have put it in Christie 
v R, supra. 
It is interesting to compare this inference with the non-inference 
when a suspect refuses to answer as a matter of right when confronted 
by police questioning. 
See Noormohamed v R, Harris v D.P.P., R v Bond etc. supra. 
59. Lf91A7A.C.545 at 559. 
60. supra, at 510. See also R v Cook Ll9527 2 All E.R.97 where Devlin, 
J. delivering the~dgement of a full court said, at p.99, that the 
trial judge "must generally exercise his discretion so as to secure 
a trial that is fair both to the prosecution and to the defence". 
Also M8~1ell v D.P.P. and Stirland v D.P.P. Supra. both of which 
contain references to 'fairness'. 
61. Selvey v D.P.P. supra at 520. 62. Ibid. at p.516. 
Noormohamed v R Ll9427 A.C.l82 at 192. See also Harris v D.P.P. and 
Jones v D.P.P., supra. 
Selvey v D.P.P., supra, at 512. See also Lord Hodson in King v 
R Ll96~ 2 All E.R.610 at 617. Also R v Murphy Lf96il N.I.l38. 
65. See note 61 supra. 66. King v R. supra. at 617. 
67. Enunciated in R v Warickshall (1783), 1 Leach C.C.263, though the 
rule is believed to be of greater historical antiquity; see Blackstone 
in 4 Blao Com 357 who says that evidence of confessions are "the weakest 
and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by 
artifice, false hopes, promises of favour, or menaces; seldom 
remembered accurately, or reported with due precision; and incapable 
in their nature of being disproved by other negative evidence" 
68. See, for example, R v Thomas (1836), 1 C & P. 345, R v Garner (1848) 
1 Den C.C.329, R v Scott (1856), Dears & Bell 47, R v Mansfield (1881), 
~Cox C.C.639, R v Baldry (1852), 2 Den. C.C. 430. R v Thompson 
Ll89j7 2 Q.B. 12. For a modern formulation of the exclusionary rule 
see Ibrahim v R L191A7 A.C.599 at 609. The H.L. approved the rule in 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Harz (1967) 51 Cr. App~l23. 
69. But see Winn, L.J. in R v Narthan (1967) Cr. App.R.97 and quoted 
at para. 37 of Cmnd. 4991 (1972); also R v Zaveckas (1969) 54 Cr. App. 
R.202. 
10. 
70b. 
71. 
72. 
74· 
75· 
76. 
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And see Ibrahim v R, supra, at 611. Cf. Wigmore's view that 
confession is excluded solely because of the danger of admitting 
false testimony: "Evidence" (3rd Ed., 1940) Vol.III p.252. Also 
R. v Brindley and Long Ll9717 2 All E.R.698. In Deokinan v R Ll96i7 
1 AC.20 at 33 Viscount Dilhourne said: "If the ground on which 
confessions induced by promises held out by persons in authority are 
held to be inadmissible is that they may not be true, then it may 
be that there is a similar risk that in some circumstances the con-
fession may not be true if induced by a promise held out by a person 
not in authority •••• " 
Cf. R v Barker Ll9417 2 K.B.38~e~ere documents already in existence 
before inducement was offered, treated as a confession. But 
documents are trustworthy. ~ 
As Cross would put it " ••• the dislike showed by English lawyers and 
laymen alike of the spectacle of a man being made to incriminate 
himself", Cross on Evidence (11th ed.) at p.447. The exclusionary 
rule came into being a century after the last recorded instance of 
torture, see 79 Har v L.Rev. at p.594. 
R v Thompson (1783), 1 Leach 291, R v Lloyd (1834(, 6 C & P. 393, R 
v Coley (1868) 10 Cox C.C.536, R v Blackburn (1853), 6 Cox C.C.333, 
R v Smith Ll9527 2 All E.R.193· Perhaps the most interesting decision 
on automatic exclusion is Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Harz 
and Power Ll9617 1 All E.R.177• For further examples see Phipson on 
Evidence (1970 11th ed.) paras. 820-32. 
Wigmore, supra. See also Holdsworth's ·~istory of English Law, 
Vol.lX pp.l98-201, and Cowen and Carter "Essays on the Law of Evidence" 
(1956) Eastern Press. 
For the Rules see Phipson, supra. The Rules were first laid down in 
1912, and revised in 1964. Basically, they involve giving of cautions 
at various stages of the interrogation of suspects by the police. 
Ibrahim v R Ll91Af A.C.599 at 614, italics not in the original. See 
also R v Smith Ll9617 3 All E.R.972 where the C.A. refused to quash the 
conviction appealed against on the ground that the Judges' Rules had 
been disregarded in that there had been a cross-examination of the 
accused by the police after he was taken into custody; R v Voisin 
Ll91§7 1 K.B.531 - these rules are only administrative directions 
"tending to the fair administration of justice", per Lawrence, J. 
R v Voisin, supra at 539. But cf. R v Prager Ll91i( 1 ALL ER.1114 
which suggests that the Rules are only guides on how to obtain 'voluntary' 
confessions and therefore may be ignored. It is said that the R. v 
Pra~r approach "substantially deprives the rules of any sanction" [i9if/ Crim. L.R.33 and see also Glanville Hilliams in lJ.96§1 Crim. 
L.R.331 and Brownlie in Ll9617 Crim. L.R.75· The advocates of the 
abolition of the Rulesta~e recently been gaining much support; see 
the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972) supra.~Lord 
MacDermott in llgllll'ramit Legal l!roblems" (1968). His Lordship frequently 
refers to the interestsof a "fair trial" "fair and effective procedure" 
"Unfair admissions". See also proposals'made by "Justice" (1967) and .J 
b·~ents on them by Mr. Justice l"IacKenna in the New L.J. (1970) 
665-669, (1972);"Public Law" 181 comment by L.H. Leigh on the Crim. 
L.R. Committee's Report. For an interesting study of the operation 
of the Rules in the notorious "Moore Murder Case" see R.N. Goodinson 
in the (1970) XLVIII Can. Bar Rev. 292. 
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77. See, :for example, R v B8.ldry, supra, per Parke, B. that "the 
rules have been extended quite too :far, and that justice and 
common sense have, too :frequently, been sacrificed at the shrine 
of mercy." Also R v Prager, supra. 
78. In R v McGregor Ll96~ 1 Q.B.371 at 377 Lord Parker, C.J. 
quali:fied 'unfairness' as "•••• un:fair in the general circumstances 
of the administration of justice •••••••• " 
79. Sometimes re:ferred to as the "doctrine of confirmation by 
subsequent :facts", and in the U.S. as "the fruits of poisoned tree" 
80. Supra. 
81. R v Gould (1840) 9 C.E.P.364, R v Griffin (1809) Russ and Ry.151. 
82. Per Nares, J. And seeR v Berriman (1854) 6 Cox 388, R v Lockhart 
(1785) 1 Leach C.C.386, R v Mosey (1783) 1 Leach c.c. 
83. Cowen and Carter, Supra. Also A. Goetlieb in 72 L.Q.R.209 who 
comments that "conflicting authorities, inadequate reporting and 
the limited number of modern cases all contribute to the uncertainty" 
as to whether-any, and if so how much and how, the prior confession 
is admissible; see also the report of the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee (Cmnd.4991) para. 69. Cf. R v Barker Ll9417 2 Q.B.381 
which accepts that testimonial untrustworthiness is not the ground 
for the confession rule. The Committee considers that only in very 
limited circumstances should, in such situations prior confession 
be referred to. See draft Bit( Cl.2(5)(a)(b)(c). 
84. Stephen in "Digest of the Law of Evidence" (12th ed.) took the view 
that the relevant part of the confession is admissible, ibid. Art. 23. 
85. (1852) 2 Denison 430. 
86. Chalmers v H.M. Advocate (1954) Session Cases 66. 
87. R v Isequilla Ll97A7 The Times July 25 comes close to admitting that 
confessions are excluded because the police conduct in offering 
inducement or making threats is "improper or unjustified", i.e. 
an of:fer of an inducement is an improper conduct and unacceptable 
to the courts, see Lord Widge~ C.J's judgement. This case also appears 
to endorse the view in R v Prager Lf97~ 1 All E.R.ll14 that if 
police questioning is carried on to a degree which amounts to 'oppression' 
evidence of accused's statements will be excluded. 
88. Kuruma v R supra. and see Jones v Owens (1870) 54 J.P. at 760 C:f. 
with the situation where a breath test under the Road Sa:fety Act, 1967 
has been recorded on a device not approved by the Home Secretary, 
as required by the Act itsel:fs Scott v Baker Ll96~ 2 All E.R.993. 
Hoyle v Walsh~96il 2 Q.B.13 R v Palfrey Lf91Ql 1 W.L.R.416, D.P.P. 
v Carey Ll97fVA.C.1072. 
89. Ordinary experience indicates that the use of the terms ':fairness' 
or 'unfairness' without any precise meaning attached to them is 
not unusual; one hears, :for example, that "the trial was unfair". 
But what does this mean? 
90. History of English Law Vol. II at p.67la "The judges sit in the 
court, not in order that they may discover the truth but in order 
91. 
92. 
93. 
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that they may answer the question 'How's that?'. This passive 
habit seems to grow upon them as time goes on". Cf. the procedure 
that is said to have prevailed in the Star Chamber in the 16th 
and 17th centuries. See Glanwille Williams "The Proof of Guilt", pub. 
by Stevens and Sons Ltd. 
Glanwille Williams, supra. 
Appeal to a Divisional Court Ll96l7 3 All E.R.677, italics .s~plied. 
See also R v Court /J.96f/ Crim L.R. 697; in R v Buchan Ll96Y 1 All 
E.R.502 repeated the basis for exercising the exclusionary discretion 
as stated in Callis v Gunn, supra. 
While in custody the constable said to hima "I want to take your 
finger prints. Alright?" to which the defendant had replied ''Yes". 
The C.J. held that there was no 'false representation'. 
94· Ibid. at 680-81. See also R v Buchan, supra. 
95. It may be argued in reply that use of a 'trick' is permissible in 
criminal detection, though not in securing evidence. But why not 
in the latter case? 
96. Even though in 1955 the judicial approach to evidence obtained b,y 
illegal search and seizure was not uniform in the various states; 
some had adopted the federal exclusionary rule whilst others had 
not. See Ku.ruma v R Ll95i7 A.C.197 and }mpp v Ohio, 367 U.S.643 (1961) 
97. Ll96i]l All E.R. 848. 
98. 'Physical disability• presumably meant something other than the 
drunken state on the suspicion of which the examination was made. 
99 Ibid at 849. 
99. Ibid at 849· 
100. Callis v Gunn, supra. does not appear to have been cited in R v Payne. 
101. See, for example, the judgement of Marshall, J. in R v Maqsud Ali, 
infra. 
102. See the 1972 report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. (Cmnd. 
4991) paras. 50-52 where this fact is recognised. The majority hesitated 
to recommend tape recordings should be used by the police for investigation 
purposes. 
103. Ll96j7 2 All E.R.464. There was no inducement and the c.c.A. was 
clear that the conversation recorded on the tapes, without the knowledge 
of the two prisoners "amount to, or come very near to, a confession of 
guilt". The recorded evidence\oas in a Pakistani dialect but the 
transcribed passages had been placed before the jury. 
104. The C.C.A. has held in R v Rose and Mills fl96fl 3 All E.R.298 that 
tendering in evidence of such recordings is not in breach of the Judges• 
Rules. The Rules are not breached, for the caution is a warning 
against the type of folly i.e. shouting incriminating observations 
across the corridor to one another, which the appellants committed. 
The Court made clear that it did not expressly or impliedly "give 
any approval to a police practice, if anywhere it were to be found 
to exist - that is not this case - of setting up microphones in cells 
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for the purpose of tape recordings of what may be said in the cells". 
Ibid. at 302. 
105. Ibid. at 469. 
106. One may doubt whether there is no built-in compulsion to remain with 
the police, at whatever place, especially for a person not able to 
speak the language. Cf. Lord Cooper in Chalmers v H.M. Advocate, 
supra, suggesting that a youth of 16 taken to and held at the police 
station could hardly be expected to know his rights to leave the 
station or, even if he had known it would not have availed him. 
107. See Younger Report, 1972, Cmnd. 5012, on the radical methods of 
eavesdropping. The report, confined to attackes on prvacy by 
private persons, paints a frightening picture of the efficiency 
of modern bugging devices and the inefficacy of the existing 
remedies against them. See Appendix I of the Report. 
108. Ll96i7 3 All E.R.298 at 302 (italics supplied). The tape recording 
machine had been placed in a nearby empty cell and this recorded 
the incriminating conversation four men had shouted to one another 
across the corridor. See also R v Stewart Ll97Q7 1 All GR.689 -
accused 'tricked' into confessing to a friend; held evidence 
admissible. 
109. Ll96jl N.I.l38, in the Courts-Martial Appeal Court. This decision 
was relied upon by the Privy Council in King v R, supra. 
110. His Lordship's italics, at 147-148. 111. Ibid. at 149. 
112. (1972) Cmnd. 4991 para. 27. 
Bill clause 2. 
113. Ibid. paras. 66-68 and the draft 
114. The concept of 'oppressive conduct' was derived by the Committee 
from Callis v Gunn, supra, and R v Prager (1971), 56 Cr. App. R. 
151 at p.l61. 
115. Thus recognising Selvey v D.P.P., and other prior cases, as stating 
the correct law on the exclusionary discretion. 
116. Ibid. para 278 and the draft clause 45(8) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ILLEGAL SEARCH - ADMISSIBILITY IN AMERICA 
It was noted in the first Chapter that the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States constitution in fact falls into two parts: the first part 
bans "unreasonable searches and seizures", and the second part prohibits 
the issuing of general warrants (1) for search or arrest. Furthermore, 
searches and seizures are not unlawful if carried out without a warrant 
provided they are reasonable. However, since the relevant case law (2) 
on the question of admissibility of items seized, or of conversation 
recorded, in breach of the Fourth ~endment prohibitions and requirements 
has been developed in the context of both the Fourth and the Fifth 
Amendments it is appropriate at this stage to look at the wording of the 
Fifth Amendment. 'rhis states that no person "shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself" (3). It is in the context 
of these two Amendments that the absolute exclusionary rule in the United 
States - both at federal and State level - has been developed, though 
primarily it rests on the Fourth. 
I 
The earliest relevant case is Boyd v United States (4). A federal 
statute, passed by the Congress, authorised the courts in revenue cases, 
on a motion of an attorney, to require a defendant or a claimant of 
merchandise alleged to be unlawfully imported to produce his private books 
and papers or else the revenue authorities• allegation must be taken as 
confessed. The petitioners, in an action for forfeiture of goods, had 
been served with such a noti~e; they had objected at the trial that the 
compulsion, and the reception in evidence of the invoices amounted to 
compulsory self-incrimination and was contrary to the constitution. In 
other words, the law was repugnant to the federal constitution as applied 
to both the criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court 
-. 
held that the Statute was unconstitutional, as violating both the Fourth 
and the Fifth Amendments, and that the lower federal court should have 
therefore excluded the documentary evidence. The Court rejected the 
government•s contention that the order was free from any constitutional 
objection because the statute did not authorise search and seizure; 
failure to produce papers would have meant a confession of the government 
allegations, and this was tantamount to forcing a defendant to give 
evidence against himself. 
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Delivering the opinion (5) of the majority Bradley, J. held that the 
Fourth Amendment applied because "a compulsory production of a man's 
private papers is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, in all cases in which search and seizure would be; because 
it is a material ingredient and effects the sole object and purpose of 
search and seizure". 
The Court thus equated compul~ory production of a man's private papers, 
to be used in evidence against him, with search and seizure, and no 
unreasonable search. In the Court's view it is one thing to search for and 
seize stolen goods or goods concealed to avoid payment of duty on them; 
it is quite a different thing when private effects are searched for and 
seized for the purpose of obtaining information or for the purpose of using 
them as evidence against him: the latter is unlawful whilst the legality 
of the former had been recognised by the common law for at least two 
centuries. 
Admittedly, the decision involved consideration of the unconstitutionality 
of a statute, a function which is out of the question for English courts 
to undertake within the present British constitutional framework. However, 
a striking feature of this judgment is that the two Amendments were placed 
in their historical perspective and this historical background was then 
heavily relied upon to determine the operation of the constitutional 
prohibitions and rights. Bradley, J. took Entick v Carrington (6) as his 
starting point for this purpose, describing it "as one of the landmarks 
of English liberty ••••• as one of the paramount monuments of the British 
Constitution"; Lord Camden's propositions, in the Supreme Court's opinion, 
must have been in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment, and 
the drafters of the Amendments must have followed the language of 
Lord Camden and treated it as "expressing the dlrue doctrine on the subject of 
searches, and as furnishing the true criteria of the reasonable and 
unreasonable character of such seizures". However, to compel a person to 
pruduce, or to illegally seize his private papers and books for the purpose 
of adducing them as evidence in a criminal charge against him is contrary 
to the principles of free government: "It is abhorrent to the instincts 
of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. . .... 
it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom". 
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This is a clear and definite statement that the purpose behind the 
privilege and prohibitions on unr~asonable and illegal searches is the 
protection and maintenance of the fundamental values cherished by a 
politically free society. 
The Court maintained that there was an intimate relation between the 
Fourth and the Fifth Amendments for both threw great light on each other; 
illegal searches and seizures are always made for the purpose of securing 
evidence for use in a criminal trial and such use amounts to compelling 
a man to give evidence against himself. The latter, moreover, throws 
light on the question of what is an unreasonable search within the Fourth 
Amendment: seizing a man's private papers for the purpose of using them as 
evidence against him is another way of compelling him to incriminate himself. 
On this basis the Supreme Court held that although the present case was not one 
involving aggravating circumstances like illegal and forcible search and 
seizure, yet compulsion to produce private papers through a statute was 
equally obnoxious and "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get 
their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight 
deviations from legal modes of procedure". 
It is obvious that the evidence was held to be inadmissible not 
because of any rule of evidence but as a result of a liberal construction 
of the constitution itself; what was otherwise thought to be a lawful 
act by the Congress was made illegal and which therefore meant that the 
documents should not have been admitted in evidence by the federal circuit 
court. However, it is difficult to accept the Court's reliance on the 
Fourth Amendment, for the statute indirectly forcing the defendant to produce 
documents cannot be described as allowing or carrying out an 'unreasonable 
search'. The Anglo-American criminal procedure provides no method for 
compelling a defendant to produce evidentiary documents; the American system 
could not do so because of the common law privilege enshrined in the Fifth 
Amendment. Ideally, therefore, Boyd's case would be on sounder basis if 
only the Fifth Amendment was relied upon; the use of the Fourth Amendment 
for the purpose is dubious and unnecessary. 
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The foundation for the development of the present absolute and 
automatic exclusionary rule on the evidence obtained by methods involving 
police illegality was laid down by the Supreme Court in Weeks v United States 
(7). The Court there held that evidence procured by illegal searches must 
be excluded by the federal courts. A federal marshall, without a search 
warrant or a warrant for arrest, and having got hold of the keys to the 
accused's home entered the premises and seized some private documents 
belonging to the accused. The defendant's objection to their being 
admitted at his trial on the ground that the methods by which they had been 
obtained violated his Fourth and the Fifth Amendment rights and privileges 
was overruled by the federal district court. The Supreme Court allowed 
his appeal. Delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court 
Justice Day referred to the historical basis of the two Amendments and 
expressed the view that they took their origin in "those safeguards which 
had grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, such as were permitted under the general warrants issued under 
authority of the government •••••••• ", that the two Amendments perpetuate 
principles of humanity and civil liberty.· which, in England, had been 
secured after years of struggle; that the Fourth Amendment protected 
everybody, whether accused of a crime or not, and that the courts were duty 
bound to effectuate and enforce the principles of the Amendment (8). If 
the courts admitted illegally obtained evidence, it would amount to a 
judicial affirmation of a "manifest neglect, if not an open defiance of the 
prohibition of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people 
against such unauthorised action". 
At first appearance the exclusionary rule is constitutional and not 
judicial in origin and, therefore, not providing a basis for comparison, 
in relation to its origin, with the English inclusionary rule. However, 
on deeper analysis this is not so, for what the Supreme Court was saying was 
that an exclusionary rule is essential to give meaning to a constitutional 
principle. Indeed, after Weeks' decision for a long time the courts 
remained uncertain (9) as to the origin of the exclusionary rule and although 
Mapp v Ohio (10) seems to have put the rule on a constitutional basis, it 
will be argued later that this is not the same as a constitutional origin. 
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Interestingly, Justice Day's opinion draws a comparison between general 
warrant for search and warrantless searches - indeed one could argue that 
theoretically and in practice the latter pose a greater threat to the 
structure of a free society than does the former. 
Day, J.'s opinion also emphasised the desirability that the courts 
in a contest between an individual and the executive, where both of these 
happen to be lawbreaking, must not side with the executive nor with the 
individual but should aim to preserve the fundamental values of the society: 
to admit evidence procured by illegal search is to impair the dignity of 
the courts and the courts, therefore, should not sanction 11 the tendency of 
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions 
by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions". 
The Weeks doctrine has subsequently been qualified by three important 
limitations. First, for such evidence to be excluded, the defendant must 
make a 11 timely objection" by a pretrial motion. It was said in Weeks v 
United States that if during the course of the trial objection is raised 
to admissibility of the evidence on the ground that it had been obtained 
in violation of constitutional privileges the court would not consider such 
an objection for "to pursue it would be to halt the orderly progress of a 
cause, and consider incidentally a question which has happened to cross 
the path of such a litigation, and which is wholly independent thereof". 
Thus, unless the defendant makes a timely application for return of the 
goods the exclusionary rule cannot be applied, otherwise the court will 
have to determine a collateral issue. This qualification to the exclusionary 
rule is difficult to comprehend in the light of the fact that the 
exclusionary rule is intended to infuse meaning into the Fourth Amendment 
constitutional rights; for surely failure to observe a procedural 
requirement, i.e. of an application for return of the goods, ought not to 
reduce the importance of the constitutional rights. It may be that after 
Jones v United States and Mapp v Ohio (10) this limitation on the 
exclusionary rule may not be valid. 
- 19-
In Agnello v United States (11) one of the contentions by the 
government was that evidence of illegal possession of cocaine, which the 
police had seized by illegal means, was admissible because no timely 
application for the return of the goods had been made and that the court 
should not, during the course of a criminal trial, pause to determine the 
collateral issue of how the evidence had been obtained. Butler, J. giving 
the opinion of the court held that since the accused apparently did not, 
in advance of its being offered in evidence, know that the government had 
searched his house and found the cocaine not did he know in advance the 
government's intention to adduce it in evidence, he could not be expected to 
raise a timely objectiionz in any event it would have been unreasonable to 
have expected of someone, who denied to have possessed the drug, to apply 
for the return of it (12). 
Secondly, the person moving to suppress the evidence must have a 
standing to complain of illegal search, i.e. the search must be shown to 
have violated his constitutional rights. Thus, if the place searched was 
one where the accused happened to be an invitee the Weeks' doctrine would 
not apply. However, the Supreme Court's approach to this requirement has 
recently become rather liberal for in Jones v United States (13) it held 
that the accused has a standing to invoke the Weeks' doctrine if he was 
"a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed". 
Thirdly, the court has held that if the accused gives evidence 
suggesting that he has never possessed goods, e.g. narcotics, in his life, 
the prosecution may call the officer who carried out the illegal search to 
impeach such a testimony. Thus in Walder v United States (14), when the 
defendant gave evidence that he had never had drugs in his possession, the 
court held that the testimony given by one of the police officers who had 
participated in the search to the effect that drugs had been found in the 
defendant's possession was admissible evidence. The court said: "It is 
one thing to say that the Government cannot make use of evidence unlawfully 
obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the 
illegal method by which the Government's possession was obtained to his 
advantage, and provide himself with a shEid against contradiction of his 
untruths". 
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One can only question the soundness of this rule, for it lets in the 
evidence of the very offence of which the accused is charged - evidence 
which is admissible to prove the offence - through, as it were, the 
'back door'. It would be difficult not to concede that evidence of past 
misconduct or convictions should be admissible for the purpose of 
impeaching the credibility of the accused as a witness but that is something 
different from admitting evidence of the immediate offence for this purpose: 
although said to be admitted for a purpose different from that of proving 
the offence, effectively it fulfills the same purpose and defeats the 
Weeks' doctrine. 
The federal exclusionary rule is clearly aimed to underpin 
constitutional rights of the individual persons, for as the court said: 
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in 
evidence against a citizen accused of an offence, the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches 
and seizures, is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, 
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts 
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they 
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles 
established by years of endeavour and suffering which have resulted in their 
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land ••••• "(15). The purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is thus clear; the basis of the rule is judicial 
control of the police and executive powers; the origin is the common law. 
This exclusionary rule has never been questioned and has been 
consistently applied by the courts in federal prosecutions (16) though, 
admittedly, the basis of the rule was not examined until Mapp v Ohio. 
However, the rule has been extended and applied to deal with novel situations. 
Thus, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v United States (17) the writ of error 
was to reverse the judgment of a federal district court which had fined a 
company for contempt of court and had ordered imprisonment of F.w. Silverthorne 
until the contempt was purged. After arresting the Silverthorne brothers 
at their homes federal officials entered their offices and made a clean 
sweep of all the books and documents. 
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The knowledge gained from these documents formed the basis of the subsequent 
indictment, although the originals were returned on the order of a district 
court. Subpoenae were served upon the brothers for production of the 
original books and documents and on failure to comply the court imposed 
imprisonment for contempt. The government argued that although there had 
been an illegal search, there could be no prohibition against making use of 
the knowledge obtained from this illegality. Holmes, J. giving the 
majority opinion held that if the tree was poisoned so were the fruits and 
that the Weeks' doctrine was not confined to admissibility o'f tangible 
items of evidence (18). "The essence of a provision forbidding the 
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so 
acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used 
at all". If knowledge of the facts is obtained from an independent source, 
it can be proved like any other evidence. Thus, the exclusionary rule is 
seen to have the aim of preventing the government profiting from its own 
wrongdoing: the government, in prosecuting an individual before a court, 
must come with clean hands and if it does not, the courts will have no 
part of it. 
In \>long SUn v United States ( 19) the federal narcotic officers had, 
without an arrest warrant, broken open the door of the defendant's house 
and, having arrested him, obtained verbal information from one of the 
arrested persons which eventually led to the arrests of other persons 
involved in possession of drugs. The Supreme Court, in a five to four 
majority, held the arrest unlawful (20); the petitioner's oral declarations 
made inside the house were 'fruits of the poisoned tree' and, therefore, 
inadmissible. Moreover, the drugs seized from the persons arrested because 
of the lead given by the oral statements should also have been excluded. 
Brennan, J. relied upon Silverman v United States (21) and held that 
no distinction could be drawn between physical materials obtained illegally 
and verbal statements overheard by illegal means or testimony of matters 
observed during an unlawful search: they are all to be excluded to enforce 
"the basic constitutional policies". These policies, which have led to 
the exclusionany rule do not permit any logical obstruction between physical 
and verbal evidence for "Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by 
federal officers •••• or of closing the doors of the federal courts to any 
use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained ••••••••• 
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•••• the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal 
evidence would seem too great to warrant introducing such a distinction 11 • 
Again we see an emphasis placed on the constitutional rights and the 
judicial method of upholding them; there is no suggestion, or a claim, 
that the constitution mandates an exclusionary rule. 
Logically, the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine must have some 
limit, for there comes a point in time in the sequence of events when the 
initial illegality must become too remote to have any further tainting 
effect. This was recognised in Wong Sun's case. The relevant test is 
whether the challenged evidence had come to by exploitation of the initial 
illegality or by methods which are sufficiently distinguishable and 
independent so as to purge it of the initial wrongdoing; if the taint is 
dissipated the exclusionary rule does not apply (22). Of course, whether 
this is so is a question of fact in each case. 
The exclusionary rule, as pointed out, has been applied in subsequent 
cases, though at times, partly from a desire to restrict or qualify its 
operation (23) the approach to individual cases has been illogical. Thus, 
for example, in Davis v United States (24) the police had illegally 
obtained possession of certain documents from the defendant's petrol 
filling station. The Supreme Court held the documents admissible on the 
grounds that as the coupons were government property the defendant was 
only a custodian of them. According to Douglas, J. who delivered the 
majority opinion, the exclusionary rule applies only to private property 
whereas here the officers' claim to the coupons was of a right. Secondly, 
the filling station was a place of business and not a private residence. 
It is difficult to see why the nature of the property seized, or entered into, 
should make any difference to the right of privacy and security of the 
defendant or to the power of the police to search his premises; the Fourth 
Amendment is protective of 'privacy' and 'people' not 'places' and, 
moreover, as Frankfurter, J. most tellingly pointed out in his dissenting 
judgment, the facts of the case were such that had the police applied for 
a search warrant it would not have been granted (25). 
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The dissenters also maintained that although the coupons, not being 
private property, would fail to come within the Fifth Amendment privilege, 
they did come within the Fourth: "Merely because there may be the duty 
to make documents available for litigations does not mean that public 
officers may fOrcibly or fraudulently obtain them"; an artificial 
distinction drawn by the majority between private resident and a place of 
business tended to wear away the safeguards for individual liberty by a 
process of "devitilizing interpretation" and was devoid of any support 
from history (26). It will be seen that the dissenters' view was finally 
vindicated in Katz v United States (27). 
II 
Apart from seizure of tangible items by illegal acts, evidence can 
be intangible and obtained by wire tapping or, as the fruitful product 
of modern science, by use of electronic devices - sometimes referred to 
as electronic eavesdropping or 'bugging'. These methods are subtle, but 
present a much more powerful threat to civil liberties. Whilst in England 
electronic eavesdropping and telephone tapping has not yet posed .a serious 
threat - certainly at least not known to have taxed the courts (28) -
in America the extensive use of these methods by the police for obtaining 
evidence of crimes has provided an interesting development. Faced with 
a growing number of cases where the admissibility of such evidence has 
been challenged the Supreme Court at first expressed concern but for some 
time hesitated in holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches covered this new situation. Clearly, the framers 
of the constitution could not have foreseen, or~en imagined, the wonders 
of modern technology. Here the court was presented with a situation which 
could not, by any linguistic manipulation of the Amendment, be treated as 
within the Amendment as it stood. However, accepting its duty to balance 
the interest of society that criminals should be detected with that other 
interest of society and of individuals that civic liberties should be 
protected the Supreme Court finally interpreted the Amendment in the 
context of its purpose. The purpose of the Amendment, the court concluded, 
was protection of 'privacy' and, therefore, judicial 'clamp down' on all 
methods of electronic surveillance or telephone tapping was inevitable. 
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The first serious attempt to face the problem was made in 
Olmstead v United States (29), where the Supreme Court, in a five to four 
decision, held that interception of messages by federal officers on the 
telephones of the conspirators was not a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment and, therefore, evidence of the tapped conversation 
was admissible. In other words, the constitutional prohibition against 
unlawful searches was restricted to 'material' objects and only if there 
had been an 'entry' in the sense of a physical trespass. The facts of 
the case indicated that the interception was done by inserting wires 
along the ordinary telephone cables (30) and conversation was then overheard 
over a period of months. Taft, J. delivering the majority opinion held 
that the Fifth Amendment could not apply because there was no evidence of 
compu1sion to induce the defendants to talk. As regards the applicability 
of the Fourth Amendment the majority maintained that the Amendment sought 
to protect the privacy of places not persons; this, according to them, 
was manifest in the Amendment's requirement for a proper description of 
the 'place' to be searched. 
This literal interpretation of the Amendment meant that private 
conversations were not protected. The fact that at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was enacted telephones did not exist was simply overlooked (31). 
The petitioner suggested to the Court that discretion should be exercised 
to exclude evidence obtained by unethical standards, but this was 
rejected as being at variance with the common law authority (32): "A 
standard which would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other 
than nice ethical conduct by government officials ,.,ould make society suffer 
and give criminals greater immunity than has been know;thereto before". 
In a powerful dissenting opinion Holmes, J. described such methods of 
obtaining evidence as "dirty business" and expressed the stark choice 
the court must make; 11It is desirable that criminals should be detected, 
and to that end all available evidence should be used. It is also desirab,le 
that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, 
when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained •••••••• 
We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals 
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part 11 • 
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Brandeis, J. expressed serious concern that a non-exclusionary rule, 
which must follow from a literal construction of the Fourth Amendment, 
would enable the government by use of new scientific techniques to 
produce papers in courts without removing them from the house of the 
defendant; it would mean an exposure of all intimate occurrences within 
the house to a jury. 
The shift in the conceptual framework from that of illegal searches 
to one of protection of individual's 'privacy' in construing the Fourth 
Amendment is obvious; it reflects the concern first voiced by Lord Camden 
that such lawless in~trusions by the government or the police into 
private homes would be "subversive of all the comforts of society" (33). 
This view of the minority opinion received further support in the approach 
taken in Nardone v United States (34). Section 605 of the Federal 
Communications Act, 1934, passed by Congress, says that "no person not 
being authorised by the sender shall intercept any communication and 
divulge or publish the existenoe,contents, substance, purpo~t, effect or 
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person ••••• ". Faced with 
a situation where federal officers had obtained evidence by wire tapping 
in the court, held that 'any person' included federal agents. This 
construction was further extended in the second Nardone decision (35) 
when the court held that the exclusionary rule applied not only to the 
evidence of conversation tapped in breach of the section, but also to any 
evidence procured or made accessible by ~ of the information supplied by 
the tapped conversation. It is clear that section 605 could have been 
construed (36) as restricted to non-governmental bodies, but the judicial 
policy of gradual extension of the Weeks' doctrine was beginning to reach 
out for new areas of police activity: the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' 
doctrine is inseparable from the exclusionary rule in the context of the 
policy reasons which gave birth to the rule (37). However, both Nardone 
decisions were based on the Court's supervisory power over the federal 
criminal prosecutors (38) and were not claimed to be constitutionally 
required; it is this fact which explains the Supreme Court's refusal to 
apply the exclusionary rule to evidence of messages illegally intercepted 
by state police (39). 
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Thus, in Schwartz v Texas (40) it was held that the Court should not, 
unless the Congress made it clear, lightly presume the supremacy of 
federal law in this matter and, therefore, where a state has legislated 
an inclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the federal 
statute, the Supreme Court should not in disregard of such state law 
impose an exclusionary rule (41). Thus, the Court's holding meant that 
a federal statute did not automatically apply to the states, and, as 
it was later said, "despite the plain prohibition of section 605, due 
regard for federal-state relations precluded the conclusion that Congress 
intended to thwart a state rule of evidence ••••• " (42). 
So long as the theoretical basis of the exclusionary rule in the 
Weeks' case was not determined - and the issue remained uncertain for a 
long time - state rules of evidence, judicial or statutory, had to prevail 
in appeals from state convictions. ~·thermore, even if theoretically 
the federal exclusionary rule were to be founded on the constitution, 
there still remained the question whether 'wire tapping' was a 'search' 
within the constitution 'or indeed whether illegal police activities denied 
'due process of law' to the victim. However, the increasing frequency 
with which the police resorted to wire tapping and electronic eavesdropping 
combined with the invention of increasingly sophisticated scientific 
devices, finally freed the Supreme Court to hold that such activities 
were 'search and seizure' within the Fourth Amendment, which was binding 
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The changed social 
reality and the re-emphasised importance of judicial containment and 
control of the police led to a judicial volta face. 
It was the sophisticated technique of electronic eavesdropping which 
influenced this change of policy. In Goldman v United States (43) the 
defendant lawyers had been convicted of conspiracy to violate the 
bankruptcy laws by attempting to receive money for forbearing to act in 
bankruptcy proceedings. The federal agents had obtained access to their 
office and an adjoining room; they then installed a listening apparatus 
in a small aperture in the partition wall with an attachment from it to 
the earphones in the adjoining office. The next day, on discovering that 
this system did not work, the officers heard the conversation through a 
detector-phone which was placed against the partition wall. The motion 
to suppress this evidence having been denied the defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court took the view that the installation of the apparatus 
constituted a trespass but that the Fourth Amendment did not, on a literal 
reading of it, cover the situation (44). 
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Dissenting from the majority Murphy, J. maintained that the scope and 
operation of constitutional principles should not be restricted by 
a literal reading of its provisions. T.he evils and phenomena of the 
present age, rather than those that prevailed when the constitution was 
framed, should provide the context for construction of the constitutional 
prohibitions; because the conditions of life have greatly expanded the 
range and character of activities requiring protection from the government 
intrusion must also change and, therefore, the rules protecting these 
individual Tights' must also adapt. Modern science enabled 'search' 
of one's premises without the necessity for a physical entry and these 
devices must be as abhorrent to a civilised and free society as the physical 
intrusions condemned in Entick v Carrington. In his opinion, as in that 
of Brandeis, J., the Fourth Amendment in essence aimed to protect 'privacy'; 
listening in by electronic devices was a breach of this privacy (45) and 
therefore within the Fourth Amendment prohibition. The dissenting opinion 
makes clear that the question whether there was a trespass was irrelevant 
for consideration of the issue of police illegality; what mattered was 
whether the acts amounted to a 'search and seizure' (46). 
Thus, the concern.felt by the dissenters in Olmstead and Goldman 
was in relation to the establishment of a principle which in their opinion 
posed a threat to individual privacy. It may be that when looked at in the 
context of individual cases electronic devices recording a person's intimate 
private life may not appear a spectre, especially when use of it in a 
case has led to uncovering of a criminal plot. Ho\·tever, it must also be 
realised that legal rules once established have a tendency to stabilise 
and continue finding support in their subsequent application; in the 
pr?cess, however, they can affect both the innocent as well as the 
anti-social. One of the essential features of a free society is the 
rejection of any principle finding its justification in the fact that it is 
a means to an end. If it be argued that application of an absolute 
exclusionary rule in cases where there is convincing evidence of a crime 
having been committed letsoff the criminals scot free then, as Murphy, J. 
would answer: "Rights intended to protect all must be extended to all 
lest~ey so fall into desuetude in the course of denying them to the worst 
men as to afford no aid to the best of men in time of need". 
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In other words, to enforce the law it must not be permissible to break 
the law. Moreover, since the power to search is constitutionally limited, 
and that it cannot be used without a warrant to search for papers, by what 
logic is a 'search' for private conversation, not recorded on paper, 
permissible? As Murphy, J. in his powerful dissent maitained, the 
distinction between a conversation that is recorded on paper and the one 
which is simply uttered orally inside one's home makes no sense; the 
police certainly find it immaterial for "the form it takes is of no concern 
to them". 
However, the majority in the Supreme Court remained averse to 
extending the meaning of the li'ourth Amendment 'search and seizure 1 • This 
reluctance was further seen in cases involving 'participant monitoring', 
i.e. the situations which do not involve physical intrusion, without 
consent, on the petitioner's premises but where a police agent induces 
the accused to talk to him and, unknown to the accused, records the 
conversation on a recorder hidden on hie body. In On Lee v United States 
(47) an undercover agent had enabled Narcotics Bureau to pick up on a 
receiving set some damaging admissions made by the defendant, who was at 
the time on bail, to their agent. The conversation was transmitted by a 
small microphone in the agent's inside pocket. It was argued that the 
method of obtaining evidence violated the 'search and seizure' provision 
of the Fourth Amendment and, alternatively, evidence of recorded 
conversation should have been excluded under the judicial power to require 
"fair play" in federal law enforcement (48). The Court rejected the 
Fourth Amendment argument because there was no element of trespass. As 
regards the "fair play" contention, the Court maintained that a criminal 
prosecution was more than a game in which the government must be check-
mated and the game lost because the officers ignored the rules of the 
game (49). In dissenting from the majority Frankfurter, J. joined in by 
Burton and Douglas, J. J., reiterated Brandeis, J.'s fear in Olmstead v 
United States that modern science could ensure seizure of evidence without 
a trespassory act. It was true that criminal prosecution was not a game 
"But in any event it should not be deemed to be a dirty game in which 
the 'dirty business• of criminals is outwitted by the 'dirty business' 
of the law •••••• My deepest feeling against giving legal sanction to 
such 'dirty business' as the record in this case discloses that it makes for 
lazy and not alert law enforcement. It puts a premium on force and fraud, 
not on imagination and enterprise and professional training" (50). 
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A majority in Lopez v United States (51) upheld the admissibility 
of a recorded conversation between a federal internal revenue agent 
and the defendant on a charge of attempted bribery of the agent. The 
majority opinion rejected the Fourth Amendment argument (52). \fhat the 
agent bad done was to obtain the most reliable evidence of the conversation 
which he was entitled to disclose anyway. Brennan, J. strongly dissented 
(53) and favoured allowing the appeal on the basis of the Fourth Amendment 
rights and the Weeks' doctrine, overruling On Lee and Olmstead (54) 
decisions. All surreptious surveillance of this type violated the 
Fourth Amendment rights, and the alleged distinction between written 
and verbal communication, in his opinion, was irrational. "If a person 
commits his secret thoughts to paper, that is no licence for the police 
to seize the paper; if a person communicates his secret thoughts verbally 
to another, that is no licence for the police to record the words •••••• 
The right of privacy would mean little if it were limited to a person's 
solitary thoughts, and so fostered secretiveness. It must embrace a 
concept of liberty of one's comminications, and historically it has". 
Nor, in his view, was there any justification for an "illiberal 
interpr~tation " of the Fourth Amendment by limiting its protection to 
physical items seized by a trespass; such an interpretation was contrary 
to Boyd v United States (55) - a decision which interpreted the Amendment 
in the context of its history and purpose rather than on its literal 
language. No contitution could work as an instrument of contemporary 
government "if it were deemed to reach only problems familiar to the 
technology of the eighteenth century". 
The rigour of the dissenting opinions in these decisions was a clear 
indication of the broader approach to the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment that was in the offing. The most difficult obstacle to the 
application of the Weeks' exclusionary rule was that electronic eavesdropping, 
or any other surreptitious use of mechanical devices, for obtaining 
evidence was not yet accepted as a "search". There were additional 
difficulties. Thus, there was the point, albeit a technical one, of the 
need to prove a trespass by the police before the Fourth Amendment could 
be activated (56). 
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Moreover, the legal distinction between protection of "persons" and 
"places" meant that surreptitious recording by a person to whom the 
defendant had talked voluntarily was not within the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition and, therefore, not subject to the exclusionary rule. Thus, 
even though it was perhaps realised that the traditional meaning of a 
"search" was deficient in describing a modern phenomenon, or even though 
there may have been a recognition that any language goes through a 
continuous development and words can acquire new or changed or extended 
meanings, the majori.ty kept to the original premise in Olmstead's case 
and stuck to its logical implications. Perhaps a more compelling reason 
for holding that use of such gadgets did not amount to a search was the 
one in the argument raised by the governmant in Lopez v United States, 
mainly if the Court were to hold the evidence so secured inadmissible 
then effectively the whole gamut of investigational techniques like 
employment of confidential information or or undercover agents would 
become illegal; it would deal a serious blow to the necessary machinery 
for detection of crimes and apprehending the lawbreakers. The crucial 
question before the Supreme Court was whether to declare electronic 
eavesdropping as an illegitimate method in this gamut of techniques. 
Theimplications of such a technique were emphasised by Brennan, J.: 
"there is a qualitative difference between electronic surveillance •• ~··· 
and conventional police stratagems such as eavesdropping and disguise. 
The latter do not seriously intrude upon the right of privacy. The risk 
of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or 
deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably 
inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk 
we assume whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic surveillance comes 
into play, the risk changes crucially. There is no security for that kind 
of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum 
of true privacy ••••••• Furthermore, the fact that the police 
traditionally engage in some rather disreputable practices of law 
enforcement is no argument for their extension " (57). This is a clear 
assertion of judicial policy making- the written constitution did not 
describe such police activities as a 'search', but the particular.conditions 
at a specific period in the society's history made, in the Court's view, 
such a description necessary. 
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The increasing influence of the dissenting opinions finally led the 
Supreme Court to rewrite its opinion in Berger v New York and Katz v United 
States (58). In Eerger v New York a New York statute allowed justices 
of the New York Supreme Court to issue authority for use of mechanical 
devices for recording of conversations. Acting under this procedure 
Q 
the state police recorded conversation of the petitioner and used it in 
prosecution of a bribery chanrge against him. By five to four majority 
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New York Court of Appeal 
which had held evidence of the recordings admissible. The decision was 
based on the ground that the statute by its blanket permission to eavesdrop 
without adequate judicial supervision, or acceptable protective procedures, 
violated the Fourth Amendment (59). Thus, with this decision electronic 
eavesdropping became a 'search' - a permissible search subject to the 
safeguards as to the issuance of search warrants prescribed by the ]'ourth 
Amendment. Douglas, J. concurred in the majority opinion of Clark, J. 
but went even further by holding that such a search also violated the 
Fifth Amendment and that as the search was for "mere evidence" no nicety 
of language in a search warrant could have avoided a violation of the 
two Amendments. "If a statute were to authorise placing a policeman in 
every home or office where it was shown that there was a probable cause 
to believe that evidence of crime would be obtained •••• it would be 
struck dO\in as a bold invasion of privacy, far worse than the general 
warrants prohibited by the Fourth Amendment". Permitting electronic 
surveillance was, in his opinion, no different from placing an invisible 
policeman in the home and was more offensive because the house occupier 
was unaware of the invasion of his privacy (60). 
Thus, provided a search by electronic surveillance is narrowly 
circumscribed and authorised by a neutral judicial body, it is, like any 
other search, permissible; a permission for an indiscriminate eavesdropping 
is unlawful. 
In Katz v United States the Court took a step further. The F.B.I. 
had, by use of electronic listening device, obtained record of the 
conversation -mainly regarding wagering.- which the petitioner had made 
from a public telephone box. 
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The device had been attached to the telephone booth. In allowing his 
appeal and expressing the opinion of seven members of the Court, Stewart, J. 
rejected the ntion that the Fourth Amendment aimed at "constitutionally 
protected area11 (61). The Amendment protects individual privacy against 
government intrusion; the view that the Amendment only protects places 
and not persons must be rejected; the essential question was whether the 
individual has intended to preserve something as pivate, no matter that 
the place concerned is accessible to the public. In this particular case 
the Court held that the surveillance carried out was narrowly circumscribed 
and had a duly authorised magistrate intervened he could have authorised 
the 'bugging' (62). 
Thus, the strong indication in Osborne v United States (63) that 
Lopez v United States (63) might be overruled came to be fulfilled in 
Berger and Katz decisions. The technical distinction between trespassary 
and non-trespassary 'bugging' was untenable against the background of 
sophisticated mechanical devices. The distinction clouded the central 
issue of 'privacy of individual homes' of which the closely defined rules as 
to police powers of search are an expression, both in England and the 
United States. Moreover, this distinction led to artificial selection of 
facts of one case from the other and failed to deal with the fundamental 
purpose behind the limits on police powers (64). In holding that even a 
non-trespassary e~vesdropping is controlled by the Fourth Amendment, the 
eight to one majority overruled Olmstead v United States (65). Unlike 
an ordinary se~ch, one by electronic devices, is inherently indiscriminatory, 
for besides 'listening into' the conversation of a suspect it also records 
the conversations of innocent persons who might be within the vicinity. 
It, therefore, poses a greater threat to individual liberties: even 
though there is no physical entry, it is a 'trespass' nonetheless and does 
not allow the innocent victim to exercise his common law right to evict 
the trespasser. 
It may be that by holding that electronic eavesdropping amounts to 
a 'search' and thus activates the exclusionary rule laid down in the 
Weeks' case the Supreme Court has denied, or taken away, one effective 
weapon of crime detection from the police. 
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However, the decision is an outcome of the Court's concern with the 
sophistry of such scientific techniques and the serious threat they pose 
to the social structure of a free society; it is a concern no different 
from the importance attached by common law in its early formative period 
to precise defini tiona, and judicial control, of the po'loTers of the 
executive. As Brandeis, J. said, such constitutional limits on the 
executive powers were imposed in order to secure 11conditions favourable 
to the pursuit of happiness 11 and to confer on the individuals, as against 
the government, 11 the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilised man (66). 
Thus, the Weeks' exclusionary rule at federal level is based on a 
purpose not on the written constitution- judicially held to be behind 
the common law's attitude in delineating police and executive powers: 
the rule protects the fundamental right of privacy (67). The area of 
constitutional law which defines these powers expresses this fundamental 
right.of an individual vis a vis the executive or, as some might put it, 
the state. In laying down the exclusionary rule the Supreme Court has 
been aware of the serious danger, and at times almost certainly, that 
a criminal escapes because of what appears to be a technicality, but has 
concluded th~this is a smaller price for a society to pay than that 
attacks upon an individual's privacy should go unchecked. That the Court 
is aware of this danger and has tried to attach qualifications to the 
Weeks' doctrine is a proof of its desire to minimise the 11social costs 11 
of the exclusionary rule. Thus, one example of a rule ancillary to the 
doctrine is that before the Court will exclude the evidence the accused 
must have a "standing to challenge" the unlawful police action. This means 
that the accused must show that ~ right has been violated by the police 
action in the course of seeking evidence. Admittedly, this rule has been 
much liberalised by Jones v United States (68) which held that a person 
is aggrieved and therefore has a standing to challenge if he shows that he 
has been a victim of a search or seizure and that the search was directed 
against him. (69). However, this principle, amongst others, (70) 
indicates the Court's recognition that conflicting values and claims 
both those within the general society and between the general society and 
an individual - must be taken account of in devising rules of evidence in 
the area of constitutional rights and powers and that the courts must do 
the necessary balancing. 
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NOTES 
1. Thus enacting into a written form the fundamental constitutional 
principle declared in Entick v Carrington; the Amendment also 
requires that when a warrant is issued, the place to be searched 
and the things or persons to be seized must be particularly 
described. 
2. The discussion in what follows is, as in the first Chapter, con-
fined to the decisions handed down by the Supreme Court. 
3. The Fifth Amendment is concerned with other matters besides the 
privilege, e.g. "double jeopardy", "indictment by a Grand Jury", 
"due process of law", "just compensation for private property 
taken". 
4· 116 u.s. 616 (1886). 
5· Miller, J., concurred in by White, J., gave a separate opinion 
concurring with Bradley, J's opinion in so far as it was based on 
the Fifth Amendment. He disagrees with the majority on the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment for there was no 'search' -
an essential condition for the operation of this Amendment. 
6. (1765) 19 State .Trials 1030. "But our law has provided no paper 
search •••••••• to help forward the conviction ••••••• It is very 
certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself ••••••••• ; 
and •••••• the search for evidence is disallowed upon the same 
principle. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the 
guilty". The Supreme Court decisions abound with such references 
to the common law for an historical interpretation of the 
Amendments. 
1. 232 U.S.385 (1914) It ought to be pointed out that this decision 
was pre-prohibition era and, therefore, it would not be true to 
say that the exclusionary rule was a result of the judiciary's 
anti-prohibition attitude. 
e. The Court said that different principles apply when a search is 
made of a lawfully arrested person, see chapter 1 supra. 
9· See Wolf v Colorado, 338 U.S.25 (1949). 
10. 367 U.S.643 (1961) 
11. 269 U.S.20 (1925). See also Nardone v United States, 308 U.S. 
338 (1939). 
12. See also Gouled v United States, 255 U.S.298 (1920)a "A rule of 
practice must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail 
over a constitutional right". Such a rule, one may add, is a 
strange one for the courts do not always refuse to consider 
collateral issues, e.g. as to competency of a witness. 
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13. 362 U.S.257 (1960) following Jeffers v United States, 342 u.s. 
48 (1951). As said the requirement is weakened b,y Mapp v Ohio, 
supra; see also Katz v United States, 388 u.s. 41 (1967) which 
held that the prohibition against unreasonable searches aims to 
protect people not places. See also Melvin Gutterman: "A Person 
Aggrieved• Standing to suppress illegally seized Evidence in 
Transition" (1974) 23 Emory Law Journal, III. 
14. 347 u.s. 62 (1954). 
15. See also Clark, J in Mapp v Ohio, infra. Ch.4,in whose opinion 
if such evidence were not to be excluded, the Fourth Amendment 
protections and rights would be "a form of words". 
16. Among others see Gouled v United States, 255 U.S.298 (1921) Marron 
v United States 274 U.S.l92 (1927) Harris v United States, 331 U.S. 
145, Trupiano v United States 337 U.S.699 (1948), United States 
v Rabrowitcz, 339 U.S.56, On Lee v United States 343 U.S.747 (1952), 
Muller v United States, 357 U.S.301 (1958), Giondenello v United 
States, 357 U.S.480 (1958), Jones v United States, 357 U.S.493 
(1958), Elkins v United States, 364 U.S.206 (1960), Abel v United 
States, 362 U.S.217 (1960). 
17. 251 U.S.385 (1920). 
18. Cf. Walder v United States, supra. note 14. 
19. 371 U.S.471 (1963). 
20. 'Unlawful' because there was no 'probable cause'. One of the 
petitioners on the arrival of the officers had run away; the flight, 
in the Court's opinion, did not justify an inference of guilt suf-
ficient to give a 'probable cause' for arrest. In fact, according 
to the majority, a warrant could not have been issued because, again, 
there was no 'probable cause' in that facts essential for issuance 
of a warrant did not exist, there was only a suspicion. See also 
Carroll v United States, 267 u.s. 132 (1923), Brinegaft v United 
States, 338 u.s. (1948), 160, Henry v United States, 361 U.S.98 
(1959). 
21. 365 U.S. 505 (1960), which applied the Weeks doctrine to the con-
versation overheard by illegally installed electric gadgets (not a 
wire-tapping case). 
22. See Nardone v United States, 308 U.S.338 (1939). 
23. In this respect, as indeed in the development and final 
application to State Courts of the Weeks doctrine illustrates the 
influence of the composition of the Supreme Court on the develop-
ment of the law. So far as state trials are concerned, it is 
submitted that a differently constituted Supreme Court - for 
example, the present Berger Court instead of the Warren Court -
could quite logically have declared an inclusionary rule in Mapp 
v Ohio, supra. 
24. 328 u.s. 582 (1946). 
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25. Murphy, J. joined in the dissent. Cf. the position in England 
especially Ghani v Jones discussed in ch. 2 Supra. 
26. "I cannot believe that a vast area of civil liberties was thus 
meant to be wiped out by a few words, without prior argument or 
consideration". See also Olmstead v United States, 271 U.S.438 
(1928). 
27. 389 U.S.347 (1967) the holding of which means t~t a person using 
a public telephone box is entitled to as much privacy as one using 
his private residence. Also Berger v United States, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967). These decisions discussed infra. overruled Olmstead v 
United States, on illegal eavesdropping by mechanical devices. 
28. But see the Report of the Younger Committee on "Privacy" (1972 
Cmnd. 5012) on the potential threat to privacy through these 
techniques. 
29. 277 u.s. 438 (1928). 
30. The decision has no bearing on "electronic surveillance" but 
is confined to "telephone tapping". 
31. And see Carroll v United States, 267 U.S.132 (1923) where it was 
said that the "4th Amendment is to be construed in the light of what 
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted". 
In Olmstead the majority felt that prohibiting of \oJiretapping should 
be left to the Congress. 
32. But cf. Kuruma v R, supra, ch. 2. which clearly recognises such a 
common law discretion. 
33. Entick v Carrington, supra. 
34· 302 U.S.379 (1937). 35.308 U.S.338 (1939). 
36. As it might have in England. 
37. For a further application of Nardone v United States, see Weiss 
v United States, 308 u.s. 321 (1939), Benanti v United States, 355 u.s. 
96 (1957), Lee v Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1967)• 
38. The States control their own criminal-law administration, see 
Constitution, AQt 1 and the lOth Amendment. 
39. And the policy behind the rule in Wolf v Colarado, infra. ch.4. 
Wolf v Colarado, 338 u.s. 25 (1949), held that the Weeks' doctrine 
did not apply to State criminal trials. 
40. 344 u.s. 199 (1952). 
41. Douglas, J., following his view in Lee v United States, infra 
dissented and held that wire-tapping violated the 4th Amendment. 
42. Supreme Court explaing Schwartz decision in Benanti v United States, 
supra, which also held that wire-tapping evidence obtained by a 
State officer was not admissible in federal courts - under the so-
called 'silver-platter doctrine'. 
43· 316 u.s. 129 (1942). 
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44. Applying Olmstead v United States supra. Stone, C.J. and 
Frankfurter, J. agreed but would have been willing to overrule 
the Olmstead decision if there had been a majority in favour 
of doing so; both agreed with the views of Murphy and Brandeis, J.J. 
45· See also Lopez v United States, supra., where in his concurring 
opinion \'/arren, C.J. said that "the fantastic advances in the field 
of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the 
privacy of the individual" 
46. i.e. installing of the detectaphone was a direct invasion of 
'privacy' whether or not it was a trespass. cr. Brandeis, J's 
opinion in Olmstead v United States, supra - interference with 
telephone wires in itself should be enough to justify exclusion. 
41· 343 U.S.747 (1952). See also Hoffa v United States, 385 U.S.293 
(1966) holding that the defendant's admissions to an agent who 
recorded them did not violate Hoffa's 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments 
rights. 
48. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 1934 inapplicable 
because there was no wiretapping. 
49· Citing Stone, J. in McGuire v United States, 273 U.S.95. See also 
Bentham's "Rationale of Judicial Evidence" (ed. Bowring) who would 
have described the "fair-play" argument as "the fox-hunter's reason" 
50. To quote the answer given by an Indian Civil Servant to Sir James 
Stephen on the explanation for use of torture; "there is a great 
deal of laziness in it. It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably 
in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to 
go about in the sun hunting up evidence". See Stephen "A History 
of the Criminal Law in England" Vol. 1 at 442. 
51. 373 U.S.427 (1963) 
52. The argument that there was an 'entrqpment' in that the agent 
showed an apparent willingness to accept the bribe was also rejected; 
there is a difference bett-teen manufacturing or inducing a crime 
and employing methods to detect and pr~vent one. 
53. With whom Douglas and Goldberg J.J. joined. 
54· Warren, C.J., one of the majority, agreed that OMLee was wrongly 
decided. 
55. Note 4 supra. 
56. See e.g. Silverman v United States, 365 U.S.505 (1961) - a "spike 
mike" - an electronic device - inserted into the party wall separat-
ing the observation post from the alleged gambling establishment: 
held there was a trespass and therefore evidence not admissible. 
See also Osborn v United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) and Irvine v 
California, 347 u.s. 128 (1954). In Irvine's case Douglas, J. 
maintained that eavesdropping by mechanical devices amounted to 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment even if there was no physical 
penetration of the premises, he had taken a similar view in 
Silverman's case. 
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57. Lopez v United States, supra. 
58. 388 u.s.41 (1967), 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
59· And also that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment which makes 
the 4th Amendment applicable to the States. The relevant statute 
was widely drafted and failed to provide that the warrant must 
describe with particularity "the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized" as required by the 4th Amendment; 
nor was the statute restricted to a limited surveillance but 
allowed a continuous one. Cf. the precisely drafted warrant 
issued in Osborn v United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
60. And see Douglas, J's opinion in Osborn v United States supra. 
and Warden v U~den 387 u.s. 312 (1967). In Katz v United States, 
supra. Black, J. also relied upon the 5th Amendment "since I see 
no way in which the \'lOrds of the Fourth Amendment can be construed 
to apply to eavesdropping". 
61. See e.g. Silverman v United States, 365 u.s. 505 (1961), Lopez 
v United States, 373 u.s. 427 (1963), Berger v New York, supra. 
62. It is a rule that before a search warrant is executed the 
defendant should be given a notice about the intention to carry 
out the search - Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Hep 194 (1603)• he 
ought to signify the cause of his Coming and request to open the 
doors. The Supreme Court held that because of the nature of 
'search' in electronic surveillance this rule did not apply. 
63. Supra. 
64. As Douglas, J put it in Silverman v United States, supra. the 
"trouble with stare decisis in this field is that it leads us to a 
'Watching of cases on irrelevant facts". 
65. Supra. Admittedly Berger's case was concerned with the uncon-
stitutionality of a State Legislation; this was rectified by the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Sat(e Streets Act 1968, which provides 
for interception of telephone and oral communications in accord-
ance with the requirements in Berger and Katz. However, the 
unconstitutionality of the New York Statute could not have been 
pronounced without at the same time overruling Olmstead case. 
66. Olmstead v United States, supra. Also expressed by Bradley, J. 
in Boyd v United States, supra. 
67. As will be seen, infraJconsideration of this 'right of privacy' 
at state level led the Court to provide another reason for the 
exclusionary rule, i.e. that of deterrent to the police who are 
tempted to break the law. 
68. 362 U.S.257 (1960). Prior to this decision the 'standing to 
challenge' belonged to a person who claimed that his own property 
had been seized, i.e. his 'property rights' under the 4th 
Amendment had been violated. This obviously created serious 
difficulty for e.g. for a person charged with unlawful possession 
of drugs where he could clearly not plead not guilty and at 
the same time claim the property is his. See Melvin Gutterman 
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"A Person Aggrieved a Standing to Suppress Illegally seized 
Evidence in Transition", 23 Emory Law Journal III for an interesting 
discussion of the cases, especially United States v Jeffers, 342 
u.s. 48 (1957). 
70. See e.g. Wong Sun v United States supra. and other qualifications 
discussed at the beginning of this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXTENSION OF WEEKS 1 DOCTRINE TO THE STATES 
The exclusionary rule in Weeks v United States was laid down in 
relation to evidence obtained by federal officers for the purpose of 
federal prosecutions, and it was not until 1949 that the Supreme Court 
was presented with the question of its applicability to state trials; 
that is to s~ whether the absolute exclusionary rule banned in a state 
prosecution all evidence which has been obtained by illegal search and 
seizure by the state police, or where such evidence having been obtained 
by federal officials had then been passed on to the state police. This 
chapter will aim to examine and trace the changes in the judicial approach 
to these questions and, incidentally, also briefly look at the Court's 
attitude to evidence illegally obtained by the state police, without 
federal partioipation, but subsequently purported to be used for federal 
prosecutions. Although the appeals from the states must inevitably provide 
a sharp focus on the issues particularly relev~~ to a country with a 
written constitution - indeed, a federal structure must necessitate a 
constitution in a written form in order to delimit the powers of its 
institutions - the Supreme Court's pronouncements also provide fruitful 
material on the clash of policies and values that constantly take place in a 
democratic and free society. In other words, they supply one with 
indications of the relevant policy reasons which compel the Court to lay 
down one rule rather than the other. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States constitution is usually 
relied upon as the basis for persuading the Supreme Court to extend the 
application of the various rights, duties, privileges and prohibitions of 
the constitution to the states. This Amendment applies to the states only 
and is not directed at the federal government; however, the concept of'due 
process of law• in it has proved most effective in 'aproning1 round it the 
rights and prohibitions declared in the other Amendments. The Amendment 
says: ·~o state shall make or enforee any law which shall abridge 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
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state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of law." 
In Palpo v Connecticut (1) the petitioner after having been suc~essful 
at the state Court of Appeal against the sentence of life imprisonment 
had been arrested, retried and on conviction sentence~to death. The 
present appeal rested on 'double jeopardy' which is prohibited by the 
Fifth Amendment ~r federal prosecutions. In essence the petitioner's 
argument was that whatever is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment is 
automatically prohibited by the Fourteenth (2). This was not a novel 
proposition since the Court had in the past faced the same issue·" in 
relation to other parts of the first eight Amendments to the constitution (3). 
The Court rejected the submission that the Fourteenth Amendment 
automatically made applicable to the states the first eight Amendments in 
their entirety and took the view that the Fourteenth Amendment's 'due 
process clause' absorbs only those rights, privileges and immunities 
which can be described as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty". 
Thus, only if a privilege or right c~ reasonably be said to be an 
essential part of 11ordered libertyV will it be binding on the states; the 
Fourteenth Amendment absorbs those aspects of the constitution which are 
essential for the survival of liberty and justice(4): the 'due process 
clause' of the Fl!lurteenth Amendment c&h.emns state laws or actions if they 
are incompatible with those"fun.damental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all ourcivil and political institutions"; it 
prohibits those proceedures in a trial which prevent 11a fair and 
enlightened system of justice".(5) So far as 'double jeopardy' was 
concerned, it did not in Cardozo,J's view violate thesr principles. 
I 
In ··,iol.f v Colorado ( 6) the issue was \'fhether the 'due process of law' 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fourth Amendment and, 
therefore, made applicable t~ the states its privileges and prohibitions. 
The petitioner's argument that it did so had important implications. 
- 102 -
Thus, if his conten,tion were to be accepted by the Court, then a decision 
on the origin or the rationale of the exclusionary rule in v/eeks v United 
States (7) would become imperative, for the appeal itself alleged that the 
petitioner's conviction at the state court was secured by admission of evidenc 
which had been illegally obtained by the state police and that this should 
have been excluded, Thus, even if the court were to hold that the 'due 
process' clause incorporated the Fourth Amendment, it would have to 
consider whether the exclusionary rule was mandated by the Amendment(8). 
The petitioner had been convicted in a state court for a state offence 
by admission of evidence which would have been excluded in a federal court. 
Frankfurter,J. delivering the opinion of a majority of six justices held 
that the Fourth Amendment guarantees were binding on the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Weeks' doctrine could not be made binding 
on the state courts and the conviction therefore must be affirmed. The 
minority (9) whilst agreeing with the majority's first conclusion took a 
contrary view on the second. 
In expressing the majority opinion Frankfurter,J. said: "Due process 
of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirement. It 
is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must 
enforce because they are basic to our free society. But baaic rights do 
not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human 
experience, some may not 'too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is 
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is 
deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, 
due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a 
given time be deemed the limits on the essentials of fundamental rights". 
It was for the Court, by,~ gradual and empiric process pf 'inclusion and 
exclusion 1 to decide what the 'due process of law' includes(10). He then 
held that the right to privacy against police intrusions which was at the 
core of the Fourth Amendment was basic to a free society and implicit in the 
concept of 'ordered liberty' and, therefore, through the due process clause 
binding on the states. "The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, 
as a prelude to a search without authority of law put solely on the 
authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to 
be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined 
in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking 
peoples." 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees were thus binding on the states, who 
could not abridge them. However, the method of enforcing them, or the 
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remedies for any breach of thEBeguarantees by the government, called for 
varying answers and solutions by the st~tes; the Sureme Court could not 
impose them on the states, for Weeks rule "was not derived from the 
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment, ••••• The decision was a 
matter of judicial implication." (11) 
Thus, in recognising that the social realities of the individual 
states may call for their,ow.n rules of evidence the Court had removed 
any doubt as to the basis of the exclusionary rulea the rule was 
evidential -- a judicial fiat -- and not a constitutionally required 
one. The majority supported its holding by pointing out that most of 
the English-speaking world did not regard an exclusionary rule as vital 
to the protection of individual privacy(l2). Moreover, an analysis of 
the attitude of the various states to the Weeks' doctrine indicated that 
whilst before 1914 twenty six states had rejected the exclusionary rule, 
by 1949 thirty one states had decided not to accept it. Lastly, the 
majority felt that a defendant in a criminal trial had adequate and 
effective alternative remedies for his grievance that the police had 
violated his constitutional rights. The emphasis is thus clearly on 
an effective enforcement of the constitutional rights; the exclusionary 
rule is only a remedy which the states are free to accept or reject and 
the Supreme Court would not impose it on them but would leave them free 
to devise their own remedies(l3) ,for breach of the Fourth Amendment 
rights and prohibitions. However, the majority opinion, perhaps 
inadvertently, also provided a built-in source for the eventual 
destruction of the decision when Fra.nkf'urter,J. saids" Granting that 
in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of 
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as 
falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause 
a state's reliance upon other methods which if consistently enforced, 
would be equally effective." This statement gives a clear indication 
as to the non-constitutional origin of the federal exclusionary rule; 
it suggests that certain policy reasons -- reasons springing from the 
importance of enforcing the constitutional liberties and prohibitions 
lie behind the awclusionary rule and that while in 1949 these policy 
reasons were being adequately satisfied by alternative remedies in the 
states, at an appropriate moment the Court may take a different view 
and overrule Wolf v Colorado. The states have the constitutional right 
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to make their own rules of proceedure and evidence; however, the more 
activist role assumed by the 5upreme Court in balancing the various 
competing individual and social interests, and the fact that policy 
considerations frequently fare in its decision-making process means that 
a differently constituted Court may later in time take a different view 
of the meaning and effect of a constitutional provision. 'rhe 
unsatisfactory feature of Wolf v Colorado was that its ruling left room 
for varying methods of upholding the Fourth Amendment; however, by saying 
that the states were bound by the Fourth Amendment but then not extending 
to them the application of what the Court recognised as the effective 
remedy for the rights and privileges in the Amendment, the Supreme Court 
produced an unsatisfactory situation. The Court accepted that what it 
was involving itself in was the balancing of two opposing demands, mainly 
the social need that crime should be repressed and the other competing 
social interest that police should not be allowed to flout the law, and 
that the result should not mean a disproportionate loss of protection 
for society in the preservation of the individual rights.(14) 
The Court might, it is submitted, have considered whether the states 
were obliged as a matter of 1due process of law' mandated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to exclude evidence obtained by illegal search. It 
has been seen that the Supreme Court has often considered the extent to 
which the various constitutional declarations directed to the federal 
government are applicable to the states through this clause. What does 
not appear in the various opinions is whether the clause independently by 
itself would prohibit reception of such evidence; in other words without 
having to consider the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the states 
the Court might have dealt with the appeal by deciding whether police 
illegality violates the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a criminal 
~ 
trial must be in accordance with the due process of law. The issue of the 
effective alternative remedies would then have become irrelevant. 
Any discussion of Wolf v Colorado must take account of the dissenting 
opinion of Murphy,J. who expressed his disappointment at the majority's 
conclusion that the alternative remedies were effective. "Alternatives 
are deceptive •••••• there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. 
That is no sanction at all." It was unrealistic to expect a District 
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Attorney to initiate criminal prosecutions against himself or against 
his associates, and as to the civil remedy of tr~pass action: "But what 
an illusory remedy this is, if by 'remedy' we mean a positive deterrent 
to police and prosecutors tempted to violate the Fourth Amendment. ••••••• 
in a trespass action the measure of damages is simply the extent of the 
injury to physical property. If the officer searches with care, he can 
avoid all but nominal damages ••••••••• Are punitive damages possible? 
Perhaps." Moreover, the award of punitive damages differed from state 
to state and the finances of the individual officers might make any 
court award of damages useless: the only effective remedy lay in the 
exclusionary rule. 
It ought perhaps to be pointed out that impressive as Justice 
Murphy's reasoning is in emphasising the deterrent aspect of the 
exclusionary rule, it is a misnomer to describe the rule as a 1remedy 1 
for an aggrieved individual. It is submitted that the rule may be a 
society's instrument for upholding and underlining the fundamental 
importance of certain constitutional rules and declarations and for 
ensuring an obedience to them, but it can hardly be described as an 
individual defendant's remedy in a criminal trial. A 1remedy 1 implies 
some form of compensation for a plaintiff or a petitioner either in 
monetary or non-monetary form; an exclusionary rule can only be a policy 
instrument of judicial policy. On the other hand a civil action for 
trespass brought against a police officer is appropriately termed a 
'remedy' since it compensates the plaintiff in the event he is 
successful in his action. 
The majority's view was thus clear that the constitution did 
not lay down an exclusionary rule, though the irrelevant issue of 
'alternative remedies' diverted the Court's attention from the question 
whether the sanctity of constitutional rights and limitations made such 
a rule unavoid§ble(l5). 
As already indicated, the facts of Wolf v Colorado were not 
considered in the context of the 'due process of law' olause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; however, in Rochin v California(l6) the Court held 
that although the administration of criminal justice in the states is 
predominantly for the individual states the Court has jurisdiction to 
review state criminal convictions under the due process clause.(17) 
The state police suspecting that the petitioner was involved in selling of 
narcotics made an illegal entry into his house whereupon he swallowed the 
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two capsules of morphine. The petitioner was handcuf'fed and taken to a 
hospital where,against his will, a stomach pump \·Jas used to recover the 
damning evidence of the capsules; he was subsequently convicted of an 
offence under a Californian statute. The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction on the ground that the police conduct was so outrageous as to 
be contrary to the 'due process of law'. As Frankfurter,J. in the majority 
opinion said, the method used by the pdice "more than offend(s) some 
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime 
too energetically. This is a conduct that shocks the conscience" and 
failed to respect certain decencies of civilised conduct. In his view 
the clause gives the Court a basis for exercising judgment on the state 
criminal proceedings and to ensure that these proceedings do not offend 
"those canons of decency and fairness vthich express the notions of justice 
of English-speaking peoples even towards those charged with the most 
heinous offences." The clause summarised the personal i.nununities considered 
fundamental.(18) 
Frankfurter,J. did not cite Wolf v Colorado although he had there 
written the majority opinion. Rochin's case involved illegal entry into the 
house; it may be that the compulsory use of the stomach pump, in his view, 
raised differe~t issues from that of the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
defendant (19)·. By implication this means that coer6ion and physical 
assault by the police are considered so serious as to amount to a denial 
of due process though an illegal entry or search by itself does not. It is 
submitted that this approach may explain the absence of reference to 
Wolf v Colorado (20). In other words, if the only serious act of illegality 
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights, then although the 'due 
process of law' clause applies the Fourth Amendment to the states, it does 
not extend to them the Weeks' doctrine; if, on the other hand, the act or 
acts complained of involve physical brutality on the defendant, the 'due 
process of law' requires an exclusion of evidence procured as a result of 
it. The police conduct must be such as to"shock the ~onsoienoe."(21) 
The majority's approach in Rochin could not but have cast doubts on 
Wolf's case and weakened its holding. A further erosion of the Wolf's 
doctrine took place in Irvine v California (22) where the police, suspecting 
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that the defendant \otas involved in illegal bookmaking, made an illegal 
entry into his house and installed a concealed microphone; a hole was 
bored in the roof and "tires were strung to transmit the sounds picked up 
by the microphone. At later dates further entries were made to rearrange 
the location of the microphone. Thus, the whole sequence of eve~ts 
amounted to, as the Court said, a flagrant, deliberate and persistent 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights - in fact the police 
had heard every word said in the household for more than a month. In a 
majority opinion of five to four the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 
on the ground of the Wolf v Colorado holding that the federal exclusionary 
rule did not apply to the states. In Jackson,J. opinion Wolf v Colorado 
could not be overruled for the states have had not sufficiently long 
period of time to give further consideration to their evidential rules on 
this matter (23). However, the majority went on to reason in support of 
the Wolf's doctrine. Thus, there \-las no point in treating the exclusionary 
rule ·as a deterrent, for the case law suggested that the rule was not an 
effective sanction to put an end to the federal police practice of illegal 
searches. The disciplinary or educational effect on the police of releasing 
the defendant in such cases was so indirect as to be ineffective. 
Moreover, rejection of such evidence led to escape of the guilty: "It 
deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been 
pursued by another. It protects one against whom incriminating evidence 
is 4iscovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the 
victims of illegal but fruitless searches." '¥inally, the majority felt - as 
they did in Wolf v Colorado - that other alternative remedies, including 
the federal criminal charge (24) for violation of constitutional rights, 
were available. 
This is a remarkable way of supporting a decision not to apply the 
exclusionary rule to the states, for these very reasons could in their 
entirety and with equal force be arrayed against the federal exclusionary 
rule. It is one thing to say that the rule, since it is a result of the 
Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction over federal criminal prosecutions, 
does not extend to the states; it is quite another to give factual reasons 
which can be valid against both the federal and state rules. 
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The decision, however, lost some of its weight because of Clark,J.'s 
opinion. He reluctantly concurred with the majority (25) for the sake of 
certainty and predictability though had there been a proof of physical 
brutality he would have excluded the evidence. The dissenting opinion 
of Fr~nkfurter,J. was again based on the 'due process of law' clause. 
In line with his opinion in Rochin's case he maintained that the clause 
enabled the Court to ensure that the proceedings in the state courts did 
not offend the basic standards of "decency and fairness", the uncertainty 
and lack of exactitude in its meaning a\'i'S not regrettable for although 
it permitted the Court to give it different meanings at different periods 
of history this would be done within the limits of its judicial function 
and in accordance with the method of judicial reasoning; he, therefore, 
disagreed with the majority's opinion (26) that 'shock the conscience' 
test would lead to uncertainty and haphazard decisions. He then went on 
to explain the difference between Wolf v Colorado and Rochin's case; in 
Rochin v California the v/olf' s case was not relevant because the 
unlawful search there had been aggravated by the repulsive conduct of 
the police with the result that the conduct of the police was not in 
accordance with the values implicit in the 'due process of law' clause. 
Violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment_ rights thus did not by 
itself disbar the relevant evidence in the state courts. Consistent 
with this reasoning Frankfurter,J. held that in Irvine's case although 
there had been a "more powerful and offensive control over the Irvines' 
life. • • • • • • the conduct of the police here "Ylent far beyond a bare search 
and seizure," the conviction therefore must be reversed, 
II 
The views of the dissenters finally prevailed in Mapp v Ohio (27) 
where the Supreme Court by a majority of five to four overruled Wolf v 
Colorado and applied 'judicial braking' on the state courts' freedom to 
lay down its own rules of evidence in the area of constitutional rights. 
In order to do this the Court had only one course (28) open, mainly place 
the exclusionary rule squarely on a constitutional basis. The petitioner 
was appealing from his conviction by a state court for knowingly possessing 
obscene literature. The material had been confiscated by the police by an 
unlawful search of her home; without a warrant they forcibly opened the 
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door of the defendant's home, handcuffed her and searched through the 
bedroom furniture and also looked into her photo album and through her 
personal papers. When the defendant's attorney arrived at the scene he 
was refused permission to see her. The search subsequently spread to the 
rest of the house, including her child's bedroom. In the opinion of the 
Ohio Supreme Court these methods did "offend a sense of justice" but 
since the defendant had suffered no brutal or physical force the evidence 
produced by the search was admisstble. 
In an opinion written by Clark,J. (29) the Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction. In his opinion the exclusionary rule v1as a necessary 
deterrent safeguard for the Fourth Amendment rights and protections; 
without it the Amendment would be a mere form of words. The rule was an 
essential ingredient of the Amendment and was an integral and inseparable 
part of the right of privacy; it bound the states via the 'due process 
of law' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: the exclusionary rule had a 
constitutional basis. Moreover, the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments 
expressed "supplementing phases of the same constitutional purpose - to 
maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy" (30) and both these 
Amendments ensure that no one is to be convicted of unconstitutional 
evidence. As to the factual considerations which had influenced the 
Court in Wolf v Colorado, the majority pointed out that the alternative 
remedies and protections for the right of privacy against state police 
had been shown to be worthless. In their opinion it made little sense in 
a system where evidence which could not be used by a federal officer 
could be available to state police. Such a dichotomy of approach only 
"serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which (the 
state) is bound to uphold." The criminal goes free not because a constable 
has blundered but because the lavr sets him free (31): "Nothing can destroy 
a government more quickly than its failure to obey its own la\oJS, or 
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. 11 In deciding 
on an issue between the government and a citizen the Court must take 
account of the importance of judicial integrity, and should not allow the 
police'short cuts' to secure convictions; such a tolerance of the police 
conduct by the courts destroys the system of constitutional restraints 
which are fundamental to preservation of individual liberties, and in 
particular the individual's right to privacy: the police cannot suspend 
constitutional constraints. 
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In his concurring opinion Black,J. doubted whether the Fourth 
Amendment standing by itself supported an exclusionary rule for the 
express wordi1~ of the Amendment did not require such a rule, nor could 
the rule justifiably be inferred from it. However, a combined reading 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provided a "constitutional basis" (32). 
In his dissenting opinion (33) he cast serious doubton the wisdom and 
constitutionality of the action of the Supreme Court in pressing judgment 
on the individual states' decision to lay down a rule for its criminal 
proceedure; each state has its peculiar problems of law enforcement and 
therefore must be left free to decide on its own attitude to police 
illegality. This was a pertinent point against applying the exclusionary 
rule to the states for since the rule was a judicial implication rather 
than an express constitutional mandate and since the states have jurisdiction 
to make their own rules of evidence there could be no justification for 
overruling Wolf v Colorado. However, in so far as Harlan,J. was admitting 
that the exclusionary rule aimed to maintain certain basis standards he 
was contradicting himself in his reference to problems of law enforcement 
experienced by the states; this suggests that a state can sacrifice basic 
standa:cds in the light of its own peculiar crime problem. However, his 
dissent highlights the fact that any claim as to the exclusionary rule 
being a constitutional requirement is not universally shared in the 
Supreme Court (34). 
Thus, both the majority and the minority opinions appear either to 
support or take cognisance of the belief that the rights which are basic 
to 'constitutional dignity' and the 'due process of law' concept have to 
be safeguarded and strengthened by judicially created rules in support 
of the substantive law. If we may use an analogy, then the latter is the 
body which cannot be effectually used without the supprt of the limbs in 
the form of rules of evidence. The right of privacy is at the core of 
the constitutional limitations of police powers, and so far as the states 
\-lere concerned not even Harlan,J·. denied that the alternative remedies 
open to individual citizen for violation of his residual right of privacy 
had proved of no effect in deterring police illegality (35); the increasing 
number of appeals on this issue suggested ineffectiveness of the 
alternative remedies. 
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III 
One consequence of the Supreme Court's desire to limit the operation 
of the exclusionary rule - and also a strong indication of the fact that 
the rule was aimed at the federal officers as a penalty for their defiance 
of the law- was the so-called 'silver platter doctrine'. The Court had held 
that provided illegal search had not been carried out at the behest and 
encouragement or with participation of federal police, then evidence 
obtained by illegal search and seizure by state police could be handed 
over for use in federal courts. The Fourth Amendment, in the Court's view, 
aimed to protect federal rights and since the \oleeks' doctrine was treated 
as supportive of this Amendment, the,exclusion~ rule only affected the 
federal officers (36). The silver platter doctrine remained unquestioned 
for some time but obviously it could only be justified so long as the 
Court maintained that unlawful search and seizures by state police did 
not violate the federal constitution. 
With the decision in Wolf v Colorado that the Fourth Amendment is 
applicable to the states it might have been thought that the doctrine 
lost its basis in 1949. However, this was not so for in Lustig v United 
States (37), decided on the same day as Wolf v Colorado, the doctrine was 
endorsed. lt,ederal officials had hinted to the state police that 11 there 
was something wrong 11 which led to the state police to carry out an illegal 
search. The evidence turned up by this search was later shared by the federal 
police. The Supreme Court pointed out that the controlling feature for 
the applicability of the 'silver platter doctrine' was proof of participation 
by the federal police; on the facts of this particular case no distinction 
could be drawn between participation in the initial search and joining 
in the critical examination of the contents of the illegal search. The 
Court held that there had been participation by federal police and, 
therefore, the doctrine did not help them in their contention that evidence 
was admissible. 
The doctrine, unpopular as it was, met its end in Elkins v United 
States (38) where the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion delivered by 
Stewart,J., held that as a result of Wolf v Colorado no logical distinction 
could be drawn between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and that obtained in violation of the Fourteenth: in both cases 
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federal police were relying upon an act which had flouted the constitution 
and the Court would as a matter of its supervisory jurisdiction over 
federal criminal proceedings exclude both types of evidence. This 
overturning of the doctrine was in the face of a dissent by Frankfurter,J. 
(39) that in accordance with the Wolf principle evidence acquired 
innocently by federal officials should be admitted. 
This explanation and discussion of the Supreme Court decisions which 
finally led to an exclusio~ary rule, both at the federal and state level, 
suggests alternative rationales for the rUle. Case law has constantly 
and emphatically brought out four important features of the American 
judicial approach in this particular area of law of evidence. First, 
over a period of about half a century there has been a gradual but well 
articulated clarification of judicial views as to the purpose and function 
of the exclusionary rule. The development from Wolf v Colorado to 
Mapp v Ohio is one of an assertion by the Supreme Court that there can 
be no dichotomy or variation in the application of the central and core 
values supporting the constitutional and political structure of American 
society; the values which underlie the federal structure are also the 
core of state systems. Secondly, there has been a noticeable judicial 
resistance to the courts having to participate or acquiesce in the 
wrongdoings of the police, or, as the Supreme Court has always said, 
the 'government'. Thirdly, and logically independent of the seoond, 
there has been an expression of abhorrence and strong disapproval by the 
Court of the methods used by the police in obtaining evidence. Fourthly, 
there is an emphatic assertion that the prohibition against unreasonable 
searches in the Fourth Amendment is in essence a declaration of the 
individual right of privacy cherished by common law. All these four 
factors have at one time or another propelled the Court towards an 
exclusionary rule; one or more of these reasons have featured in the 
judgments at one time or another. An important observation provided 
by these judgments is that while the increasing complexity of modern 
society has been leading to a great increase in violent and non-violent 
organised crime, the Court has with equally great emphasis accepted an 
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all embracing exclusionary rule. Gradually the Court has been 
denying police the fruits of their extra-legal acts; the popular feeling 
about 'law and order' has proved totally ineffectual in inducing the 
Court to}ronounce an inclusionary rule. It is submitted that the 
Supreme Court's approach ought to be taken as an indicator of the extent 
to which the Court is out of touch with the public opinion; it shows 
a recognition that legal rules, including rules of evidence, are an 
essential tool for ensuring that the structure of society remains 
basically free.. An analysis of the major Supreme Court decisions will 
show that in deciding on an issue between the executive and a citizen 
values which are too deep at the foundation of the social structure, 
values which cannot be resolved by a formal logic or expediency, must be 
involved. 
Compared with this, the judicial decision making process in 
England has been rather mechanical and considerably less dynamic. The 
inclusionary rule in England, although probably not as unacceptable and 
irrational as some commentators might like to describe it, has been 
arrived at by a process of judicial reasoning which, to say the least, 
is unsatisfactory and irrational. The English rule does make pragmatic 
sense and does strike a 'sensible' balance baween the various demands 
of society; it enables the courts not ~commit themselves in advance on 
all police irregularities, intentional or accidental, trivial or flagrant 
and serious. But the rule does suffer from some defects in that it has 
been arrived at without adequate and necessary consideration of its 
rationale. It is submitted that a claim that such evidence is admitted 
because it is relevant does not provide a rationale; all evidence to be 
admissible must be relevant. Secondly, although the function of this 
rule of evidence seems to be to secure the conviction of a guilty person, 
its effect on the police is disregarded. Thirdly, the role of 
evidential rules within the corpus of that law called the constitutional 
law has also been ignored. Lastly, and perhaps the worst feature of the 
scene, the bases or criteria on which such relevant evidence would be 
acluded in the court's discretion are imprecise and where stated do not 
make sense. 
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It may be that any comparison between the English and American 
law must take account of the fact that the Supreme Court has readily 
available criteria of fundamental rules in a written constitution. 
However, it is submitted tha the difference in the two approaches cannot 
be explained away on this basis. The Fourth Amendment does not 
explicitly command the courts to exclude for all purposes evidence 
obtained in breach of the constitutional rights and prohibitions (40). 
Therefore, any view that the exclusionary rule is inevitable or 
unavoidable is untenable. The cases examined in the previous two chapters 
show that without having to abandon an acceptable judicial reasoning 
process the Supreme Court could have avoided the constitutional argument 
and treated the issue as one belonging to the Court's supervisory power (41); 
it instead chose to turn it into one raising a constitutional principle. 
The reason for this was the importance the Court attached to the values 
underlying the Amendments: an inclusionary rule could have been laid down 
without any disloyalty or violence to the language of the constitution, 
but the Court chose not to do this. 
Justification for the exclusionary rule can be either normative or 
factual (42). The normative justification may rest either on certain 
other legal rules or on moral standards which the courts consider they 
must observe. The Fourth Amendment does not state that the evidence 
should be excluded (43), and, therefore, the Court has at times relied 
upon both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments to justify the rule. 
However, this reasoning finds almost no support in the historical 
development and in the purpose of the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment confers certain rights on individuals, subject to certain 
well-defined situations as to when these can be abridged by the police; 
any act on the part of the police in defiance of these restrictions in 
the constitution could be 'punished' by a civil action for damages -
including punitive damages - for trespass or by a criminal prosecution 
of the police or by an internal police discipline without or with the 
accompanying public criticism of police conductthat is inevitable in a 
free society. 
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All these 'remedies' exist in America, but the Supreme Court has chosen 
the exclusionary rule and has treated it as constitutionally based (44). 
This claim that the rule has a constitutional basis provides a normative 
justification in the sense that although the rule receives its expression 
in judicial pronouncements, it is required by the Amendment in the context 
of its purpose. Thus, the 'constitutional basis' claim means that 
the essence of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments make an exclusionary 
rule inevitable. But, as pointed out, there need be no inevitability 
about it: the inevitability springs from the Court's opinion as to the 
basic values of the society enshrined in the constitution, and the 
importance the Court attaches to these values. The exclusionary rule 
is inevitable because otherwise the constitutional - or common law-
right of privacy cannot be meaningful; the right of privacy may as well 
be struck out of the constitution. Thus, a rule of evidence has been 
evolved to be a concomitant of a constitutional safeguard: both, in the 
view of the Supreme Court, must stand or fall together. It is against 
the background of this explanation that any claim that English and 
American situations are not comparable must be treated with scepticism. 
Another justification for the exclusionary rule is sometimes 
provided by the belief that the courts should not assist the government 
in the use of the fruits of its own illegality, although the said 
illegality may in the framework of cl~ssification of the wrongful acts 
amount to only a civil wrong. Since the doctrine of separation of 
powers treats the courts as independent of the executive, the courts 
must insist that the government in accusing an individual must itself 
be free from blemish. If the methods used by the government in securing 
evidence to prove the defendant's guilt are themselves unlawful, then 
judicial integrity requires the courts not to use the fruits of government 
illegality (45). This is the concept of the 'imperative of judicial 
integrity' which insists that the courts must appear impartial and must 
not legitimise illegal police conduct or lend it any degree of respecta-
bility. As Brandeis, J. in his dissenting opinion insisted in 
Olmstead v United States, the Court refuses to admit such evidence "in 
order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the 
administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from 
contamination" (45b). 
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This is a recognition of the fact that mistrust of official integrity 
subverts free institutions and the courts must dissociate from activities 
which generate such mistrust. 
Then there is what is called factual justification, or a 
justification based on the belief as to what the exclusionary rule can 
achieve in terms of controlling police conduct. This is the deterrent 
principle founded on the belief, though not on any empirical evidence, 
that an exclusionary rule deters the police from resorting to illegal 
acts in relation to their duty to solve the criminal offences. Such a 
justification~r the rule has received frequent emphasis. On this basis 
the rule implies that if the fruits of illegality are excluded, then the 
knowledge that evidence obtained by unlawful acts will have no meaningful 
effect in the trial of the defendant would lead to a lessening of the 
desire to carry out unlawful searches and seizures. This approach 
reinforces the thesis that the exclusionary rule is judicially created 
and that it serves to compel the police to observe and respect the 
constitutional restrictions on their powers. The deterrent theory 
propounded in Mapp v Ohio has received further support in the Court's 
holding that the exclusionary rule in Mapp v Ohio has no retroactive 
effect (46). An unsatisfactory feature of this theory is that the 
illegality already having taken place the Court is apparently allowing 
an obviously guilty person to escape as a warning to the police not to 
indulge in illegal acts. Moreover, if deterrment is the aim then it 
ought not~ matter whether the illegality took place before or after 
Mapp v Ohio decision; if exclusion of evidence obtained by post Mapp v Ohio 
illegality is supposed to deter, then suppression of evidence obtained by 
pre-Mapp v Ohio illegality will also obtain the same result. That such 
a distinction has been made suggests that exclusion of evidence takes place 
because of the Court's wish to penalise the law enforcement agencies, 
not necessarily only to deter them. Of course, it could be argued that 
by excluding evidence the Court is ensuring future police compliance with 
the constitutional prohibitions on their powers; and probably this result 
is achieved. However, acceptance or rejection of this is difficult for 
in reality the considerable delay that ensues between the date of the 
police illegality and the date of a successful appeal may mean that the 
deterrment value is not that significant. 
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The deterrment justification for the exclusionary rule is thus beset 
by the problem of proof; whether the Supreme Court is on a sound ground 
when relying upon the judicial policy of bringing about police conformity 
to the law can only be proved or disproved by empirical evidence. 
Whatever research there exists on this issue, it neither supports nor 
rejects the deterrent effect of the rule (47). However, one private 
judicial view has been that the rule has had a significant effect on 
police standards (48). At a common sense level such an opinion seems 
to commend itself, for an exclusionary rule must, in the ordinary course 
of events, deter~ policemen; what remains uncertain is whether this is 
significant enough to justify the rule (49). 
More than one of the above justifications have been relied upon by 
the Supreme Court in the same case; this has enabled the decisions to possess 
solid foundation. If there is no proof that the exclusionary rule deters, 
there is the Court's belief that it does, and this cannot be criticised 
for the deterrence theory in the sentencing policy for certain types of 
crimes rests on belief and not on empirical proof. The rule is of 
constitutional origin, but if not then judicial integrity requires 
that such evidence be excluded. Thus, one or more of these justifications 
support a particular opinion or a particular decision of the Supreme 
Court (50); and it cannot be true that if the deterrment objective were 
adeq~tely met by civil remedies, the exclusionary rule will be on a 
shaky foundation (51) for the much stronger basis for the rule is that 
it is intimately linked with the constitutional declarations and is part 
and parcel of the constitution in the context of the values preserved by 
it (52). 
As has been pointed out the Fourth Amendment on its literal 
construction could not be said to dictate an exclusionary rule. Prior 
to Mapp v Ohio this fact had led to judicial pronouncements that the rule 
springs from the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction over federal 
trials. The Supreme Court is empowered to fashion rules of evidence for 
federal criminal proceedings "inconformity with the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted •••• in the light of reason and 
experience". (53) Thus, in Lopez v United States the Court, as an 
alternative to its reliance on the Fourth Amendment, would have allowed 
the appeal on the basis that under its supervisory jurisdiction the 
evidence should have been excluded (54). 
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The Court took the view that if the electronic surveillance does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, i.e. if it was not a 'search', then it 
should nonetheless be excluded because 11we ought to devise an appropriate 
prophylactic rule". Various other opinions have supported the view that 
the rule is not a constitutional one (55), though Mapp v Ohio appears to 
have rejected this basis of the exclusionary rule. This rejection was 
obviously necessitated by the Court's decision to apply the rule to the 
States; an exclusionary rule which is based or doctrinally supported 
by the supervisory jurisdiction could not be imposed on the states. The 
Supreme Court therefore described the rule as having a constitutional 
basis in the sense that it was an inseparable part of the Amendment and 
made it seriously meaningful; remove the exclusionary rule and the 
individual right of privacy is meaningless. In so deciding the Court 
may also have been motivated to bring about a uniformity in the judicial 
approach to police illegality - a desire which is also seen in providing 
a theoretical basis for the exclusion of involuntary confessions. Thus, 
the Court's rejection of Frankfurter, J.'s approach to applying the 
exclusionary rule to the States, through the 'due p~ocess of law' clause 
via the test of whether the police conduct "shocks the conscience", 
illustrates this desire for uniformity and a distrust of subjective 
assessment of police conduct (56). 
This approach on the part of the Supreme Court may suggest that the 
Court has been indulging in judicial legislation. It is submitted that 
this is no more a judicial legislation than an English Court's approach 
to interpretation or construction of legislative enactment, though the 
American approach is bolder and freely takes into account the policy 
issues &ld policy objectives. Two factors (57) have played a significant 
part in propelling the Court towards an absolute exclusionary rule. 
First, the social reality of the frequent and increasingly subtle and 
brutal methods adopted by the police in securing evidence. Secondly, 
a realisation that the existing civil remedies are an inadequate 
compensation for the victim of a misguided or deliberate police zeal; the 
alternative civil remedies (58) for the violation of constitutional rights 
have been considered to be ineffective and spurious. The reality of 
pursuing these other remedies involves various facts: the inordinately 
long time before a civil action comes to trial, the likelihood that 
substantial damages will not be awarded, the fact that the individual 
police officer may not be worth suing for damages (59), the fact that a 
convicted person inside the prison cannot be expected to have suffident 
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moral strength and determination to initiate or persist in such actions 
and the fact that the convicted person may not be able to afford the 
legal costs for a protracted civil suit. Nor does the Supreme Court have 
faith in other non-legal collateral remedies such as complaints to the 
police chiefs or the internal discipline of the police organisations. 
v 
In evolving the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by illegal 
search the Court has placed emphasis on the techniques, or methods, used 
by the police in obtaining the evidence. In this the judicial approach 
shows similarity to that seen in the evolution and application of the 
exclusionary rule in relation to involuntary extra-judicial confessions. 
Indeed, in Mapp v Ohio Clark, J. suggested that both the exclusionary 
rules are intimately connected in the purpose they try to achieve. 
In the early period of American history admissibility of extra-
judicial confessions was governed by the common law rule that now prevails 
in England, mainly confessions must be excluded unless the prosecution 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that they were voluntary in the sense 
that they were not made either because of a fear or hope of a secular 
reward exercised or held out·by a person in authority. This rule was 
given a constitutional basis, at the federal level, at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In Hopt v Utah Hanlan, J. in adopting the common 
law rule as to voluntariness in R v Warickshall stated the rationale 
for the exclusionary rule as the probability that the confessional 
statement might be untrue and unreliable (60). In Bram v United States 
(61) the Supreme Court held that the federal constitutional Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was a "crystalisation of 
the doctrine as to confessions" and, therefore, the exclusionary rule 
on involuntary confessions was of constitutional origin and not, as in 
England, a rule of evidence. This basis of the exclusionary rule has 
been doubted and criticised (62) and with some validity; however, a 
judicial approach which reads a well-established common law rule into 
and from the written constitution, irrespective of the original purpose 
of the constitutional provision, indicates a desire to underpin the rule 
by a more solid foundation: a constitutional argument for a rule of 
evidence provides a stronger, firmer and a perpetual basis. 
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In this respect the method used is the same as in shoring up the 
exclusionary rule for the evidence obtained by illegal search. 
Although the basis of the rule at federal level is proclaimed to 
be the Fifth Amendment, the test for admissibility continues to be 
'voluntariness' ( 6 3). Ho ... rever, all types of improper police conduct 
do not, or may not, amount to coercion or inducement, and in such cases 
the constitution may not assist the Court in providing justification for 
suppression of evidence obtained by an impropriety. To meet such 
situations the Supreme Court may rely upon its jurisdiction to control 
the process of the trial and create a rule of evidence in accordance with 
the Court's experience and reason. In McNabb v United States and 
Mallory v United States (64) the Supreme Court held that confessions 
which have been obtained in breach of th~ rule that the accused should 
be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay would be 
excluded. This rule, known as McNabb-Mallory rule, has been formulated 
under the Court's inherent supervisory jurisdiction and is based on 
'considerations of justice'; the judicial administration of criminal 
justice implies a duty to establish and maintain civilised standards 
of procedure and evidence: the police must only adopt methods which are 
in accordance with these. standards, ensure protection for the innocent 
and which commend themselves to a progressive (65) and self-confident 
society. However, it is significant that in McNabb v United States the 
Court relied upon Boyd v United States and Weeks v United States for 
its statement that "evidence obtained in disregard of liberties deemed 
fundamental by the constitution cannot stand" and maintained that rules 
of admissibility of evidence do not derive solely from the constitution. 
The justification for excluding involuntary confessions is two-fold; 
firstly, that the constitution mandates their exclusion and, secondly 
that certain fundamental values which the American society deeply cherishes 
makes exclusion necessary. Just as in the case of exclusion of evidence 
obtained by illegal search and seizure, so in the case of confessional 
statements it is the case law developed in relation to state trials that 
offers source material for a propoation that 'involuntary' confessions 
are sometimes, if not always, excluded for other policy reasons. 
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The 'due process of law' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (66), 
apart from being the criterion for effective incorporation of the 
various parts of the Bill of Rights to the states, has also been an 
independent notion against which the conduct of the police before the 
arraignment can be tested. If a right or privilege is fundamental to 
individual liberty and justice then it is a part of the 'due process of 
law'. It was this approach to the 'due process' clause that enabled 
the Supreme Court to lay dovm an exclusionary rule for confessions in 
state trials: if confessions are not voluntary, i.e. are not a result 
of the accused's free will and rational choice, 'due process' has been 
denied ( 67). Ho"1ever, 'involuntariness' is a narrower concept than 
'denial of due process of law' and, therefore, the ambit of the 
exclusionary rule to be applied by the state courts has been much wider 
than in the federal courts. The police methods in state criminal matters 
may amount to coercion simpliciter of one degree or another (68) or they 
may be no where near coercion as generally understood but may at the 
same time fail to come up to the "fair and civilised" standards insisted 
upon by the Supreme Court. It would therefore be misleading to assert 
that American exclusionary rule in this area of the law is based on the 
test of 'involuntariness', for as Warren, C.J. said: " •••••• a complex 
of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions 
which, by way of a convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary, 
and the role played by each in any situation varies according to the 
particular circumstances of the case" (69). The Supreme Court has often, 
when discussing the 'dueprocess of law' clause, made references to 
'unfairly obtained evidence'; the notion of 'unfairness' in such oases 
must refer to police conduct rather than - as in English courts' 
expression 'unfair to the accused' - to the prejudice or disadvantage 
suffered by the defendant. In American situation 'unfair' emphasises 
the importance ·of observing some minimum procedural safeguards and 
standards during, as well as before, the trial: the Court insists on 
certain protective procedures to be observed by the police. 
Thus, the frequent references to 'fair trial' when considering 
the 'due process of law' clause suggests an interchangeability of the 
two concepts - at least certainly in the area of police illegality. 
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It is submitted that when using the expression 'fair trial' English 
courts have been expressing the same concern, albeit unlike in the 
case of their American counterparts there is no conscious awareness of 
this, on a "complex of values". In Rogers v Richmond Frankfurter, J. 
stressed the 'method' of obtaining evidence as the reason for the 
Courts' exclusionary rule; such police methods "offered an underlying 
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an 
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system - a system in which the 
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured 
••••••" (70). Thus, in cases of confessions the exclusionary rule 
springs from the abhorrence felt by the society towards certain police 
methods - an abhorrence caused by the "deep rooted feeling that the 
police must obey the law while enforcing the law, that in the end life 
and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to 
convict those thought to be criminals as from the criminals themselves". 
(71). Thus, although the primary test for excluding extra-judicial 
confessions happens to be their 'voluntariness' as required by the due 
process clause, the justification for the rule derives from the values 
considered by the courts as fundamental to the society in general. 
The judicial policy is clear. The 'due process of law' requirement is 
intended to guarantee adequate and effective procedural standards for 
the protection of persons accused of crimes;, the relevant evidence may be 
true ·or false, but judicial aim is to prevent "fundamental unfairness" 
in the USE of that evidence, and whether it is 'unfair' is decided by 
reference to the method of extraction of evidence (72). The purpose of 
exclusion of this type of evidence is to discipline the police and 
indirectly to compel them to observe the minimum standards expected by 
the courts. As vJarren, C.J. expressed .it: "there are considerations 
which transcend the question of guilt or innocence. Thus, in cases 
involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt 
attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where 
an agency of the government ••••• wrings a confession out of an accused 
against his will" (73). 
This flexible approach to the meaning of the 'due process' clause 
and the judicial policy to compel the police to observe certain standards 
is also seen in matters relating to police questioning of suspects; 
i.e. the situation which, at a comparative level, is in England governed 
by the Judges' Rules. 
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Police questioning of a suspect in America is judicially evaluated by 
reference to the 'due process of law' concept. However, whereas in 
England the issue is treated as independent of the main confession rule, 
the Supreme Court having been fortunate to have a constitutional 
criterion, has dealt with such questioning within the context of the 
'due process of law' as well as that of the Fifth Amendment privilege (74). 
The mere fact that the accused had been denied the service of a 
lawyer when police questioning took place and after the accused had been 
arrested did not render the accused's statements inadmissible, though 
they might be excluded if the accused had suffered prejudice in the sense 
that the trial had become 'unfair' or that a denial of 'due process of 
law' had taken place (75). The facts of a case may show no evidence of 
physical brutality, or of protracted questioning or deceitful tactics, 
or mental illness on the part of the accused at the time of police 
questioning. However, the imprecision and flexibility of the term 
'involuntary' in American system means that even detention incommunicado 
could be construed as leading to an involuntary confession; such a 
detention would be a denial of 'due process of law' and the resultant 
confessions therefore would be excluded. 
In Miranda v Arizona ( 76) the Supreme Court laid down judicial 
requirements for custodial interrogation by the police. Once the accused 
has been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, then 
unless other fully effective procedural safeguards are devised by the 
States to inform the accused of his right to remain silent and he is 
given ••a continuous opportunity to exercise it" the police must warn him 
that he has a right to remain silent, that statements made may be used 
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
appointed or retained attorney. The accused may waive these rights 
"voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently", though he can at any stage 
of the questioning reassert his rights and, therefore, if he indicates 
that he does not wish to be interrogated, he cannot be questioned any 
further. If these safeguards are not observed, evidence of his statements 
is not admissible. 
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English judicial attitude and tradition would make such a 
'blanket libertarian' approach unthinkable. One may disagree with the 
Supreme Court's wisdom in providing to the accused the combined arm~ 
of the 'due process' clause and the Fifth Amendment privilege and 
thereby render almost every confessional statement inadmissible; but 
the crucial fact is that the policy reasons behind such rules (77) are 
the same as in the case of exclusion of coerced confessions or of 
evidence obtained by illegal searches. In all these cases the Court 
recognises that the techniques used by the police amount to either 
exercise of arbitrary powers with a tendency to undermine individual 
liberties or that they are contrary to the implications of an 
accusatorial system, and contrary to the fundamental values of American 
political society. The government must respect an individual's dignity 
and his privacy (78). The confessional statements may be true and 
be corroborated by other evidence, but has Lord Sankey put it: "It is not 
admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong ••••••• It is not 
sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by irregular or 
improper means" ( 79). Thus, the emphasis in American cases throughout 
is on the method by which evidence had been extracted (80) and the 
judicial aim is to deter the police from future breaches (81). 
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda v Arizona made frequent 
references to both the increasing number of violent crimes and to the 
well-tried and sophisticated, if not brutal, methods of police 
interrogation; this social reality must therefore play part in rule 
formulation. Keeping a suspect incommunicado, or subject him to a 
protected interrogation, without the assistance of his counsel or the 
presence of his relatives is an artificially created atmosphere which 
"carries its own badge of intimidation" and generates 1 abhorrence 1 on 
the part of society. It matters not that threatening words have been 
offered; the conduct of the police is still offensive to the general 
morality, and although the Court recognises (82) that police interrogation 
is an essential part of successful police work the social interests that 
are likely to be sacrificed by such methods necessitate exclusion of 
evidence. 
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Thus, exclusionary rules for involuntary confessions and for the 
evidence obtained by illegal searches are based on the same judicial 
policy - to provide a judicial control of the police methods in 
bringing the offenders to justice and thereby to protect the essential 
values cherished by the society. Admittedly, thefurmer purpose is a 
function of the extent of police misconduct or the extent of their 
arbitrary exercise of powers; however, it is submitted that the origin 
of the two exclusionary rules is judicial and not constitutional. 
The constitution has provided a support for the judicial reasoning in 
creating the rules for it has supplied the Court with a source of the 
essential values that need to be protected and preserved. The Fourth 
Amendment does not command an exclusionary rule. The Fifth Amendment 
says that the privilege applies "in a criminal trial" and, unless •trial' 
were to be defined as having been initiated on arrest and not on 
presentment before the court, the privilege must be restricted to 
judicial proceedings and should not include the events at the police 
station. Indeed, the confession rule was devised no less than a hundred 
years after the privilege had become part of the comti.tution. Hol>Jever, 
despite this, the Court has rationalised its exclusionary rules by 
reference to the Amendments. Interestingly, an implied admission that 
the exclusionary rule is a judicial creation can be found in Warren, C.J.'s 
stand in l1iranda v Arizona that the rule was being pronounced subject to 
the Congress on state legislatives legislating satisfactory safeguards 
for protection of the accuseds 1 rights. 
A distinction must be drawn between the 'extraction' and-the •use' 
of the evidence. So far as illegal search isooncerned common law ignores 
the 'extraction' aspect; on the other hand in cases of involuntary 
confessions common law has taken the method of extraction as the 
foundation of the rule, no matter that the original rationale for the 
exclusion of confessions was untrustworthiness and unreliability. In 
Wolf v Colorada the Supreme Court concentrated on police methods in 
extracting the evidence though in the end the Court decided not to let 
this fact control their decision. 
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This was despite the fact that at the time \-/olf v Colorado decision 
.,.tas handed down Frankfurter, J. had written decisions for a group of 
three cases on admissibility of confessions in which he held that as a 
matter of 'due process of law' - and thus emphasising the police 'method' 
- evidence of confessions was not admissible in State trials (83). 
However, at that time confession rules were not yet considered as suitable 
guides or analogies for evolving a rule for evidence obtained by illegal 
search. That the exclusionary rule relating to confessions could provide 
a basis for judicial thinking on the rules for admissibility or 
inadmissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search was suggested by 
Clark, J. in Mapp v Ohio. He then took the view that the Fourth 
Amendment right of privacy is no less 'basic' than the freedom from 
conviction by coerced confessions or by confessions obtained in violation 
of the 'due process of law': both are intimately related in maintaining 
the inviolability of personal privacy and personal liberties. 
It is submitted that it.can no longer be valid to maintain that the 
confession rule, both in America and in England, is based on the 
untrustworthiness, or the likely falsity or unreliability, of the 
confession; that original common law rationale has been outstripped by 
other considerations. The 'conduct' of the police is as - and perhaps 
more- important as that the confessions might be false. It may be that 
in Engl~d the 'alternative remedies' are adequate to control the police, 
though because of the rare challeng.: es to such evidence it is difficult 
to assess such a claim. It may be that the police force in England is 
basically law abiding though even here the increasing number of convictions 
of police officers for corruption in recent years casts doubt on this 
claim. However, what is most significant is the fact that English courts 
have not given adequacy of alternative remedies as the reason for the 
inclusionary rule; the sole reason for admitting the evidence is its 
'relevance.• to the issue. Police standards, the fundamental political 
values of our society, the importance of the judicial neutrality in a 
contest between an individual and the police, the separation of powers, 
the conflict of various social interests are the factors which have not 
figured at all in the judicial pronouncements. Indeed, there has been no 
sound theoretical discussion of the inclusionary rule. 
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NOTES 
1. 302 U.S.319 (1937). Unless otherwise stated italics supplied. 
2. The Fifth Amendment, directed against the federal government partly 
declares that no person shall be "subject for the offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb". And see Kepner v United States, 
195 u.s. /00 . 
3. E.g. that a prosecution by a state presentment or on an indictment 
by a grand jury could be replaced by an information at the instance 
of a public official, see Hurtado v California, 110 u.s. 516 (1884); 
that the freedom of speech in the first Amendment cannot be abridged 
by the states, De Jonge v Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936); see also 
Twining v New Jersey 211 U.S.78 (1908). For the decision that the 
6th. Amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury in federal trials is 
binding on the states see Duncan v Louisiana 391 U.S.145 (1968) 
-majority of 7:2, Harlan and Stewart, J.J.dissenting. 
4. See Adamson v California, 338 U.S.25 (1949) and Twining v Ne'o~ Jersey, 
supra. In Duncan v Louisiana, supra, F~tas, J. concurring·with 
the majority also took the view that not all federal requirements, 
e.g. on the need for a unanimous verdict, bind the states. 
5. per Cardozo, J. in Palko v Connecticut, supra note 1. The test 
for incorporation into the 14th. Amendment of the federal rights 
has, of course, been phrased in a variety of ways e.g. whether the 
right is 'h. fundamental right essential to a fair trial", in 
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S.335 (1963), Malloy v Hogan, 378 U.S.1 
(1964). In Duncan v Louisiana, supra, Black, J. and Douglas, J. 
held that the 'due process of law' incorporated all the 8 Amendments. 
For Biective incorporation see Henkin in 73 Yale L.J. 74 (1963). 
6. 338 U.S.25 (1949). 
1. Discussed supra Ch.3. 
8. An alternative basis, i.e: apart from saying that the Fourth 
Amendment required the exclusionary rule, the Co~·t could hold 
that the 'due process' itself included such a rule. 
9. Murphy, Rutledge and Douglas, J.J. 
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10. See also Davidson v New Orleans, 96 U.S.97 (1877) for a similar 
statement. 
11. 
12. 
16. 
18. 
20. 
Per Frankfurter, J. This reasoning on the applicability of a federal 
rule of evidence on the states is similar to the one in 
Berger v New York, supra. Ch.3 See also the opinion of Black, J. 
who would have reversed the conviction but for the fact that the 
federal exclusionary rule \"las a "judicially created rule of evidence". 
Of the ten jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and the British 
Commonwealth of Nations wh:rc.J.. had considered the question, none had 
at the time an exclusionary rule. 
I.e. action for damages for a trespass or in certain cases criminal 
prosecution. The Court cited Elias v Passmore 119~/ 2 H.B.164 
for this proposition; according to Frankfurter, J. another remedy 
lay in "the internal discipline of the police, under the ages of an 
alert public opinion". Kuruma v R fj 95f/ AC. 197 was of course 
post-Wolf v aiorado. 
Thf)!( Court derived this argument from the opinion of Cardozo, J. in 
People v Defore, 242 NY13 (1926) where in rejecting the exclusionary 
rule for the state of New York he had said: "The criminal should 
not go free because a constable has blundered". 
Though Rutledge, J. in his short dissenting opinion emphatically 
stated that the Fourth Amendment carried with it the sanction of an 
exclusionary rule: "Compliance \ii th the Bill of Rights betokens 
more than lip service". Cf. Weeks V. United States, 232 U.S.383 
(1914) where it was said that without the rule "the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment ••••• might as well be struck from the 
Constitution". 
342 u.s.165 (1952). 
As it was said in Malinski v New York, 324 U.S.401 (1944) the 
Supreme Court "must be deeply mindful of the responsibilities of the 
States for the enforcement of criminal laws, and exercise with due 
humility our merely negative function in subjecting conviction from 
state courts to the very narrow sorutiny which the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment authorises". 
Using the sentiments expressed by Cardozo, J. in Snyder v Massachusetts, 
291 U.S.97 (1934). 
And see Frankfurter, J.'s opinion in Irvine v California infra. 
And also provide a rejoinder to Jackson, J.'s comment in Irvine v 
California, infra, that in Rochin's case the court "studiously 
avoided •••• and never once mentioned the \1olf case". It also shows 
that any comment that "In Rochin the court had to ignore the \volf 
case to achieve a satisfactory result", is not accurate. See 
28 Mod. L.Rev.298. 
- 129-
21. Black and Douglas, J.J. concurred but on the ground that the 5th. 
Amendment, applicable to states though the 14th., made the evidence 
inadmissible. Douglas, J. criticised the majority's basis for 
reversing the conviction as being too much dependent on the idio-
syncrasies of the judges. 
22. 347 U.S.128 (1954)- the Warren court. Majority opinion given by 
Jackson, J. 
23. This reads like a 'warning' to the state jurisdictions to operate 
the exclusionary rule. 
24. Under 62 Stat.696, 18 USC (Supp.111) Section 242 such acts can be 
punished by fine and imprisonment. 
25. Warren, C.J. and Jackson, Minton and Reed, J.J. Consistently with 
his opinion in Wolf v Colorado Douglas, J. dissented. Black, J. 
dissented on the ground of the 5th. Amendment privilege. Frankfurter, J. 
joined by Burton, J. also dissented. 
26. As expressed by Jackson, J. who said that 'shock the conscience' 
test must be rejected as being too subjective. 
27. 367 u.s.643 (1961). 
28. I.e. apart from adopting Frankfurter, J.'s approach of relying in 
each case upon an application of the 'due process of law' clause of 
the 14th. Amendment. 
29. As to his attitude in Irvine v California see supra. The others in 
the majority were Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, and Brennan, J.J. 
Harlan, J. with whom vfuittwcer, J. and- most surprisingly-
Frankfurter, J. j:>inedjdissented. Stewart, J. was in favour of 
reversal but on the ground that the Ohio obscenity statute was 
unconstitutional. Thus, the overruling of \.Jolf v Colorado was in 
reality by four against four. 
30. This interdependence of the two Amendments suggests the coming 
closer or merging of the rationales of the exclusionary rules for 
evidence obtained by illegal search and for involuntary confessions. 
However, it would be misleading to s~ that at this time coerced 
confessions in the State courts were excluded on the basis of the 
5th. Amendment. See Adamson v California, 332 U.S.45 (1947) and 
other appeals from the states or confessions, infra, and 
Mallory v Mogan, 378 U.S.1 (1964) and Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S.436 
( 1966). 
31. Replying to Cardozo, J.'s famous dictum in People v Defore supra 
note 14. See also Douglas, J.'s comment that " ••••• continuance of 
Wolf v Colorado in its full vigour breeds the unseemly shopping 
around", undercuts federal policy and ensures double standards. 
32. Black, J. had been one of the majority in Wolf v Colorado. In 
Rochin's case he had favoured reversal on the ground of the 5th. 
Amendment being applied to the states through the 14th. cr. 
Bradley, J.'s opinion in Boyd v United States discussed in Ch.3. 
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3 3. Joined by Frankfurter, J. 
34. Harlan, J. also argued that 12 years was a short time in the 
context of the doctrine of stare decisis to justify overruling 
\-Tolf v Colorado. 
35. Though after \'lolf' s decision an increasing number of states had 
adopted the Weeks' doctrine; see the Appendix to the majority 
opinion in Elkins v United States, 364 U.S.206 (1960). 
36. Weeks v United States, 232 U.S.383 (1914). The expression 
'silver-platter doctrine' comes from the opinion of Frankfurter, J. 
in Lustig v United States, 338 U.S.74 (1948). Cf. Burdeau v 
McDowell, 256 U.S.465 (1921) - evidence obtained by private 
detectives held admissible in federal court. 
37. 338 U.S.74 (1948); judgment was delivered by Frankfurter, J. 
Murphy, J., joined by Douglas and Rutledge, J .J. concurred but 
specifically declared that illegal search by state officials barred 
reception of the evidence in federal trials, participation or no 
participation. See also Benanti v United States, 355 U.S.96 (1957) 
- wire tapping evidence procurred by state officers not admissible 
in federal court. 
38. 364 U.S.206 (1960); see also the comp~i~on case of Rios v United 
States, 364 U.S.253 (1960). 
39. I.e. in both the above cases; Clark, Harlan and Hhittaker, J.J. 
joined in the dissent. 
40. I \iould agree that the exclusionary rule is a 'constitutional 
principle' but in a different sense from the one usually assumed. 
Of course, as Louis Schwartz says (1966) M.L.Rev. 635, one cannot 
transplant the American rule to England; but just as in America 
the powers of the police and restrictions on them ~ part of our 
constitutional law. 
41 • And leave the aggrieved parts to his civil remedies, as in 
Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S.388 (1971) where the Supreme Court held that violation of 
the Fourth Amendment rights gave a cause of action for damages. 
Berger, C.J. dissented. 
42. See Oaks: "Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure", 
37 u. of Chi.L.Rev. 665. 
43. Nor for that matter that it should be admitted. 
44. As claimed in Mapp v Ohio, supra. and Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra., 
among others. 
But Cf. Black, J.'s method of interlocking the Fourth and the Fifth 
Amendments to provide a constitutional basis for the rule, perhaps 
because he realised the \'lealmess in the theory that the rule is 
based on the Fourth Amendment. This approach provides a firm literal 
constitutional basis but cannot be supported by history. Moreover, 
the exclusionary rule applies to corporations in relation to illegal 
search and seizure but the privilege is not available to them. See 
Essgee Co. v United States, 262 U.S.151 (1923) and Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v United States, 251 U.S.385 (1920). 
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45. See Holmes, J. in Olmstead v United States, 277 U.S.438 (1928) 
and the dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J. in Kaufman v United States, 
394 U.S.217 (1969). Also Weeks v United States, supra, Wolf v Colorado 
supra, Terry v Ohio, 392 u.s.1 (1968), Harris v New York, 401 U.S.222 
(1971). In Dodge v United States, 272 U.S.539 (1926) Holmes, J. 
maintained that the Courts 1 ~ of such evidence is a further 
invasion of privacy. 
45b. 277 U.S.438 (1928). See also the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J. 
in On Lee v United States, 343 U.S.747 (1959) and Brennan, J. in 
Harris v Ne\oJ York, 401 U.S.222 ( 1971) - "It is monstrous that the 
Court should aid or abet the lav1breaking police offieer". 
46. In Linkletter v Walker, 381 U.S.618 (~65); also Harris v New York, 
401 U.S.222 (1971) where the Court admitted illegally obtained 
evidence on the ground that excluding it would have no deterrent 
effect; Schipani v United States, 401 U.S.983 (1971) where such 
evidence held admissible for sentencing purposes; Cf. Verdugo v 
United States, 397 U.S.925 (1970) and Walder v United States, 
347 u.s.62 (1954). 
47. See Oaks: "Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure" 
(1970) 37 U.Ch. L.Rev. 665. See also James E. Spiotto "Search and 
Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its 
Alternatives" (1973) Jou. of Legal Studies 243 - a study in the state 
of Illinois indicating an increase in the number of motions to 
suppress evidence in narcotics and gun cases. 
48. Carl McGovern, a member of the u.s. Court of Appeals for the District 
Columbia, 70 Michigan L.Rev. 673. 
49. The Supreme Court itself has regretted the lack of empirical evidence, 
see Irvine v California, 347 U.S.128 (1954) per Jackson, J. and 
Elkins v United States, 364 U.S.206 (1960) per Steuart, J. 
50. See, e.g. Brennan, J. in Harris v New York, 401 U.S.222 (1971) ~ 
the objective of deterring improper police conduct is only part of 
the larger objective of safeguarding the integrity of the adversary 
system; the judiciary must not aid and abet the police. See also 
Mapp v Ohio, supra. 
51. As Carl McGovern thinks in his article, supra. 
52. See Burdeau v McDowell, 256 U.S.465 (1921) - the rule is aimed at 
the government and, therefore, evidence obtained by private illegal 
acts is admissible. Also Desist v United States, 394 U.S.244 (1969) 
Harris v Ne\·1 York, 401 U.S.222 (1971). See also R.I.-I. Flemming 
"Some Problems of Evidence before the Labour Arbitration" 60 Nich. 
L.Rev. 133. 
53. Rule 26 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, italics supplied. 
And see McNabb v United States, 318 U.S.332 (1942) - a case of 
involuntary confessions - for this supervisory jurisdiction. 
54. Lopez v Unites States, 373 U.S.427 (1963). 
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55. See e.g. Jackson, J.'s view in Irvine v California, supra; Black, J.'s 
opinion in Katz v United States, supra, and berger v New York, supra; 
Frankfurter, J. in Elkins v United States, supra, Brandeis, J. in 
Olmstead v United States, supra. But Cf. Clark, J. in Mapp v Ohio 
supra who rejected this origin of the rule and see Byars v United 
States, 273 U.S.28 (1927) where a unanimous Court held that the 
federal "constitutional cystem" could not tolerate~ of such 
evidence. 
56. Clark, J. thought that the 'shock-the-conscience' test would lead 
to unpredictability and uncertainty, see Irvine v California where 
the test was rejected by seven justices. Test also criticised in 
Rocher v California, supra, by Black, J. and in }ffipp v Ohio, supra. 
57. Not to mention theunprovable but generally accepted view as to the 
'liberal' or 'libertarian' composition of the Supreme Court under 
Warren, C.J. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
See also Bive~, v Six Unknown Agents, supra note 41. 
As to the position in England see Police Act, 1964,for an empirical 
research showing how effective alternative civil 'uits have been, 
and how many of them have been settled out of court, see James, E. 
Spitto supra note 47. 
R v Warickshall (1783), 1 Leach, 283, Hopt v Utah, 110 U.S.574 (1884). 
168 U.S.532 (1897) in an opinion delivered by White, J. 
Prof. \·/igmore described White, J. 's opinion as having "reached the 
height of absurdity in misapplication of the law", see 3 Wigmore, 
Evidence Section 821 (1940), and 8 Wigmore Evidence section 2266 
where this identification of the exclusionary rule with the 5th. 
Amendment is described as "erroneous, both in history, principle 
and practice". See also 29 Mich. L.Rev. 191 at p.201. 
See e.g. Ziang Sun Han v United States, 266 U.S.1 (1924). 
64. 318 U.S.332 (1943) 354 U.S.449 (1957). 
65. For this we could read "free and democratic society". 
66. ~s well as that of the 5th. Amendment. 
67. Brown v l1ississippi, 297 U.S.278 (1936); Chambers v Florida, 309 
U.S.227 (1940), Lyons v Oklahoma, 322 U.S.596 (1944). 
68. Indeed, in America the instances of police brutality are, in the 
English context, beyond description. The methods resorted to by the 
police can be, to say the least, barbarious; see the facts of 
Brown v Mississippi, supra, Chambers v Florida, supra and Watts v 
Indiana, 338 U.S.49 (1949). In Culombe v Connecticut, infra, 
Frankfurter, J. conceded that breaches of the Judges' Rules in 
England are "relatively mild - compared with what is common American 
practice". 
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69. Blackburn v Alabama, 361 U.S.199 (1960). See also Spano v New York, 
360 U.S.315 (1959). 
70. 365 U.S.534 (1961). He referred to "impermissible methods 11 which, 
even though the confession may be true, must lead to exclusion. 
See also Brennan, J. in Harris v New York, 401 u.s. 222 (1971)-
the objective of deterring improper police conduct is part of a 
"larger objective of safeguarding the integrity of our adversary 
system 11 , and a government must accord respect to "the dignity and 
integrity of its citizens 11 • 
71. \~arren, C.J. in Spano v New York, 360 U.S.315 (1959). See also 
Black, J.'s eloquent statements to this effect in Chambers v Florida, 
supra. 
72. See Roberts, J. in Lisenba v California, 314 U.S.219 (1942). 
73. Blackburn v Alabama, 361 U.S.199 (1961) italics added. Also Black, J. 
in Chambers v Florida, supra, - procedural safeguards to prevent 
tyrannical governments; Frankfurter, J. in Culombe v Connecticut, 
367 U.S.568 (1961). 
74. For the 5th. Amendment's application to the States see Bram. v 
United Sta tea, 168 U.S. 5 32 ( 1897) ; the Amendment 'tlas made applicable 
to the States via the 14th. Amendment in Malloy v Hogan, 378 U.S.(1964) 
and Haynes v \fashington, 373 U.s. 503 ( 1963). See also Davis v North 
Carolina, 384 u.S.737 (1966). 
75. Crooker v California, 357 U.S.433 (1958), Gideon v Vlainwright, 
372 U.S.335 (1963), Massiah v United States, 377 U.S.201 (1964). 
76. 384 U.S.436 (1966), follo\-.ring and amplifying Escobedo v Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also Culombe;v Connecticut, supra. 
77. Harlan, J. joined by Stewart and \oJhi te, J .J. dissented in 1'1iranda, 
maintaining that the rule would discourage any confession at all: 
it was, in their view, a utopian sense of voluntariness. 
78. Though memory of the Star Chamber procedure plays its part, see e.g. 
r1a11oy v Hogan, 378 U.S.1 (1964) and Miranda v Arizona, supra. 
79. Cited by Warren, C.J. in ~liranda's case. 
80. See also Rogers v Richmond, 365 U.S.534 (1961), Healey v Ohio, 332 
U.S.596 (1948), Ashcroft v Tennessee, 322 U.S.143 (1944); Rochin v 
California, supra: the police conduct 11shocks the conscience11 ; 
Irvine v California, supra: 11additional aggravating conduct, which 
the court finds repulsive". On police 'trick' or 'deception' see 
Rogers v Richmond, supra. 
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81. Like Mapp v Ohio,~liranda v Arizona is also not retroactive, see 
Johnson v New Jersey, 384 U.S.719 (1966) and Cf. Davis v North 
Carolina, 384 U.S.737 (1966). In Harris v Nev1 York, 401 U.S.222 
(1971) Brennan, J. maintains that one of the purposes of the f1iranda 
rule is to deter the police. See also Riddell v Rhay, 404 U.S.974 
.Lego v Twomey, 404 U.S.477 (1972). ~ 
82. See e.g. Culombe v Connecticut, supra where both \-larren, C.J. and 
Frankfurter, J. recognised this fact and the problems that an 
exclusionary rule creates for the law enforcement duties of the 
police. 
83. Watts v Indiana, 338 U.S.49 (1949), Turner v Pennsylvania, 338 
U.S.62 (1949), Harris, v South Carolina, 338 U.S.68 (1949) - all 
extending Brown v Mississippi, 297 U.S.278 (1936). Frankfurter, J. 
was one of the principal decision makers in Wolf v Colorado, 
supra, decided on the same date. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DIFFERENT RULES - A CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our examination of the Supreme Court decisions undertaken in the 
previous chapters leaves onefact clear; that is, the basis of the 
'automatic exclusion' rule, in relation to both illegal searches and 
involuntary confessions, is not a mandate from the written constitution. 
The constitution itself could not by any linguistic stretching or 
juggling of the words be construed as declaring such a rule. The rule 
is one of evidence which, albeit owing its birth to the judicial creativity, 
remains the only practical means of giving substance and respect to the 
fundamental rights and liberties of the individual vis a vis the 
executive (1). This is the central aim of the two exclusionary rules and 
it rests on an 'activist' or 'creative' judicial approach which in 
England would be juridically and politically unthinkable.and unacceptable. 
It is an approach which claims that in the field of public law rules 
of evidence can be an important and effective tool in the hands of the 
judiciary for ensuring a healthy survival of what is basically a 
libertarian democratic structure of society: in this context the 
substantive law of the constitution and the supportive rules of evidence 
relating to it are interdependent. In that sense evidential rules .E!. 
constitutional or have a constitutional basis. Such an analysis need not 
suggest that this twin-relationship is inevitable in all societies; 
each democratically free society presents its own peculiar problems and 
the judicial rules evolved to deal with them must take account of, and 
be influenced by, a particular social system. In the American setting 
it was the judiciary's lack of faith in·the efficacy of the collateral 
civil and criminal remedies, and in the usefullness of the police 
organisations internal disciplinary measures, which led the Supreme Court 
to assume an indirect judicial control over the police investigative 
procedure and habits - procedure which can affect an individual's 
constitutional rights and liberties. ~Y this approach the Supreme Court 
gave the exclusionary rules a similar, if not the same, status as the 
constitutional Amendments. (2) 
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However, closely connected with this judicial concern for the 
inviolability of the constitutional rights is the Court's abhorrence of 
certain police methods which offend the core values of a free society 
with an adversary system of a criminal trial. A judicial system, 
including the judicial technique of reasoning, is inseparable from the 
social and political system within which it has its existence, and because 
of this fact it is inevitable that the courts should uphold and develop 
procedural and evidential rules in conformity with and influenced by the 
values system of that society. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court's 
insistence that one of the pruposes of the exclusionary rule in the cases 
where evidence has been obtained by an illegal search - and also to some 
extent in a case of police questioning of suspects (3) - is to deter 
the police from future illegality supports this contention. Moreover, 
judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court have emphasised the important 
fact that Anglo-American criminal process is accusatorial or adversary 
and not inquisitorial in nature, and that in such a criminal process 
constitutional rights and liberties may have to be protected at the cost 
of that other aim of the court, i.e. the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused; the process is treated as having begun not 
when the accused comes before the court pleading to an information or 
indictment but right from the moment of his arrest: judicial control 
of the process is therefore retrospective to a period earlier than the 
actual trial (4). The privilege against self-incrimination which in 
J 
England is relevant only during the actual trial (5), ·is operative in 
the United States from the moment a suspect ·~as been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant"way". 
One may disagree with,or indeed challenge, the theoretical and historical 
soundness of such an extended application of the privilege doctrine (6), 
but the strength of the Court's feeling for the preservation of a certain 
value, that is no one should be "forced" to incriminate himself out of 
his own mouth and that the police should concentrate on efficient 
collection of independent evidence, is clear both in Escobedo v Illinois 
and Miranda v Arizona (7). 
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This value-basis is also evident in the rule excluding evidence procured 
by illegal search and seizure; in this case the fundamental value which 
needs protection from the executive interference or encroachment is 
that of individual privacy, judicially treated as the essence of the 
Fourth Amendment rights, privileges and prohibitions. Two further 
features need to be stated. Firstly, a catchphrase like 'law and order' 
or the maxim of 'the rule of law' are equally applicable to both a 
private individual and the police; the value-system of a free society 
cannot accept that its agents for law enforcement should indulge in 
lawlessness - in civil and crminal sense - for an effective discharge 
of their duties. In the judicial process of adjustment or balancing of 
the various interests of the society and the individual there is nothing 
to choose from in such a situation (8); if anything, rules must be 
developed which work as a positive deterrent to the police from 
disregarding other laws which restrict their freedom of action. It is 
when the police begin to flout limitations on their powers and operational 
freedom that a greater threat is posed to the political system of a free 
society: such police conduct is a prerequisite of an effective totalitarian 
system of government. Secondly, in l~ing down judicial requirements 
for an acceptable police conduct prior to the appearance of the accused 
in the court the Supreme Court is in effect undertaking the task of 
supervising and controlling the police organisation. However this is not 
something unique, for even in England the Judges' Rules, the rule 
regarding the admissibility of pre-trial confessions and the judicial 
control of the police by issuing a mandamus aim to regulate and influence 
police behaviour in non-court situations. The only point of debate 
between the two judicial systems in the present context is on the extent 
to which the justification and reasons for, and the basis of, the 
different rules on admissibility are purely judicial. 
This thesis maintains that an explanation of the basis, or origin, 
of the exclusionary rule in the United States in relation to relevant 
and trustworthy evidence obtained by police illegality does not wholly 
lie in the existence of a written constitution (9). 
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It is essential to state this, for it_is an oft-repeated assumption 
that the two approaches are explicable by the fact that.the Supreme Court 
has derived the exclusionary rule from the written constitution with an 
implication that the constitution itself declares such a rule, that since 
England does not have a written constitution a comparison between the 
two differing approaches cannot be legitimate and that therefore the 
American rule is not relevant here. This last conclusion may be sound, 
but it certainly does no.t follow from the former. One must seriously 
disagree with Wigmore who described the Weeks 4octrine as undermining 
the institutions the Supreme Court aims to protect or that the Court 
"regards the overzealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the 
community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or pander~r" (10), 
for as the Court maintained in Weeks v United States, the praiseworthy 
duties of the police must not be aided by a sacrifice of the fundamental 
values embodied in the law of American society (11). This view contrasts 
sharply 1tri th the approach of the courts ~d the reformers in England. 
Thus, the Criminal Law Revision Committee in its report on the rules of 
evidence and in its recommendation for 'reforms' of the law on confession 
and the Judges' Rules (12) failed to take account of the essentially 
moral values involved in formulation of rules of evidence, especially 
in the area of police powers and individual liberties. The report 
assumes that the only purpose of such rules is to facilitate the police 
in their function of ferreting out the crime. Proposed changes in this 
area have·-·been· c0nsidered, and the arguments developed, by reference to 
judicial pronouncements only. Similarly, Eentham's hedonistic 
utilitarianism is unsatisfactory from this angle for it takes a narrow 
view of a criminal trial in that it assumes its overriding purpose to be 
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused; to this end 
all relevant trustworthy evidence is to be admitted. It ignores the 
fact that in certain areas of law rules of evidence are not value-free 
and that reasons other than "the old woman 1 s reason" or "the fo:xhunter' s 
reason" or the memories of "unpopular institutions" like the Star 
Chamber could justify retention of the privilege of silence (13): even on 
the basis of Eentham's crude moral principle of balancing the total 
happiness and satisfaction of the greatest number as against the maximum 
pain and suffering, it is doubtful whether the privilege of silence may 
not come out as worthy of retention (14). 
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The real explanation for the different American and English rules 
is to be found in the judicial methods of reasoning which lead to the 
creation of judge-made law. In other words, to get an answer for the 
disparate rules - without necessarily advocating the superiority of the 
one or the other - we need to examine the extent to which the judicial 
technique employed in England incorporates or takes account of the values 
of the society in general or of a particular elite group which is conscious 
of the purpose and function of judicial rules. Secondly, it is also 
important to determine the extent to w~h in the public law sphere the 
courts are prepared to treat the rules of evidence as mere tools for 
ensuring an effective operation of the substantive rules of the 
constitution (15). In considering this it may be helpful to examine the 
influence of the doctrine of "separation of powers" on judicial thinking 
and the degree of unwillingness to "tread on the legislature's toes"; 
this happens to be a marked feature of English judicial attitude to 
creating new rules, or radically modifying the old, to meet the strange 
and new situations brought about by the quick pace of social changes. 
Lastly, we cannot ignore the possibility - or, indeed, the fact - that 
the different approaches to police illegality can causally be connected 
with the radically different social climates in the two countries. The 
American judicial method is much bolder, but it is inevitable that the 
extent of organised and unorganised crime, the type of police training 
and ethos, the greater geographical area and population and the cultural 
attitude towards the role of the police on the part of both the judiciary 
and the general public must bear influence on the rule making process. 
One further crucial point must be made. Whilst it is legitimate to 
carry out an analysis and comparison of the judicial decisions in the two 
jurisdictions, the emerging picture will remain incomplete if one were to 
ignore the different historical contexts in which the rules have 
evolved: in order to appreciate the rules of evidence, particularly in 
the area of criminal law, the total legal experience must be looked at. 
However, a historical perspective, with the other factors mentioned above, 
can only provide an explanation but cannot justify an inclusionary rule; 
a justification must be provided by an external criterion which, in the 
present context, must be the purpose of the rule. 
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I 
The basic approach adopted in judicial reasoning is, on a first 
impression, that of a peculiarly legal logic which relies upon other 
cases and extracts from them either a principle or a rule relevant and 
applicable to the immediate factual situation. This is what looks like 
a deductive process or drawing of inferences from the existing rules or 
principles; the precise operative sphere of a rule being indeterminate 
or uncertain a judge has some degree of freedom in drawing such inferences 
for the purpose of solving the immediate issue (16). However, contrary 
to the general belief that judges, therefore, do not make law) pre-existing 
propositions or rules do not have fixed and rigid ambit. By the mere 
fact that the principles or the rules are, and have to be, expressed in 
words they are capable of "infinate refinement and qualification" (17). 
In other words, the peculiar legal logic (18) referred to is a mode of 
approach, a mode of thinking and a style of reasoning which is by no 
means free from an element of choice of the relevant facts - though the 
choice is circumscribed by judicial tradition - as well as an element 
of freedom as to the need or the wisdom of overruling the so-called 
'found law' or creating a new rule. Moreover, in exercising this choice 
the •personal equation', that is the subjective belief or viewpoint on 
the matter in issue, of the judge concerned must pl~ some part. Thus, 
even though a court may in an individual case be faced with a wealth of 
authority pointing to one conclusion, the higher courts, and particularly 
the House of Lords, is free to lay down a different 'rule'. The courts 
may have over a period adhered to the general principle that new offences 
should only be created by Parliament and yet boldly proceed to create 
one despite the absence of any authority to support such an act (19). 
This distinguisking of one case from another, or a radical departure 
from an existing rule, could be for a variety of reasons. It may be 
because 'justice' demands that on the facts of the immediate case the 
decision should go one way rather than the other; it may be that the 
irresistible force of the changing political and social trends calls for 
a creative process; a rule may have to be abrogated in order that 
different social objectives are met by a differently constituted rule; 
it may be that the scale of values have changed. However, personal 
idiosyncracies have a very limited part to play, though personal values 
and beliefs as to the purpose of a particular branch of the law must 
influence the reasoning process. 
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So far as rules of evidence are concerned they are, of course, as 
much judge-made as the fundamental principles of our constitutional law 
(20); in neither case have our courts merely declared the pre-existing 
law or "found it" but have actively created it in order effectively to 
achieve some objectives - the wider social and political ones or the 
limited one of determining the guilt of the defendant. However, the 
English judicial method of creating new law via the case decisions is, 
compared with that of the American courts, less activist, less bold, 
more mechanistic and at times, because of the failure to support it by 
theoretical arguments, tending to be irrational. Moreover, it is 
generally denied that judicial law-making - an essential part of any 
legal system - involves reliance upon an effectuating of values either 
derived objectively or subjectively considered important. Nonetheless 
values are used in formulating the law, though the actual process is 
probably an unconscious one. Admittedly, however, of recent times the 
fiction that judges do not make the law has been recognised for what it 
is, for as Lord Hailsham has said: " •••••• there is no such thing as a 
value-free or neutral interpretation of the law •••• Judges, like anybody 
else, are influenced by the economic and political climate of their 
time" (21). That the influence of the values involved in the decision 
making is likely to be in favour of the establishment is implied by 
another extrajudicial statements "Judges are inevitably part of the 
establishment and the establishment's ideas are those which are operating 
in our minds •••••• I think the law has to be part of the establishment" 
(22). Indded, it '-rill be difficult to deny that in the fields such as 
the constitutional or criminal law political beliefs, or a belief as to 
the essential values inhering in the present social system, do pl~ a 
significant part in the judicial lawmaking ( 23). 
The reasons for the fictions that the judges do not make law, or 
that if they make it such law is value-free are not hard to find. Legal 
historians of traditional mould have perpetrated these falsehoods; for 
example Blackstone's announcement that judges are "the depositaries of 
the laws, the living oracles" (24) has been taken to mean that judges 
only ' declare' the la\v in tle sense that they 'find it ' • Indeed, they do 
find it but only in the sense that they make it and until recently (25) 
what has been omitted is an examination and analysis of~ they make it 
and the extent to which 'values' come into the proces~ of formulation of 
rules. 
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A good deal of explanation for the uncritical acceptance of the assertion 
that judges do not make the law and are neutral in their enunciation of 
legal rules lies in the considerable influence exercised on English 
lawyers by the positivist school of jurisprudence. This juristic 
thought has admittedly had its beneficial effect in that it underpinned 
and gave validity and legitimacy to the judge-made law; it fed the 
belief in judicial objectivity and impartiality, and provided a 
psychological basis for the necessary obedience on the part of the 
general public to such law (26). However, it had an unsalutory influence 
in that it led to a self-imposed restrictive judicial role and 
generated and perpetuated the belief that judges must keep the law and 
policy issues, or the legal rules and 'values' di stinctly separate; 
in bringing this about it shifted the attention from the fact that legal 
rules must be purposive and functional. In other words, it gave the 
English courts a mechanical and undynamic mode of problem solving (27). 
The higher appellate courts may, despite a wealth of judicial 
authority against. its view, decide that the irresistible social and 
political forces, on the notion of ':justice•, require an old rule to be 
changed on an entirely new one to be created (28). The judicial 
technique adopted does in a limited way allow this but since the process 
of change must be reasonably imperceptible, decisions may be made to 
appear logical extensions of the previous ones; in reality the new or 
the reformulated rule may encapsulate a new judicial policy or new 
'values' (29). The technique of reasoning by analogy and the freedom 
of selecting and emphasising the fact considered relevant provides the ratio 
with the appearance of a logical structure and thus meets the desired 
objective that the rules must be certain. It, however, masks the source 
of the rule for "every important principle which is developed by 
litigation is in fact at bottom the result of moreorless definitely 
understood views of public policy ••••• the unconscious result of 
instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions •••••• " (30). 
The fact that a series of factual situations offers alternative rulings 
for each of which adequate reasons can be marshalled with equal force 
suggests that the process of judicial law-making involves a degree of 
choice - a choice which is dependent upon value or values that are 
considered necessary to be protected and preserved. 
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Decision making therefore involves an evaluation of ideals, 
though these in any decision may remain inarticulated. National safety, 
sanetity of person and of property, safety of individual morality may 
all be relevant and useful criteria for making a decision, particularly 
at the level of the highest court in a system. Thus, when national 
safety is considered to be in peril, the courts might exercise a less 
strict supervisory role over the police and the executive vis a vis the 
individual; in times of peace different values may take over with a 
resultant<hange in judicial emphasis (31). Similarly, a rule of 
evidence may be changed, or a new one stated, because, again social 
security has to be weighed against individual freedom (32). That when 
doing this the courts use a value-laden approach is difficult to deny, 
and the debate centres only on whether appropriate values or ideals 
have been used at all or, if so, whether an appropriate one has been 
allowed to prevail. In the English context this debate moves further, 
for it raises critisism of a process where the decision maker is 
sometimes not conscious of this reality even though admitting that the 
decision or the rule arrived at may be a sensible or a 'correct' one: 
there is an important difference between arriving at a right place 
blindly or by chance and by a method or route which was selected after 
alternative ones had been considered, for only the latter can inspire 
confidence in a future use of the same route. Judicial decision making 
is not a product of a logical deduction but "where we are applying law 
to human conduct and to conduct of human enterprises, we resort to 
standards or to intuitive application" (33). 
Every 'is' proposition must have an .• ought 1 proposition within it; 
ethical and moral values or standards play an active part in a statement 
of a rule. For a proper application of a rule this fact may be beside 
the point, but for an understanding and explanation and assessment of 
the rules indentification of these 'oughts' is of fundamental importance. 
The positivist approach with its undue emphasis on studying the 1is 1 
propositions and a disregard~r their moral content has contributed to 
a delay in an appreciation of the true reality of judicial rule making 
(34). 
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These value-criteria have recently played a significant part in 
shaping judicial rules in the ijrea of what is traditionally known as 
substantive law. They have led the courts to create new offences out 
of conduct which has been adjudged to be contrary to public morals or 
whioh, in the courts' view, needs to be brought within the purview o£ 
an existing offence (35). In the area of constitutional law, on the 
other hand, the courts in England have taken a general retreat from 
consideration of values and policies; this may be partly because there 
are fewer instances (36) of serious abuse of powers by the executive that 
come before the courts and, therefore, the courts have not experienced 
great urgency for rescuing the individual from executive arbitrariness 
(36). Another reason may be that in England sharp contrast is often 
drawn between judicial and legislative lawmaking with the result that 
greater importance is attached to the nttion that the courts do not 
make law and a virtue is made of the belief that policy matters are for 
Parliament. However, this is not true, though the degree to which 
English courts are prepared to consider policy matters is less than in 
the American Supreme Court which enjoys a true separation of powers (37). 
The absence o.f a written constitution may have contributed to the 
courts' unwillingness to experiment on a bolder scale, especially in the 
area of constitutional rights where the danger o£ the judiciary 'treading 
on the legislaturds toes' is constant. A politically well-defined 
power of the courts to pronounce on the constitutionality of all 
legislative and executive acts must, apart from creating a true doctrine 
of the separation of powers, lead to a freer judicial law-making; a 
written tripartite allocation of the functions of the state can be an 
incentive to judicial activism. In England, with an unwritten constitution, 
judicial control of the executive or Parliament has to be more subtle 
for fear of causing a feud between the two institutions. In any event, 
the political history of any country must inevitably affect the 'role' 
of the courts in their relationship with the other branches of the state 
and in England the 'low profile' of the courts is further accentuated by 
a constitution in an unwritten form (38). This reality is the important 
factor which brings out in sharp relief the distinctive judicial approach 
in a country with a written constitutional rights, for the courts in 
such a situation are protected by a charter which demands of them a 
critical examination of all the executive or legislative acts by reference 
to permanent criteria- criteria which are neither of the executive's 
nor of the judiciary's making. 
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In America the Supreme Court is provided with a written Bill of Rights 
which offers a number of concepts woxded with sufficient imprecision 
and flexibility to be susceptible to a varying degree of judicial 
interpretation.and, therefore, capable of accommodating values considered 
to be universal in all free societies. Open-ended concepts like 
"unreasonable search and seizure" - \d th its underlying support! ve 
concept of the "right of privacy" -J the "due l,:t'ocess of law" - potentially 
capable of including any procedural sufaguard~icially considered 
necessary in a adversary system -,the "privilege against self-incrimina-
tion" and "equal protection of law" can all receive different interpret-
ation at different times on the question of the exact content of values 
they carry. A written constitutional document proclaiming exact rights 
and limitations of the individual and the government is thus a fruitful 
source of values necessary for judicial law-making ( 39). In England 
absence of such permanent concepts is bound to be an important factor 
in the lack of creativity; there is no basic law with which government 
or institutional acts must not conflict (40). 
There is an additional r~ason for the different judicial attitudes 
to issues involving policy considerations. The fact that an Amer~can 
judge is educated and trained to pose policy questions before he reaches 
the status of a judge, the fact that members of the Supreme Court are 
not invariably recruited from the ranks of practitioners but also from 
the academic world who have often excelled in legal philosophy (41), 
the fact that there is less blindfolded adherence to the doctrine of 
stare decisis in American jurisprudence have also been influential on 
the radically different approach taken by the American Supreme Court. 
II 
In England the rules of evidence are classified as such in the 
sense that they belong to the category of procedural rules and not to 
that of the substantive law. This traditional groupings of all law into 
the substantive and the procedural may have its value for educational 
purposes but if accepted as sacrosanct it can be misleading and 
inhibitive of intellectual appreciation of the true significance of certain 
rules of evidence and procedure which lie at the heart of substantive 
individual rights; 
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it can also lead to a failure to appreciate the purpose and social 
objectives of certain rules of substantive law. Although strictly 
speaking rules of procedure are dervied from practical experience and 
they provide the method by which rules of substantive law are to be 
applied or enforced, rules of evidence are to a considerable extent 
different from them because, unlike the procedural rules, their 
formulation often takes into account a number of policy matters and 
values (42). Moreover, such a compartmentalisation of legal rules 
produces the tendency to ignore the fact that rights conferred by 
substantive law must have a substructive of procedural and evidential 
rules for their practical validity and effectiveness, that historically 
many a right has been the outcome of an operation of procedural rules, 
and that in the case of fundamental constitutional rights of the 
individual their violation raises the question of evidential rules as 
much as that of substantive law; it also raises the issue of the extent 
to which the judiciary must undertake an effective control and 
supervision of government bodies and whether the aggrieved individual 
be left to pursue his civil remedies. 
Over the last one hundred years a great number of rules of evidence 
has been changed and radical reforms have taken place. Most of these 
reforms - and the arguments of the reformers - have been aimed towards 
the purpose of facilitating a convenient, economic and effective 
determination of the guilt or innoncence of the accused; the single 
criterion adopted for the admissibility of evidence has generally been 
its 'relevance' to this objective. In certain areas of this branch of 
law 'public policy' - a euphemism for the inarticulated but 'felt' values 
of society- has played part (43). Whatever few opportunities that 
have recently occurred th~ judicial response has been of total restraint. 
Thus, as recently as 1965 the House of Lords took the view that creation 
of any new exception to the general hearsay rule must be left to 
Parliament, even though the issue involved was not of a particularly 
sensitive nature to produce a hostile reaction on the part of the 
legislature if a new exception had been created. What was feared was 
that any new exception would be "judicial legislation with a vengeance 
in an attempt to introduce reform of the law of evidence which if needed 
can properly be dealt with only by the legislature" (44), 
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and that although common law must be developed to meet changed conditions 
"it must be by the development and application of fundamental principles" 
and that it is against public policy to create uncertainty in the law 
by assuming a more activist judicial function (45). Again, this refusal 
to take up a bold role in judicial law-making is explained by the 
factors generally commented upon in the preceding pages, more particularly 
the courts' strong adherence to the doctrine of judicial precedent. It 
is perhaps unfortunate that no legislative direction exists for 
requiring the higher courts to develop rules of evidence in response to 
the needs of justice and practical experience. 
The traditional classification of the rules of evidence into a 
category of secondary importance has received further philosophical 
support from the positivist theorists. Thus, in a modern important 
philosophical work of Professor Hart (46) the theoretical model of 
law is divided into the 'primary' and 'secandary' rules and the rules of 
evidence belong to the latter class. The secondary rules "specify the 
w~s in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, 
introduced, eliminated, varied and the fact of their-violation 
conclusively determined" (47). The secondary rules in this model are 
anc:illary to the primary ones which "lay down standards of behaviour 
and are rules of obligation, that is, rules that impose duties" (48). 
Such a treatment of rules of evidence reinforces and provides support 
for a judicial approach which fails to discern the close link between 
the two types of rules. 
A theoretical approach which casts rules of evidence in the role 
of adjuncts to the primary rules is misleading in the sphere of 
constitutionally defined rights of the individual and the restrictions 
on the governmental powers. In this area the rules of evidence may lie 
at the "centre of a legal system" (49) and, therefore, must be based on 
the 'values' related to justice, morality and public policy - and on 
the fundamental values derived from the political nature of the society. 
A discussion which accords the same significance to all the rules of 
evidence and groups them into a single category is questionable. Rules 
of evidence are not of a uniform class. Certain types of evidence are 
excluded because of their irrelevance or because, as in the case of 
hears~ evidence, they are unreliable. 
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Many other rules of evidence are founded on public policy considerations 
(50). Evidence may be relevant and of a highly probative value, but 
it may be excluded because it is considered essential to do so in the 
interest of certain fundamental values. Thus, for example, the exacting 
standard of burden of proof on the prosecution and the exclusionary 
rule for involuntary confessions are based on certain values considered 
as essential parts of the political nature of English society and the 
adversary system that goes with it. Similarly in issues involving 
'constitutional powers' of the police the moral and political postulates 
behind such powers and limitations cannot be ignored. 
III 
In Kuruma v R the ~ornmittee of the Privy Council said!'rn their 
Lordships' opinion, when it is a question of the admission of evidence 
strictly it is not whether the method by which is was obtained is 
tortious but excusable, but whether what has been obtained is relevant 
to the issue being tried" and "if the evidence is relevant, it is 
admissible and the court is not concerned with how it is obtained", and 
that ina criminal case the judge has a discretion to disallow the 
evidence 11if it would operate unfairly against an accused" (51). As 
already discussed in Chapter Two "unfairly" has not been defined or 
explained and in the Northern Ireland case of R v Murphy 
Lord MacDermott, L.C.J., did not relate it to the prejudice the accused 
might suffer nor to the conduct of the police, but to "the position of 
the accused, the nature of the investigation, and the gravity or 
otherwise of the suspected offence" (52). 
In neither of these cases did the court undertake any discussion 
of the justification for the inclusionary rule. In both cases the 
particular circumstances of the case raised the issue of national security 
and, therefore, the political and social conditions may have influenced 
the courts in formulating the rule. However, both judgments are 
singularly unhelpful in an analysis of the relevant values which on 
balance favoured the rule. It could be argued that in the particular 
social conditions that prevail in England, and especially the probable 
1!£i of not a very serious amount of deliberate police violations of 
the basic liberties of the individual, the greater sensitivity of the 
police to a critical public reaction to any disregard for the law, the 
fact that relative to American police the unarmed British police ·is less 
of a bully, the greater - justified or not - public and judicial 
- 149 -
confidence in the police organisation may be the factors which have led 
to less urgency and need to use a rule of evidence for the purpose of an 
additional judicial control of the police. In other words a balancing 
of the interest of society in ensuring the conviction or acquittal of an 
accused person has hitherto come out superior to the society's interest 
that a law enforcer should not also be a law breaker in carrying out 
his duties. 
However, because the inclusionary rule has been arrived at without 
any theoretical underpinning it inspires no confidence. Merely because 
evidence is relevant is not a sufficient justification for its admission 
nor the fact that other jurisdictions admit such evidence. Nevertheless 
the inclusion~ rule is sound for it can be the outcome of a number of 
factors;which, in the present social set up, support it. 
The doctrine of 'rule of law' is generally considered to be at the 
core of the political system of a free society; such a society in order 
to remain free must accept the doctrine as one of its major contral planks. 
In England it has been a $Ource of a good deal of our constitutional law, 
developed by the courts during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
and is, like the 'due process of law', sufficiently generalised to 
provide a number of values and principles considered fundamental to our 
system of law and political liberties. Dicey, in his classic exposition 
of the constitutional law, pointed out that one important aspect of 
this doctrine is that arrest of an individual must be by a 'due process 
of law' (53), that the 'd~e process of law' asserts a distinction 
between arbitrary andlegal process, and that all persons are subject to 
the same law. The problem, in the context of the law of evidence, is 
whether this notion requires of the courts not to~ the fruits of 
police illegality - deliberate or accidental, civil or criminal in 
nature. It is usual to assume that the doctrine is relevant to the rules 
of substantive law, though there is no reason why it should not be equally 
an effective criterion for modelling and applying necessary rules of 
evidence for contending with police illegality, especially when such 
police acts cause a denial of an important law encapsulated within the 
doctrine. 
- 150 -
It is an important principle of free societies that ends do not justify 
the means -a ~rinciple which lies at the base of the doctrine of 
'rule of law~and it could be argued that repeated and deliberate serious 
acts of police illegality for the purpose of seeking evidence violate 
this principl~~st lead to an exclusionary rule. In England this has 
not been so, though it is submitted that any such violations, 
irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence being investigated 
(54), must bring into operation the exclusionary discretion in favour 
of the defendant. 
There could be various reasons for the failure of the doctrine of 
'rule of law' to influence the formulation of an inclusionary rule. 
Firstly, it appears to have gone unnoticed that the various judicial 
pronouncements in the Supreme Court refer to the police, or the 
government, committing a 'crime' in illegally seizing the evidence, and 
that the Court should not be using the fruits of illegality. This 
emphasises the criminal nature of the police acts, and in considering 
the efficacy or adequacy of the alternative remedies the Court has 
discussed both the probability of the officer being prosecuted for the 
crime and the civil damages for trespass. In England any excessive 
exercise of the search powers may ground a civil action for damages but 
is not usually a criminal offence. Apart from a trespassary act 
involved in an illegal search, no such element exists in those cases 
where police acts are described as 'improper' (55). Therefore, a police 
illegality may not appear as serious as is generally the case in 
America, not to mention the obvious fact that the nature of police acts 
of !~legality or impropriety in that country is often extremely serious 
from the point of view of individual liberties. The result is that in 
England the factual situations do not come as much of a shock to the 
judiciary and, therefore, there is much less pressure - or aimost none -
for a deterrent rule of evidence. Moreover, the reported instances of 
police illegality have been few and far between, though one can only 
speculate on the incidence in Northern Ireland in the present political 
turmoil and almost civil war situation (56). 
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Secondly, the police in England are much more amenable to judicial 
criticism or admonitions on their conduct and more likely to conform to 
the requirements set by the courts for what is a "fair arld just" 
procedure before thertrial (57). To this extent English courts have 
better informal control over the police. American judges are not so 
fortunate; the police there have less regard for judicial holdings or 
judicial strictures on their conduct. Senior American police officers 
do not feel inhibited from making open comments, and thus making their 
views known publicly, on the undesirability of certain judge made 
laws (58). It is also the fact that the scale of America's crime 
problem is phenomenal compared with that in England. 
Thirdly, as already argued, the absence of a written constitution 
enshrining the fundamental laws - thus creating a dual sovereignty 
between the legislature and the Supreme Court - means that there are no 
criteria like the 'due process of law' readily available and pressing 
upon the courts. A \otritten constitution by its nature must produce 
focal points on which judicial reasoning centres. Admit~edly, English 
courts have emphasised the criteria of "unfairness to the accused" 
but it is almost impossible to state whether this is an alternative for 
'due process of law' or whether it is in any way meaningful (59). 
Lastly, it is submitted that a complete picture of the two 
judicial approaches to illegally obtained evidence must take account of 
the judiciary's perception of the police and their role in a criminal 
trial. In both countries the courts have a total commitment to the 
ideal of legality and the rule of law, though this may not be so complete 
in relation to police conduct in keeping the society orderly. The 
police training, and the nature of the police role within the social 
structure must result in the incukation in the police of values more 
akin to a bureaucratic organisation. Police organisations, unlike the 
legal institutions, are bureaucratic institutions and involve dedication 
to the ideals and objectives of the organisation. As Skolnick says: 
"Internal controls over policeman reinforce the importance of 
administrative and craft values over civil libertarian values. These 
controls are more likely to emphasise efficiency as a goal rather than 
legality, or, more precisely, legality as a means to the end of 
efficiency" (6~). 
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As this writer points out, a bureaurocratic organisation encourages 
and promotes efficiency and initiative rather than a disciplined 
adherence to legal requirements whereas the rule of law requires 
complaince with the law by institutions and individuals. A 
sociological analysis of the British police is likely to reveal that 
it is less of a bureaucratic organisation than its American counterpart 
at the federal or state level; it probably will also show that police 
in Britain more effectively internalise the requirement of an 
exemplary role and are more concerned with maintaining public 
confidence and faith in its work (61). 
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However, it is possible, if not highly probable, that the courts in 
England view the police as belonging to that part of the social structure 
concerned with the enforcement of the law or, more specifically, as a 
part of the judicial system. This the police obviously are not, and 
although the validity of the suggested hypothesis has not been 
empirically tested it is submitted that it accords with the real life 
observation of the role the police play in a criminal trial and the 
empathy observable between the judiciary and the police. This view 
also accords with the fact that generally the courts do not treat the 
police as part of the executive (62). 
Thus, many factors - legal and factual - explain the fact that 
the 'rule of law" doctrine has played no part in the courts' deliberations 
Ol\the inclusionary rule for the illegally obtained evidence. Against 
the background painted above an inclusionary rule is almost inevitable 
in England, for an exclusionary rule would go against the English social 
setting. However, since the courts have not felt that a total reliance 
on the extra-legal pressures on the police is wise a potentially effective 
judicial method of control of police conduct has been provided in the 
pragmatic exclusionary discretion. This rider to the inclusionary rule 
is sound and sensible for it can take into account the fact that police 
violation of the individual rights may be deliberate or mistaken, it 
may be so blatantly arbitrary as to evoke a sense of 'shock', or it may 
be deliberate but isolated and negligible in the greater interest of 
society. If wisely used, this discretion need not allow an obviously 
guilty person to go free because the constable has blundered. It can 
deal with the changed social realities without the courts having to over-
rule or abrogate the main inclusionary rule. 
However, in relation to the formulation of the statement of the 
'principle' for exercise of the discretion that the rule is weakest and 
so worded as to be meaningless. 
~he main rule being inclusionary the exclusionary discretion is bound 
to be value-laden. A discretion to exclude, in order to be reasoubly 
certain in its operation and to inspire confidence, must be based on 'ought' 
prepositions. 
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In the case of police illegality any exercise of this discretion must 
be related to the type of police conduct, that is, the method used by 
the police for the extraction of evidence and any other factor relevant 
to their conduct. It may be that the factual situation would indicate 
e11,de.,ce 
that admitting the trustworthyA- often of tangible nature- would be a 
denial of 'due process of law' to the accused or that it would be just 
not a 'due process'. Instead of stating their discretion in this form 
the courts have linked the exercise of this discretion with "unfairness 
to the accused" which according to the Privy Council is illustrated by 
a 'trick' on the part of the police. Such a meaning of 'unfairness to 
the accused' equates the adversary system of criminal trial with the 
sporting theory of justice; it is something which accords with, as 
:Bentham criticised, "the foxhunter's reason". Such a statement of the 
reason for, and the circumstances when, judicial discretion would be 
exercised is devoid of any rationality and suspiciously relies upon the 
mystic of the law for its acceptance (6~). 
In all probability :Bentham would have supported an inclusionary 
rule for, as Professor Hart has pointed out (64), utilitarianism has 
been significantly effective in "ridding the law of much irrational 
and oppressive rubbish; but this same philosphy put forWard as a sole 
criterion of the morality of legal institutions has a darker side. This 
shows itself in its willingness to make negotiable, for the sake of 
general social security, protections which many would consider to be the 
fundamental rights of all individuals against the State". 'l'h.is means 
that higher values which influence judicial rule making are irrelevant 
and on that assumption the exclusionary discretion would probably have 
been unnecessary. Whatever may have been his attitude to the existence 
of this discretion there can be no doubt that "unfair to the accused" as 
a criterion would have received the same brutal treatment as did many 
other notions and would have been classified as "passion-kindling 
appellatus" and an "impostor tenn". Indeed, we can go further than 
Bentham. Indefensible as this expression is from the Benthamite point 
of view, the words "unfair" do not even preserve that mystification which 
he so rightly deprecated: the expression "unfair to the accused" can serve 
no purpose because it is meaningless. 
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The £unction o£ words is to convey in£ormation about facts or to 
communicate the idea or values. Thus, 'due process of law' is a value· 
loaded concept which embodies a number of procedural safeguards which 
distinguish an adversary system £rom an inquisitorial one and also 
the total social system £rom that of a totalitarian one. It is a 
statement that procedural safeguards are at the heart of criminal 
proceedings (66) and are an indispensable means for making individual 
rights and liberties effective. Indeed, it is possible to argue that 
rules of evidence in a criminal trial are an expression o£ the 'due 
process o£ law', and this is how American judges have elaborated the 
exclusionary rule. Thus, the concept has been used to deal with the 
police procedure after the arrest of the accused. In no way, however, 
has the Supreme Court interpreted the concept to mean a sporting theory 
of justice, though the language used to express the values - e.g. 
"civilised standards" - has been sufficiently objective to provide 
consistency £or £urther use. At a comparative level "un£air to the 
accused" is meaningless in the context o£ a criminal trial. It is 
possible to substitute "prejudicial to the accused" for "un£air to 
the accused", but then use o£ a 'trick' could hardly cause any prejudice 
to the accused. 
Alternatively, "justice" may be a substitute £or "unfair" but, 
again, there is no indication in the courts' judgments that this is what 
is meant or, if that is the meaning, there is no discussion of the 
meaning "unjust" in the context of admissibility o£ illegally obtained 
evidence. The result is that the principles on which discretion to 
exclude will be exercised remain unstated. The primary purpose of a 
criminal trial is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, 
but in doing this the adversary system of trial insists that this objective 
should not be achieved at any cost and that certain methods of extracting 
evidence involve a much greater cost to the society than that involved 
in letting a criminal go £ree. The discretion to exclude enables the 
courts to determine when this point is reached; it enables a judge to 
decide not what he ~ do as a matter of logic but what he should do 
(67) to maintain and safeguard some essential values and purposes of the 
judicial system·. 
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As always, this discretion is a corrective to the imbalance which in 
practice develops between the two objectives, that is to acertain the 
guilt or innocence of the accused and at the same time to ensure that 
police or government methods do not become arbitrary or lawless. As in 
the use of words like 'nice' or 'beautiful' some element of subjectivity 
is inevitable in delimiting the elements of 'due process of law'; but 
as in the former some minimum objective criteria can be agreed and the 
police method of extraction of evidence may be 'right~ or 'wrong' 
independently of one's feeling about it. \~t is essential is that the 
statement of the criteria or principles for the exercise of judicial 
discretion must be reasonably clear and meaningful. If a stable English 
civilisation requires more certainty and consistency in the legal rules 
and their practical application than is the case in America (68), then 
this can only be achieved by use of concepts whose meaning is clear and 
whose function in the judicial process is well understood. As it 
happens it is the 'unstable' American civilisation which has produced 
theoretically well-reasoned and meaningful concepts for use in dealing 
with police illegality or impropriety in extraction af evidence. "We 
may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can 
identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure they are 
sufficient or whether we are applying them consistently" (69). Until 
we know the principles on which admissible evidence wil~ be excluded, 
the purpose or the reasons for the exclusion will remain unkno\~. 
Definition of a concept or principle may often be impossible or even 
not useful, but an explanation is always possible (70); in this the 
present state of our law on the discretion to exclude has yet to make 
a start. 
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NOTES· 
1. In the Supreme Court's words, "the government". 
2. In America a change in the federal constitution is subject to 
an elaborate procedure. An amendment can be proposed only by a 
two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress, the amendment 
is then ratified by the legislatures in at least three-fourths of 
the states. 
3. See Miranda v Arizona, supra Ch.4. 
4. The Supreme Court has not stated this in so many words, but a 
conclusion to this effect is obvious and unavoidable. 
5. For a discussion of the privilege in England see J.D. Heydon in 
(1971) 87 L.Q.R.214. Being a common law doctrine, in England it can 
be whittled away by statutory obligation to answer ~uestions; see, 
for example, Commissioner of Customs and Excmse v Harz and Power 
(1967) 1A.C. 760 and other cases discussed by Heydon op.cit. 
6. See Wigmore on Evidence (1940) vol.VIII; Bentham's criticism of the 
privilege in "Rationale of Judicial Evidence" (ed. Bowning). Also 
cf. Donahue "An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During 
Police Interrogation", 73 Yale, L.J. 1000- the 'real' trial takes 
place at the police st~tion and, therefore, just as a plea of 
'guilty' is generally not acceptable from an accused without a 
counsel so with confessions made at the police station. 
1. Discussed in Ch.4 supra. 
8. Though this would not be the case on the basis of Bentham's 
'utilitarianism'. 
9. In Wolf v Colorado, 338 U.S.25 (1949) the Supreme Court seriously 
doubted the conBitutional origin of the Weeks' exclusionary rule. 
10. See note 6. 
11. 232 U.S.383 (1914). 
12. Cmnd. 4991 (1972). 
13. See note 6. The expressionsin quotes are Bentham's. Admittedly 
Bentham' a severe criticism related to the privilege·~ as exercised 
in the court; whether he would have taken the same view of the 
privilege.· being exercised during police questioning (as embodied 
in the American Fifth Amendment and the English Judges Rules ) is 
a matter for speculation, though Bentham did protest at 
"confounding interrogation with torture". Cf \-ligmore's view on 
police interrogation of suspects~ " any sJBtem of administration 
which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory 
self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally 
thereby", because it leads to bullying, torture and laziness and 
breeds a tendency to shut one's eyes to the limits of one's legal 
powers. See note 6 above, Section 2251. For a practising lawyer's 
view as to the privilege· of silence see Lord Shawcross in "Police 
and Public in Great Britain" (1965) 51 A.B.A.J. 225 cited in "The 
Rights of the Accused" (ed. s.s. Nagel, 1972)& the privilege 
could not be suppor1ifsll: "on ethical grounds". 
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14. Admittedly when directing his criticism against the privi.lege Bentham 
was using what he called the "expository" technique; his crude 'moral' 
principle of utility was to be used for the purpose of testing the 
soundness of the aim of proposed legislation. But if judicial lawmaking 
were not to be treated any differently from the statute law, then could 
not the principle of utility be applied to a judicially created rule? 
On this reasoning the privilege may have to be retained - assuming that 
a majority of people would feel happier in having certain fundamental 
values preserved even at the cost of permitting some guilty persons to 
go free. 
15. It is submitted that it is unsound and misleading to assume that because 
United Kingdom lacks a written constitution individual rights and 
liberties (freedom from unlawful arrest, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
speech etc.) are any less constitutional in nature. In a free society 
such rights are constitutional, whether enshrined in a written charter 
or resting on common law. 
16. Considerable body of literature exists on the method of judicial 
reasoning. See, e.g., J. Wisdom 11Gods" from Proceedings of Arist. Society, 
extracted in Lloyd's "Introduction to Jurisprudence" (3rd. ad.) at 
p.798; E.H. Levi "An Introduction to Legal Reasoning" extracted Lloyd 
op.cit. at p.806; G. Gottlieb "The Logic of Choice" (1968 ed.); 
o.w. Holmes "The Common Law" (1968 ad.), R. Cross "Precedent in English 
Law" (1961 ed.), Wasserstrom "The Judicial Decision" (1961 ed.); R. Cross 
(1966) 82 L.Q.R.203, B. Cardozo "The Nature of the Judicial Process" 
(1921 ed.). 
17. See 0, Lloyd 11Reason and Logic in the Common Lawn (1948) 64 L.Q.R. 468. 
He says that the courts "sometimes employ language to indicate that they 
are making logical deductions when they are in fact doing no more than 
applying their sense of reasonableness", i.e. the courts refer to "that 
pattern of sentiment which inheres in a particular community or some 
section of it", at p.475. 
18. "Legal reasoning characteristically depends on precedent and analogy 
and makes an appeal less to universal logical principles than to certain 
basic assumptions peculiar to the la\'IY'er". It is a rational mode of 
persuasion H.L.A. Hart. 
19. For example see Shaw v D.P.P. [19627 A.C.220 and the cases discussed in 
(1948) 64 L.Q.R. 468 supra note 17: 
20. Indeed, much of the English constitutional law was developed by the courts 
during the 16th. and 17th. centuries. 
21. The Listner, 6 June, 1974 at p.720. 
22. Lord Devlin in a television interview cited by A. Patterson in (1974) 
1 Br.Jou. of Law and Society at p.135. 
23. For some of these myths see "The Lawyers and the Courts" (1967) by 
B. Abel-Smith and Stevens, pub. Heinemann. Of course, one must refer to 
the remarkable work in this field done by the American and Scandinavian 
Realists. 
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24. Blackstone's "Commentaries" vol.1 at p.70. On this declaratory theory 
of law Lord Reid has extra-judicially commented: ;But we do not believe 
in fairy tales any more. So \1e must accept the fact that for better or 
for worse judges do make law •••••• ," (1972) The Jou. of S.P.T. of Law 
at p.22. It has been said that this belief leSrls to 'humbug' "for 
judges frequently purport to find the results in the application of logic 
to precedent, while in reality they sometimes find the results to a 
considerable extent in their own ideas about public policy". (1961) 
61 Col. L.Rev.201 "The Future of Judge-made Public La\1 in England: 
A Problem of Practical Jurisprudence" by K. C. Davis. 
25. Particularly since the wri tinge of the American Realist School beginning 
with 0. W. Holmes who emphasised the inarticulate convictions of the 
judges. 
26. Judges assume that the substantive law is a scientific body of principles 
because •If courts - or at least persons who deal with courts - did not 
so firmly believe that justice was dispersed according to the inexorable 
dictates of impersonal logical science, our machinery for the 
administration of law would not exist as we knol>r it today. Just as an 
individual must cherish dreams and illusions, so also must his judicial 
insti tutionsn. Thurman Arnold "Substantive Law and Procedure" ( 1932) 
45 Yale L. Jou. 617. 
27. Significantly the sociological jurisprudence- the pragmatic school of 
thought- has had very little influence on our judicial thinking, 
certainly at conscious level. 
28. Especially after the 1966 Practice Direction of the Bouse of Lords 
!19667 1 W.L.R. 12~4. But cf. Conway v Rimmer fl96~/ A.C. 910, 
Knulier v D.P.P. L197~7 2 ALL E.R. 898. "Judges must move with society", 
per Lord Hailsham supra note 21. 
29. The usual technique is that of case by case method or reasoning by analogy. 
On the 'values' as part on the basis of the rules see R.W. Dias "The Value 
of a Value-Study of Lawn (1965) 28 M.L.R. 397. 
30. 0.\-1. Holmes nThe Common Law" ( 1961 ed.) at p. 35. See also Cardozo, J. 
in "The Nature of the Judicial Process" (1921 ad.) at p.167: "Other 
forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, 
the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which 
make the mann, including a judge. 
31. This may explain Elias v Passmore (193~7 2 K.B. 164 though its reasoning 
would still remain faulty. See also Liversidge v Anderson f194~7A.C.206. 
32. See, for example, Lord Denning in Bratty v A.G. for N.I. £196~ A.C.386 
at 411: "The old notion that only the dt'ence can raise a defence of 
insanity is now gone". 
33. R. Pound "The Theory of Judicial Decision" (1923) 36 Harv. L.Rev. 940. 
See also Wasserstrom "The Judicial Decision" (1961 ed.) asp. pp. 
p.102-105. Pound's statement was not directed at English judges but 
was only a statement of what actually happens. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
31. 
38. 
39. 
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See o.w. Holmes and Cardozo supra note 30. See also Hart in 71 Harv. L. 
Rev. 593 who, as a positivist, draltrs a distinction between legal 
concepts with settled meaning and "perumbra of debatable cases in which 
words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out", and 
that in this latter types of cases policy considerations are taken into 
account. Hart admits that 'values' and 'policies' do form a source of 
law, see his "The Concept of Law"(1961) Ch.VII, and the debate between 
Hart and Fuller extracted in Lloyd "Introduction to Jurisprudence" 
)1972) pp. 240-248. 
Shaw v D.P.P._Ll9627A.C.220 Knuller v D.P.P. fl97~72All.E.R. 898, 
Kamara v R. Ll972~2All.E.R. 1242, R v Button and Swain LT96~7 A.C.591. 
i.e. apart from the sphere of administrative la\-1 where disquiet has been 
felt as to the judicial temerity, see K~C. Davis 61 Col. L.Rev. 201 
and H.\'i.R. vlade (1962) L.Q.R. 201. 
According to Professor Wade if the belief that only Parliament can make 
law were to be accepted then "we are ignoring the lessons of history 
as well as subtracting a vital element from the judicial function"; the 
question is not \-rhether judges should make law, but~ law they should 
make, supra note 36. See also Evershed, M.R. "The Judicial Process in 
Twentieth Century", 61 Col. L.Rev.761, R.B. Stevens "The Role of a 
Final Appeal Court" 28 H.L.R.509. 
B. Abel-Smith and Stevens point out that the relatively narrow role 
played by English courts in public law is attributable partly to the 
political upheavals of the 17th. century, see Ch.1 of "Lawyers and the 
Courts" (1967). 
For example, see Brown v Board of Education, 349 U.S.294 (1955) -
segregation of schools unlawful under the concept of 'equal protection 
of the laws'; Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S.436 (1966)- accused must be 
offered counsel before police questioning on the basis of the 5th. Am. 
privilege, the 6th. Amendment and the ~ue process of law' clause; see 
also Louis L. Jaffe "English and American Judges as Lawmakers" (1969) 
Clarendon Press. 
40. Though this is debatable. Are the constitutional law and the conventions 
not basic? Is the exclusionary rule in relation to involuntary 
confessions not basic? They are not 'basic' but only in the sense that 
they can be abrogated by a simple Act of Parliament without any special 
procedure. Lord Radcliffe, as if bemoaning the lack of a written charter 
has said: " ••••• if the law is to stand for the future, as it has stood 
for the past, as a sustaining pillar of societ~ it must find some point 
of reference more universal than its own in tarnal logic" oi ted in L. J a.£fe 
op.cit. For a recent call for a charter of fundamental rights see 
"English Law - The New Dimension" Sir Leslie Scarman's Hamlyn lectures 
(pub. 1975 by Stevens). 
41. 
42. 
43. 
45· 
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See L. Jaffe, supra note 39. The report of "Justice" titled "The 
Judiciary" (1972) at pp. 21 - 25 suggests that judicial appointments 
in England should also be from the outstanding academics, though this 
has had no positive response. Lord Reid has supported this idea, see 
"The Judge as Law Maker" (1972) 12 The Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law" at p.22. In America Felix Frankfurter and William 
Douglas - two outstanding judicial figures - come from the academic world. 
It has been said that the dividing line between \'lhat is procedural and 
what is substantive is a movable one. "The difference is only in 
attitude" of an examiner of the law, Thurman Arnold "Substantive Law and 
Procedure~' ( 1932) 45 Yale L.J .617. 
For axamples, see the rule on the compellability of the accused's wife to 
give evidence; marital privilege; legal professional privilege; privilege 
as regards matters of state interest; exclusion of confessional statements, 
the Judges' Rules. 
MYers v D.P.P. £19627 A.C.1001 per Lord Hodson, italics supplied; and of. 
Lord Pearce's judgment at p.1041: "As new situations arise (the court) 
adaPs its practice to deal with the situation in accordance with the basic 
and established principles which lie beneath the practice. To exalt the 
practice above the principle would be to surrender to formalism". Also 
Lord Donovan at p.1047 -'in the field of procedural law the common law 
must be adapted by the judges". Result of this decision was the 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1965. Cf. Conway v Rimmer £196~7A.C.910. 
Per Lord Reid at pp. 1021 - 1022. Italics are mine. And see K.C. Davis 
"The Function of Judgemade Public Law in England: A Problem of Practical 
Jurisprudence", 61 Col.L.Rev. 201 - English judges see their task as 
that of "bricklayers and too much neglecting the architecture". 
46. See his "The Concept of Law" (1961) esp. Ch.V. 
47. Ibid at p.92 Italics supplied. 
48. Lloyd "Introduction to Jurisprudence" (1972) at p.169. 
49. To choose Hart's words in "The Concept of Law" ch.V. 
specifically mention rules of evidence as part of the 
but they must be part of his "rules of adjudication". 
secondary rule see L. J. Cohen in (1962) 71 Mind. 
50. Supra note 43. 
51. {19527 1'All.E.R. 236 at 238, discussed at p.57 supra. 
52. (l9627 N.I.L.R. 138 at 149• 
Hart does not 
secondary rules, 
On Hart's 
53. See Dicey "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution" 
(1959 ed.).Dicey's discussion in this respect was in the context of 
administrative law. See also the Law Commission's First Programme (1965) 
"English Law, in its history and substance, exhibits a great respect for 
both the concept and the application of the rule of law". 
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54. i.e. despite the emphasis placed by Lord MacDermott on the gravity of the 
offence being investigated. As to 'the ends justifying the means". See 
Cmnd. 4901 (1972)- a report of the Committee of Privy Councillors on 
interrogation in depth (wall-standing, hooding, subjecting suspects to 
deliberately manufactured noise, restriction to a bread and water diet 
etc.) by the army in Northe~1 Ireland. Lord Gardiner dissenting from 
the majority and described these methods as "secret, illegal, not morally 
justifiable and alien to traditions of the greatest democracy in the 
world". 
55. E.g. where the Judges' Rules have been ignored by the police or where 
they have acted as agent provocateurs. 
56. There can be instances of ~legal' search by non-police·government 
authorities, for example by V.A.T. officials. See the report in "The 
Guardian" of February 27, 1975 entitled "Woman terrorised by V.A.T. 
officer", which, if true, indicates a blatant disregard of the law on 
powers of search. As to telephone tapping by the police the Home 
Secretary can authorise this, usually done in cases of suspected espionage, 
'busting' the criminal gahgs, to apprehend escaped prisoners, or in 
connection with other serious offences. See the Report of the Committee 
of Privy Councillors (1957) Cmnd. 28~ and Lord Devlin in "Criminal 
Prosecution in England" (1960) at p.57 "I doubt whether in the end the 
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